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 Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور (Re: Shao Dorsheed)
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THREE-PART PLAN FOR DARFUR
(Public Version)
Updated 9 Sept 2006
John Weiss and Elvir Camdzic
I. THE CURRENT CONTEXT
A. Since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement(DPA) at the beginning of May, not a single Darfuri civilian has been given peace.
B. Violent attacks by armed groups, especially government-supported militias, have increased, by some accounts to double their pre-signing level. This has prompted an accelerating departure of major humanitarian aid organizations. Armed groups from rebel factions who signed the agreement have also repeatedly attacked civilian supporters of factions who refused to sign.
C. Major riots against the signing of the DPA have occurred in the large IDP camps. Inhabitants of the camps, inside Darfur and in Chad, have always favored strong interventions, by NATO, the US, or a seriously empowered and equipped UN force. But few would-be rescuers or policy analysts take into account the expressed wishes of these victims.
D. Four months after the signing, the Bashir government has moved into the final phase of its Final Solution, accompanying its rejection of UN resolution 1706 of 1 Sep 06, which “invited” the GoS to accept a UN role in Darfur, with a full court press of indiscriminate bombing, burning, raping and expulsion. .
E. White House sources stated to the authors of this Three-Part Plan that if Canada took on a lead role in the resolution of the Darfur problem, “that would get a lot of welcome at the Presidential level”
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PLAN
The Plan presented below seeks to achieve goals similar to those outlined in the failing DPA. It can thus be seen as a way of bringing about an atmosphere of security in Darfur and the restoration of its cultures, administration, and civil society but without requiring the voluntary cooperation of the Bashir Government (GoS). In fact, the implementers of this Three-Part Plan would welcome the assistance of the UN, the AU, and NATO, but the Plan can succeed without the cooperation of any of them.
This Plan to end the destruction of lives and cultures in Darfur has three elements:
A. Two sets of Darfur-Darfur conversations, protected deliberations among Darfuris. The first would produce an Interim Administration and a road map for the establishment of security and an accountable government in Darfur. The second, convened after elections and broad based consultations, would constitute a Darfur Regional Government.
B . An Implementation Force that would work in close coordination with that Interim Administration to establish the security necessary for returns to the sites of villages and the support of a relaunching of Darfuri society
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C. A Dual Purpose No-Fly Zone to neutralize the forces threatening the security of Darfur, especially the GoS and its associated militias, Popular Defense Forces, police, and other operatives.
III. PROTECTED DELIBERATIONS
Attendees and facilitators
The first conference of Darfuri leaders would construct a unified Interim Administration for the entire affected region. Canadians would play a lead role in selecting the attendees after consultations with various experts and political figures. They would also facilitate the deliberations with technical/logistical support and procedural counsel. The “road map” meetings in Bonn in December 2001 in which Afghan leaders participated under UN sponsorship provide an instructive example.
This “road map” meeting would be attended by a range of Darfuri leaders extending well beyond those assembled at the peace talks in Abuja: tribal authorities from Arab and non-Arab tribes, leaders of civic organizations, key religious figures, delegates from the Darfuri Diaspora, and militia leaders. It would be especially important to include leaders who have emerged from the social structures that have constituted themselves in the camps: sheikhs, imams, representatives of women’s self-help groups. Ranking Sudanese employees of non-Sudanese humanitarian organizations should also be invited to attend, perhaps as non-voting members.
Representatives of the Khartoum Government, however, including
governors, other administrators, military officers, and security personnel, must be excluded. Their record of subverting, disrupting, manipulating, and delaying negotiations to which they are a party necessitates this exclusion. For the same reasons representatives of the Libyan, Chadian, and Egyptian governments must be excluded.
The constitution of an accountable and representative Darfur Regional Government will take some time and will be the result of both elections and consultations with traditional authorities guided by the outline of the process drawn up at the road map meeting. Not surprisingly, the Bosnian, Afghan, Kosovar, Iraqi, and Congolese cases give useful lessons yielding both commonalities and differences. The Afghan loya jirga has been an especially influential case.
Only when the citizens and stakeholders have successfully inaugurated their own institutions of a Darfur Regional Government and a degree of security permitting returns to village sites has been established would the central government in Khartoum be contacted in order to address such matters as the use of the common infrastructure (e.g., the rail line from Port Sudan), the distribution of revenues, the structure of the national educational system, and other subjects of concern to an authentically federal state.
