مواقف في ساحات العدالة

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مكتبة الطيب مضوي شيقوق عبد الغني(الطيب شيقوق)
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02-10-2009, 05:30 PM

الطيب شيقوق
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تاريخ التسجيل: 01-31-2005
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مكتبة سودانيزاونلاين
Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة (Re: الطيب شيقوق)

    الاخ ود الزين

    تامل في المقطع المقتبس ده
    Quote:
    in view of the new constitution fundamental human rights were not created by the state but are eternal and universal institutions common to all mankind and antedating the state and founded upon natural law unlike the old constitution based on legal posititivism the new constituition has a natural law of foundation the supra constitutional character of natural law is clearly expressed in its preamble declaring that this ( the principle of democracy ) is a universal principle of mankind upon which this constitution is founded we reject and revoke all constitutions , laws , ordinances and prescripts in conflict herewith the sanctity of natural law is carried a step further by conferring upon the courts , especially the supreme court the power of juridical review fundamental rights derived from natural law are written into the constitution and the constitution provides the court with power to review any act violating those rights the supreme court is popularly called " the guardian of the Constitution " and itis in fact not unreasonable to regard the supreme court as a bulwark of human rights
    .


    تصور ود الزين اخوى الابداع القانوني المتكامل دعني انقلك لتصفح هذا اللنك الذي عرف فيه هذا المصطلح الفقهي :-


    Quote: founded upon natural law unlike the old constitution based on legal posititivism the new constituition has a natural law


    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/

    What is legal positivisim?

    Quote: Legal positivism is the thesis that the existence and content of law depends on social facts and not on its merits. The English jurist John Austin (1790-1859) formulated it thus: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.” (1832, p. 157) The positivist thesis does not say that law's merits are unintelligible, unimportant, or peripheral to the philosophy of law. It says that they do not determine whether laws or legal systems exist. Whether a society has a legal system depends on the presence of certain structures of governance, not on the extent to which it satisfies ideals of justice, democracy, or the rule of law. What laws are in force in that system depends on what social standards its officials recognize as authoritative; for example, legislative enactments, judicial decisions, or social customs. The fact that a policy would be just, wise, efficient, or prudent is never sufficient reason for thinking that it is actually the law, and the fact that it is unjust, unwise, inefficient or imprudent is never sufficient reason for doubting it. According to positivism, law is a matter of what has been posited (ordered, decided, practiced, tolerated, etc.); as we might say in a more modern idiom, positivism is the view that law is a social construction. Austin thought the thesis “simple and glaring.” While it is probably the dominant view among analytically inclined philosophers of law, it is also the subject of competing interpretations together with persistent criticisms and misunderstandings.

    Legal positivism has a long history and a broad influence. It has antecedents in ancient political philosophy and is discussed, and the term itself introduced, in mediaeval legal and political thought (see Finnis 1996). The modern doctrine, however, owes little to these forbears. Its most important roots lie in the conventionalist political philosophies of Hobbes and Hume, and its first full elaboration is due to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) whose account Austin adopted, modified, and popularized. For much of the next century an amalgam of their views, according to which law is the command of a sovereign backed by force, dominated legal positivism and English philosophical reflection about law. By the mid-twentieth century, however, this account had lost its influence among working legal philosophers. Its emphasis on legislative institutions was replaced by a focus on law-applying institutions such as courts, and its insistence of the role of coercive force gave way to theories emphasizing the systematic and normative character of law. The most important architects of this revised positivism are the Austrian jurist Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) and the two dominating figures in the analytic philosophy of law, H.L.A. Hart (1907-92) and Joseph Raz among whom there are clear lines of influence, but also important contrasts. Legal positivism's importance, however, is not confined to the philosophy of law. It can be seen throughout social theory, particularly in the works of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, and also (though here unwittingly) among many lawyers, including the American “legal realists” and most contemporary feminist scholars. Although they disagree on many other points, these writers all acknowledge that law is essentially a matter of social fact. Some of them are, it is true, uncomfortable with the label “legal positivism” and therefore hope to escape it. Their discomfort is sometimes the product of confusion. Lawyers often use “positivist” abusively, to condemn a formalistic doctrine according to which law is always clear and, however pointless or wrong, is to be rigorously applied by officials and obeyed by subjects. It is doubtful that anyone ever held this view; but it is in any case false, it has nothing to do with legal positivism, and it is expressly rejected by all leading positivists. Among the philosophically literate another, more intelligible, misunderstanding may interfere. Legal positivism is here sometimes associated with the homonymic but independent doctrines of logical positivism (the meaning of a sentence is its mode of verification) or sociological positivism (social phenomena can be studied only through the methods of natural science). While there are historical connections, and also commonalities of temper, among these ideas, they are essentially different. The view that the existence of law depends on social facts does not rest on a particular semantic thesis, and it is compatible with a range of theories about how one investigates social facts, including non-naturalistic accounts. To say that the existence of law depends on facts and not on its merits is a thesis about the relation among laws, facts, and merits, and not otherwise a thesis about the individual relata. Hence, most traditional “natural law” moral doctrines--including the belief in a universal, objective morality grounded in human nature--do not contradict legal positivism. The only influential positivist moral theories are the views that moral norms are valid only if they have a source in divine commands or in social conventions. Such theists and relativists apply to morality the constraints that legal positivists think hold for law.