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The DPA also contains provisions for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). In this DPA case, however, the decisions of the conference would have no legal status: they would only be advisory. The “consultations” would in fact be discussions of decisions already taken by Government authorities or of proposals already formulated. It is hard to imagine that the Bashir government would take seriously any comments made by the parties doing the responding.
Venue
In the first version of this Plan, drawing upon the Bonn precedent, it was recommended that the road map meeting be held outside Darfur . However, given the need for the quickest possible convening of such a meeting, it may be possible to hold such a meeting within Darfur and still to isolate it from destructive outside influence and manipulation. In the case of the negotiations of November 1995 leading to the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian conflict, a set of small buildings at the edge of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base provided a productive location that was isolated and guarded with relative ease. A similar complex might be created at the edge of the El Fashir or Nyala airfields, or possibly also on the grounds of the El Obeid Airport just outside Darfur in Kordofan. Military engineers or private contractors from any of several industrialized countries could construct and equip a suitable set of temporary buildings in less than a week’s time, as is demonstrated by their performance in many humanitarian emergencies.
Securing the Venue
[Send request to [email protected]]
IV. IMPLEMENTATION FORCE
It is clear that no military or police forces now exist within Darfur (or all of Sudan, for that matter) suitable for implementing the decisions of the Interim Administration. An international force with advanced military capabilities will thus be required. In order to establish the required atmosphere of security, the implementation force will need to carry out a number of difficult and risky assignments, the need for which will command quick agreement among a substantial number of the leaders assembled at the road map meeting: the disarmament, arrest, or neutralization of the most dangerous militia units, GoS forces and rebel formations; the enforcement of the ban on flights by Government helicopter gunships and bombers; reconnaissance aimed at mapping areas of rebel and Government control; the collection of records of violations and violators from AU repositories in El Fashir and Nyala; insuring that the Khartoum government does not impede the flow of humanitarian aid.
The indispensable task of protecting civilians also entails risks and difficulties. Any military commander tasked with protecting civilians, however, cannot limit his unit’s activities to guarding perimeters and escort duty. To accomplish his mission with
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due regard for the safety of his own troops, as well as those he is charged to protect, he must take proactive measures to reduce substantially the sources of the threat. In short, he must be prepared for extended combat with well-armed adversaries.
Staffing the Implementation Force will be a principal concern of the Canadian-American teams seeking to carry out this Plan. In the months after Darfur gained world attention in early 2004 Britain and Australia offered to send troops to a humanitarian intervention. NATO reportedly offered to send troops but was turned down by the African Union with the now-discredited slogan “African Solutions for African Problems.” Canadian General Romeo Dallaire has called for a coalition of “middle powers” such as Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan to intervene to protect civilians, not just to monitor and verify. Respected political analysts have claimed that France would be willing to send a contingent. Slovenia and Denmark have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of concern evinced by their European Union partners and have advocated stronger action. Turkey and South Korea have also been mentioned. Bosnian military specialists are now serving in international missions outside Bosnia; they would seem especially appropriate troops since, like the Rwandans, they have experience the kind of atrocity crimes that have occurred in Darfur since 2003. Finally, AU members with troops already deployed in Darfur such as Rwanda, Ghana, and Senegal might be willing to participate in the expanded mission.
V. THE DUAL-PURPOSE NO-FLY ZONE
The Government of Sudan will express violent opposition to the intrusion upon their sovereignty inherent in this Plan. “Spontaneous” demonstrations of 100,000 in the streets of Khartoum will be fed racist, jihadist, jingoist, and hyperbolic threats to react to the arrival of any intervention force with measures against this “Northern crusade” that will make Darfur a “graveyard” where the crusaders will die in “rivers of blood.” At the very least the GoS will demand an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council --unless that Council happened to be the authorizing agent of the intervention in the first place.
Practical measures the GoS might take to prevent the implementation of the Plan would include arrests of potential participants in the road map meeting; the shutting down of telephone and cell phone relay towers, an action that reliably paralyzes the AU forces who have few radios; the taking of internationals as hostages; and attacks by GoS forces on humanitarian organizations, IDP camps, and advance units of the Implementation Force.
A No-Fly Zone, which could make its presence felt within a very short period of time, could act as a counter to such contemplated GoS moves by posing three kinds of credible retaliatory threats:
1. To GoS assets such as its aircraft and missile sites
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2. To the Government’s authority by making it lose face as a state unable to respond to “forceful monitoring” by aggressive fly-overs anywhere in the country.
3. To troop and militia formations in Darfur itself.
As the only state with the weapons and transport capability to project power globally, the United States would form the core of this No-Fly Zone. Other coalition partners could also join in support after the initial phases of the operation, as occurred in the Bosnian and Kosovar cases and in Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq. America’s specialized surveillance and target acquisition aircraft (AWACS), special operations transport aircraft, anti-anti-aircraft missile systems, Stealth weapons systems, and satellite tactical capabilities are not yet fully engaged in other theaters. High-ranking sources within the American defense establishment have assured the authors that a no-fly zone is well within the operational capability of the USAF.
The no-fly zone could establish threat #1 above most easily if the Sudanese tested the enforcement of ths zone as did Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein. Sudan’s expensive fleet of at least twelve MIG-21s would be at considerable risk of reduction.
The no-fly zone could establish threat #2 above by means of the striking way military aircraft can establish their intrusive and unstoppable presence. The AWACs and other surveillance aircraft usually fly at a relatively high altitude. To someone on the ground they are barely noticeable. But fully loaded fighter-bombers can use a pattern of relatively low-level flights producing a variety of impressive, attitude-changing acoustical effects, from rolling sonic booms to a deep, long-lasting roar tht seems to dwell on the horizon for many minutes. Air Force planners understand the techniques for mapping and
maximizing the psychological effects of such flyovers, whether over a janjaweed
base, an IDP camp, or a politically vital urban agglomeration such as the capital, Khartoum, or its sister across the river, Omdurman.
The no-fly zone would establish credible threat #3 above by providing the “close air support” demanded by Kofi Annan in his list of requirements for the
success of any UN intervention in Darfur. Ad hoc coalition ground troops charged by the Darfuri Interim Administration with peace enforcment operations would also need such support. Armored, low-flying aircraft of the A-10 “Warthog” type would be effective against militias mounted on horses or camels as well as against armored personnel carriers or trucks armed with machine guns. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) delivered by aircraft based at Djibouti, on carriers in the Red Sea, or at French-operated bases in Chad could be effective against fixed GoS positions such as the militia barracks (and headquarters of janjaweed leader Musa Hilal) at Misteriha or the helicopter gunship port at El Geneina.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The UN Role
President Bashir will react to the final application of UN pressure, a Security Council demand for a UN role in Darfur, in one of three ways:
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1. He will refuse again to allow any UN role whatsoever.
In this case, the Three-Part Plan may be implemented immediately.The UN may be requested to take charge of its implementation, but in the anticipation of the rejection of that request the US and Canada can be expected to mobilize an ad hoc coalition already put together in anticipation of such a refusal.
2. He will “relent” and permit blue-hatted troops to enter Darfur, but with only a Chapter 6 observe-and-monitor mandate and a side agreement by the UN to collect no information about individual war criminals. .
The authors of this Plan consider this move to still be a possibility. It is clearly unacceptable and has zero probability of advancing the DPA or reducing the suffering of the victim population. If the UN accepted it, the US and Canada should explain their reasons for rejecting it and proceed to the implementation of the Three-Part plan.
3. He will accept a Chapter 7 intervention with a protection mandate and the authorization to use force. In the months since a strategy meeting held in Washington on 4 November 2005 almost all the organizations grouped in the Save Darfur Coalition and certain other activist groups have come to agree that this intervention action is the one to advocate. Should an adequately equipped and trained UN force genuinely capable of protection(in the military sense described above) and reconstruction actually appear in sufficient force in Darfur, hope that the genocide may be stopped will find some real measure of justification.
But that such a force will appear at all in the western Sudan is highly
unlikely, that it will appear quickly enough to spare the victims at least six more months of suffering is impossible. The UN’s own estimates place the arrival of a fully permitted protection force at January 2007 at the earliest.