    2. The Existence and Sources of Law
    Every human society has some form of social order, some way of marking and encouraging approved behavior, deterring disapproved behavior, and resolving disputes. What then is distinctive of societies with legal systems and, within those societies, of their law? Before exploring some positivist answers, it bears emphasizing that these are not the only questions worth asking. While an understanding of the nature of law requires an account of what makes law distinctive, it also requires an understanding of what it has in common with other forms of social control. Some Marxists are positivists about the nature of law while insisting that its distinguishing characteristics matter less than its role in replicating and facilitating other forms of domination. (Though other Marxists disagree: see Pashukanis). They think that the specific nature of law casts little light on their primary concerns. But one can hardly know that in advance; it depends on what the nature of law actually is.

    According to Bentham and Austin, law is a phenomenon of large societies with a sovereign: a determinate person or group who have supreme and absolute de facto power -- they are obeyed by all or most others but do not themselves similarly obey anyone else. The laws in that society are a subset of the sovereign's commands: general orders that apply to classes of actions and people and that are backed up by threat of force or “sanction.” This imperatival theory is positivist, for it identifies the existence of legal systems with patterns of command and obedience that can be ascertained without considering whether the sovereign has a moral right to rule or whether his commands are meritorious. It has two other distinctive features. The theory is monistic: it represents all laws as having a single form, imposing obligations on their subjects, though not on the sovereign himself. The imperativalist acknowledges that ultimate legislative power may be self-limiting, or limited externally by what public opinion will tolerate, and also that legal systems contain provisions that are not imperatives (for example, permissions, definitions, and so on). But they regard these as part of the non-legal material that is necessary for, and part of, every legal system. (Austin is a bit more liberal on this point). The theory is also reductivist, for it maintains that the normative language used in describing and stating the law -- talk of authority, rights, obligations, and so on -- can all be analyzed without remainder in non-normative terms, ultimately as concatenations of statements about power and obedience.

    Imperatival theories are now without influence in legal philosophy (but see Ladenson and Morison). What survives of their outlook is the idea that legal theory must ultimately be rooted in some account of the political system, an insight that came to be shared by all major positivists save Kelsen. Their particular conception of a society under a sovereign commander, however, is friendless (except among Foucauldians, who strangely take this relic as the ideal-type of what they call “juridical” power). It is clear that in complex societies there may be no one who has all the attributes of sovereignty, for ultimate authority may be divided among organs and may itself be limited by law. Moreover, even when “sovereignty” is not being used in its legal sense it is nonetheless a normative concept. A legislator is one who has authority to make laws, and not merely someone with great social power, and it is doubtful that “habits of obedience” is a candidate reduction for explaining authority. Obedience is a normative concept. To distinguish it from coincidental compliance we need something like the idea of subjects being oriented to, or guided by, the commands. Explicating this will carry us far from the power-based notions with which classical positivism hoped to work. The imperativalists' account of obligation is also subject to decisive objections (Hart, 1994, pp. 26-78; and Hacker). Treating all laws as commands conceals important differences in their social functions, in the ways they operate in practical reasoning, and in the sort of justifications to which they are liable. For instance, laws conferring the power to marry command nothing; they do not obligate people to marry, or even to marry according to the prescribed formalities. Nor is reductivism any more plausible here: we speak of legal obligations when there is no probability of sanctions being applied and when there is no provision for sanctions (as in the duty of the highest courts to apply the law). Moreover, we take the existence of legal obligations to be a reason for imposing sanctions, not merely a consequence of it.

    Hans Kelsen retains the imperativalists' monism but abandons their reductivism. On his view, law is characterized by a basic form and basic norm. The form of every law is that of a conditional order, directed at the courts, to apply sanctions if a certain behavior (the “delict”) is performed. On this view, law is an indirect system of guidance: it does not tell subjects what to do; it tells officials what to do to its subjects under certain conditions. Thus, what we ordinarily regard as the legal duty not to steal is for Kelsen merely a logical correlate of the primary norm which stipulates a sanction for stealing (1945, p. 61). The objections to imperatival monism apply also to this more sophisticated version: the reduction misses important facts, such as the point of having a prohibition on theft. (The courts are not indifferent between, on the one hand, people not stealing and, on the other, stealing and suffering the sanctions.) But in one respect the conditional sanction theory is in worse shape than is imperativalism, for it has no principled way to fix on the delict as the duty-defining condition of the sanction -- that is but one of a large number of relevant antecedent conditions, including the legal capacity of the offender, the jurisdiction of the judge, the constitutionality of the offense, and so forth. Which among all these is the content of a legal duty?

    Kelsen's most important contribution lies in his attack on reductivism and his doctrine of the “basic norm.” He maintains that law is normative and must understood as such. Might does not make right -- not even legal right -- so the philosophy of law must explain the fact that law is taken to impose obligations on its subjects. Moreover, law is a normative system: “Law is not, as it is sometimes said, a rule. It is a set of rules having the kind of unity we understand by a system” (1945, p. 3). For the imperativalists, the unity of a legal system consists in the fact that all its laws are commanded by one sovereign. For Kelsen, it consists in the fact that they are all links in one chain of authority. For example, a by-law is legally valid because it is created by a corporation lawfully exercising the powers conferred on it by the legislature, which confers those powers in a manner provided by the constitution, which was itself created in a way provided by an earlier constitution. But what about the very first constitution, historically speaking? Its authority, says Kelsen, is “presupposed.” The condition for interpreting any legal norm as binding is that the first constitution is validated by the following “basic norm:” “the original constitution is to be obeyed.” Now, the basic norm cannot be a legal norm -- we cannot fully explain the bindingness of law by reference to more law. Nor can it be a social fact, for Kelsen maintains that the reason for the validity of a norm must always be another norm -- no ought from is. It follows, then, that a legal system must consist of norms all the way down. It bottoms in a hypothetical, transcendental norm that is the condition of the intelligibility of any (and all) other norms as binding. To “presuppose” this basic norm is not to endorse it as good or just -- resupposition is a cognitive stance only -- but it is, Kelsen thinks, the necessary precondition for a non-reductivist account of law as a normative system.

    There are many difficulties with this, not least of which is the fact that if we are willing to tolerate the basic norm as a solution it is not clear why we thought there was a problem in the first place. One cannot say both that the basic norm is the norm presupposing which validates all inferior norms and also that an inferior norm is part of the legal system only if it is connected by a chain of validity to the basic norm. We need a way into the circle. Moreover, it draws the boundaries of legal systems incorrectly. The Canadian Constitution of 1982 was lawfully created by an Act of the U.K. Parliament, and on that basis Canadian law and English law should be parts of a single legal system, rooted in one basic norm: ‘The (first) U.K. constitution is to be obeyed.’ Yet no English law is binding in Canada, and a purported repeal of the Constitution Act by the U.K. would be without legal effect in Canada.

    If law cannot ultimately be grounded in force, or in law, or in a presupposed norm, on what does its authority rest? The most influential solution is now H.L.A. Hart's. His solution resembles Kelsen's in its emphasis on the normative foundations of legal systems, but Hart rejects Kelsen's transcendentalist, Kantian view of authority in favour of an empirical, Weberian one. For Hart, the authority of law is social. The ultimate criterion of validity in a legal system is neither a legal norm nor a presupposed norm, but a social rule that exists only because it is actually practiced. Law ultimately rests on custom: customs about who shall have the authority to decide disputes, what they shall treat as binding reasons for decision, i.e. as sources of law, and how customs may be changed. Of these three “secondary rules,” as Hart calls them, the source-determining rule of recognition is most important, for it specifies the ultimate criteria of validity in the legal system. It exists only because it is practiced by officials, and it is not only the recognition rule (or rules) that best explains their practice, it is rule to which they actually appeal in arguments about what standards they are bound to apply. Hart's account is therefore conventionalist (see Marmor, and Coleman, 2001): ultimate legal rules are social norms, although they are neither the product of express agreement nor even conventions in the Schelling-Lewis sense (see Green 1999). Thus for Hart too the legal system is norms all the way down, but at its root is a social norm that has the kind of normative force that customs have. It is a regularity of behavior towards which officials take “the internal point of view:” they use it as a standard for guiding and evaluating their own and others' behavior, and this use is displayed in their conduct and speech, including the resort to various forms of social pressure to support the rule and the ready application of normative terms such as “duty” and “obligation” when invoking it.

    It is an important feature of Hart's account that the rule of recognition is an official custom, and not a standard necessarily shared by the broader community. If the imperativalists' picture of the political system was pyramidal power, Hart's is more like Weber's rational bureaucracy. Law is normally a technical enterprise, characterized by a division of labour. Ordinary subjects' contribution to the existence of law may therefore amount to no more than passive compliance. Thus, Hart's necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system are that “those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and ... its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials” (1994, p. 116). And this division of labour is not a normatively neutral fact about law; it is politically charged, for it sets up the possibility of law becoming remote from the life of a society, a hazard to which Hart is acutely alert (1994, p. 117; cf. Waldron).

    Although Hart introduces the rule of recognition through a speculative anthropology of how it might emerge in response to certain deficiencies in a customary social order, he is not committed to the view that law is a cultural achievement. To the contrary, the idea that legal order is always a good thing, and that societies without it are deficient, is a familiar element of many anti-positivist views, beginning with Henry Maine's criticism of Austin on the ground that his theory would not apply to certain Indian villages. The objection embraces the error it seeks to avoid. It imperialistically assumes that it is always a bad thing to lack law, and then makes a dazzling inference from ought to is: if it is good to have law, then each society must have it, and the concept of law must be adjusted to show that it does. If one thinks that law is a many splendored thing, one will be tempted by a very wide concept of law, for it would seem improper to charge others with missing out. Positivism simply releases the harness. Law is a distinctive form of political order, not a moral achievement, and whether it is necessary or even useful depends entirely on its content and context. Societies without law may be perfectly adapted to their environments, missing nothing.

    A positivist account of the existence and content of law, along any of the above lines, offers a theory of the validity of law in one of the two main senses of that term (see Harris, pp. 107-111). Kelsen says that validity is the specific mode of existence of a norm. An invalid marriage is not a special kind of marriage having the property of invalidity; it is not a marriage at all. In this sense a valid law one that is systemically valid in the jurisdiction -- it is part of the legal system. This is the question that positivists answer by reference to social sources. It is distinct from the idea of validity as moral propriety, i.e. a sound justification for respecting the norm. For the positivist, this depends on its merits. One indication that these senses differ is that one may know that a society has a legal system, and know what its laws are, without having any idea whether they are morally justified. For example, one may know that the law of ancient Athens included the punishment of ostracism without knowing whether it was justified, because one does not know enough about its effects, about the social context, and so forth.

    No legal positivist argues that the systemic validity of law establishes its moral validity, i.e. that it should be obeyed by subjects or applied by judges. Even Hobbes, to whom this view is sometimes ascribed, required that law actually be able to keep the peace, failing which we owe it nothing. Bentham and Austin, as utilitarians, hold that such questions always turn on the consequences and both acknowledge that disobedience is therefore sometimes fully justified. Kelsen insists that “The science of law does not prescribe that one ought to obey the commands of the creator of the constitution” (1967, p. 204). Hart thinks that there is only a prima facie duty to obey, grounded in and thus limited by fairness -- so there is no obligation to unfair or pointless laws (Hart 1955). Raz goes further still, arguing that there isn't even a prima facie duty to obey the law, not even in a just state (Raz 1979, pp. 233-49). The peculiar accusation that positivists believe the law is always to be obeyed is without foundation. Hart's own view is that an overweening deference to law consorts more easily with theories that imbue it with moral ideals, permitting “an enormous overvaluation of the importance of the bare fact that a rule may be said to be a valid rule of law, as if this, once declared, was conclusive of the final moral question: ‘Ought this law to be obeyed?” (Hart 1958, p. 75



    وقد ذهب ليقول في حيثياته:-

    Quote: the new constituition has a natural law


    In contemporary jurisprudence
    In jurisprudence, natural law can refer to the several doctrines:

    That just laws are immanent in nature; that is, they can be "discovered" or "found" but not "created" by such things as a bill of rights;
    That they can emerge by the natural process of resolving conflicts, as embodied by the evolutionary process of the common law; or
    That the meaning of law is such that its content cannot be determined except by reference to moral principles. These meanings can either oppose or complement each other, although they share the common trait that they rely on inherence as opposed to design in finding just laws.
    Whereas legal positivism would say that a law can be unjust without it being any less a law, a natural law jurisprudence would say that there is something legally deficient about an unjust law. Legal interpretivism, famously defended in the English speaking world by Ronald Dworkin, claims to have a position different from both natural law and positivism.

    Besides utilitarianism and Kantianism, natural law jurisprudence has in common with virtue ethics that it is a live option for a first principles ethics theory in analytic philosophy.

    The concept of natural law was very important in the development of the English common law. In the struggles between Parliament and the monarch, Parliament often made reference to the Fundamental Laws of England which were at times said to embody natural law principles since time immemorial and set limits on the power of the monarchy. According to William Blackstone, however, natural law might be useful in determining the content of the common law and in deciding cases of equity, but was not itself identical with the laws of England. Nonetheless, the implication of natural law in the common law tradition has meant that the great opponents of natural law and advocates of legal positivism, like Jeremy Bentham have also been staunch critics of the common law.

    Natural law jurisprudence is currently undergoing a period of reformulation (as is legal positivism). The most prominent contemporary natural law jurist, Australian John Finnis, is based in Oxford, but there are also Americans Germain Grisez, Robert P. George, and Canadian Joseph Boyle. All have tried to construct a new version of natural law. The 19th-century anarchist and legal theorist, Lysander Spooner, was also a figure in the expression of modern natural law.

    "New Natural Law" as it is sometimes called, originated with Grisez. It focuses on "basic human goods," such as human life, knowledge, and aesthetic experience, which are self-evidently and intrinsically worthwhile, and states that these goods reveal themselves as being incommensurable with one another.


    راجع

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_law


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العنوان الكاتب Date
مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 05:48 PM
  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 05:55 PM
    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 06:11 PM
      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-05-09, 06:52 PM
        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة GamarBoBa02-05-09, 07:29 PM
          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عماد الشبلي02-05-09, 09:31 PM
            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 09:38 PM
              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-05-09, 10:18 PM
                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 10:24 PM
                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-05-09, 10:40 PM
                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة GamarBoBa02-06-09, 05:24 PM
                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-06-09, 05:41 PM
                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-06-09, 10:06 PM
                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-08-09, 08:32 AM
                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة wadalzain02-08-09, 09:06 AM
                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-08-09, 09:32 AM
                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-08-09, 10:17 AM
                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-08-09, 10:22 AM
                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-09-09, 03:22 PM
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                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة أحمد الشايقي02-09-09, 04:12 PM
                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Ahmed al Qurashi02-09-09, 04:13 PM
                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-09-09, 04:37 PM
                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Nader Abu Kadouk02-09-09, 04:51 PM
                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-09-09, 05:01 PM
                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Nader Abu Kadouk02-16-09, 11:47 AM
                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة أنور سيد ابراهيم02-09-09, 05:05 PM
                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-09-09, 05:52 PM
                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-09-09, 06:32 PM
                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة ممدوح أبارو02-09-09, 06:41 PM
                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة GamarBoBa02-09-09, 07:02 PM
                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة ممدوح أبارو02-09-09, 07:21 PM
                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-09-09, 07:56 PM
                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-09-09, 09:35 PM
                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-09-09, 09:38 PM
                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-09-09, 11:09 PM
                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد على طه الملك02-10-09, 00:25 AM
                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 07:48 AM
                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة ادم شحوتاي02-10-09, 08:20 AM
                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-10-09, 08:31 AM
                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة saif addawla02-10-09, 08:58 AM
                                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Nader Abu Kadouk02-10-09, 09:15 AM
                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 09:34 AM
                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-10-09, 09:41 AM
                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 09:45 AM
                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 09:49 AM
                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 09:51 AM
                                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-10-09, 09:58 AM
                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 10:00 AM
                                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 11:18 AM
                                                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 11:53 AM
                                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد على طه الملك02-10-09, 01:33 PM
                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الزاكى عبد الحميد02-10-09, 01:57 PM
                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:12 PM
                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:15 PM
                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة wadalzain02-10-09, 02:15 PM
                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة هاشم أحمد خلف الله02-10-09, 02:20 PM
                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة wadalzain02-10-09, 02:46 PM
                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:31 PM
                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:34 PM
                                                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:38 PM
                                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 02:52 PM
                                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة wadalzain02-10-09, 03:07 PM
                                                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 03:22 PM
                                                                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 05:30 PM
                                                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-10-09, 05:36 PM
                                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 05:45 PM
                                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة فيصل محمد خليل02-10-09, 06:01 PM
                                                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-10-09, 05:59 PM
                                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 06:28 PM
                                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-10-09, 06:53 PM
                                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 07:18 PM
                                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-10-09, 07:36 PM
                                                                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 07:45 PM
                                                                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-10-09, 08:03 PM
                                                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-10-09, 09:26 PM
                                                                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-10-09, 10:52 PM
                                                                                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Magdi Ahmed Elsheikh02-10-09, 10:55 PM
                                                                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-11-09, 00:23 AM
                                                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 05:41 AM
                                                                                                                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 05:58 AM
                                                                                                                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد المرتضى حامد02-11-09, 07:31 AM
                                                                                                                              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 08:09 AM
                                                                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عواطف ادريس اسماعيل02-11-09, 10:48 AM
                                                                                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 11:16 AM
                                                                                                                                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة حسن طه محمد02-11-09, 11:31 AM
                                                                                                                                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 11:55 AM
                                                                                                                                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 12:00 PM
                                                                                                                                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-11-09, 07:17 PM
                                                                                                                                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد المرتضى حامد02-11-09, 06:36 PM
          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 05:36 PM
            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-11-09, 10:37 PM
              Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-12-09, 07:48 AM
                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة محمد أحمد الخضر02-12-09, 11:42 AM
                Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة Yahia Abd El Kareem02-12-09, 12:12 PM
                  Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-12-09, 12:48 PM
                    Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-12-09, 06:30 PM
                      Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-12-09, 06:45 PM
                        Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-12-09, 06:59 PM
                          Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة الطيب شيقوق02-12-09, 08:16 PM
                            Re: مواقف في ساحات العدالة عبدالعزيز الفاضلابى02-12-09, 08:30 PM


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