In the event of a UN protection force agreement by Sudan, we thus propose the immediate implementation of the Three-Part Plan as a “bridging force” --a concept first introduced in the International Crisis Group’s Briefing on Darfur of July 2005 --to bridge the gap between the end of the failed AU mission (i.e., now) and the arrival of a mission-capable UN force.
Public Diplomacy and Media Relations
The political nature of both the goal of Darfur policy and the tactics used to accomplish those goals must be kept in mind at all times. Resources invested in the management of the road map meeting, the support of the Interim Administration, and the political empowerment of Darfuri citizens must at least equal those invested in the military aspects. As an example of just one such political consideration, the elimination of the hundreds of ways the GoS impedes and exploits the delivery of humanitarian aid must be seen as a necessary result of the forced reduction of its power and presence in Darfur.
Resources must also be invested in facilitating access to events in Sudan by Middle Eastern and African press, radio, and television. If embedding Al Jazeera journalists in the Implementation Force units proves impractical, civil affairs officers and civilian public relations experts must find substitutes. After all, Al Jazeera’s most ambitious attempt to cover the Darfur genocide, a documentary film produced in early 2004, resulted in the closing of its Khartoum office and the prosecution of its staff.
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Particular care must be taken to avoid the appearance of Arab-bashing on the part of intervening forces. The racist Arabism deployed by one of the strongest factions in the Khartoum government is a peculiarly Sudanese concoction, no more characteristic of other Arab regimes than was Nazism characteristic of other German-speaking regimes. That the intervention is somehow an attack against Islam may be effectively refuted by the fact that almost all Darfuris are Muslims.
Planning for Intervention: How Public?
Planning for the three-part intervention on the part of coordinating task forces of Canadians and Americans should begin immediately. We find it instructive that American troops and aircraft were attacking in force in Afghanistan only 27 days after September 11th. To what extent such planning should be made public is difficult to determine, however. There are arguments for quiet planning as well as for a warning to Khartoum that, for once, one of the populations that took “Never Again” as a motto actually means what it says. In any case, the longest-ruling genocidal regime in history, the Bashir government of Sudan, needs to be decisively deterred from carrying forward with its challenge to our claim to value variety of cultures as part of our common humanity.
Likely Political and Armed Responses of the Bashir Regime and Others
It is certain that the Bashir regime will attempt to mobilize its population by using appeals to the Islamic jihad tradition. In 1991, after all, Bashir proclaimed himself “imam of the jihad” against the peoples of the Nuba Mountains. In the case of the Nuba Mountains, inhabited by both Christians and Muslims, this tactic was only partly successful. A significant number of officers of the Sudanese army resisted attacking fellow Muslims, which caused a slowdown in execution and strategic reorientation of the battle plan.
The memory of this history helps to indicate why the GoS has made such heavy use of janjaweed militias. Although they are drawn from many sources, the smaller, more recently arrived Arab clans in Northern Darfur, ethnic groups more vulnerable to the appeals of the “Arab Gathering” and other racist ideologies, have provided a disproportionate number of the jj militias. These militias then were supported by the mercenaries and professionals flying the Antonov bombers and armed helicopters. In fact, the largest ethnically and linguistically uniform group of Arabs in Darfur, the Rizeigat of the South, have remained largely neutral in the conflict between rebels and Government. Their leaders, moreover, would be allocated major roles in the “protected conversation” meetings and the Interim regime.
Crowds in the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman will most likely be turned out in force, as they have been in the past, to be treated to feasts of rodomontade and warlike rhetoric. Directing the anger of crowds to “invaded” Darfur and translating it into militarily or politically effective operations may not be easy. In the first place, the Popular Defense Force units that might be formed as the result of the claims of a foreign “white” invasion do not have an impressive military record. The past record of using such units in the wars against the South and other areas has shown that the PDF formations often behave poorly and suffer heavy casualties.
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Drawing on the recruits from “the street” who attended these gatherings, the GoS might train “insurgents” to attack Implementation Force units or civilian concentrations in Darfur or even abroad, using terrorist tactics. Any action that attempts to help Darfuri victim groups to reverse their radical diminution and escape the life of the camps must weigh the benefits of success in this attempt, the reversal of a genocide against 2.5 million people, with the possible costs from terrorist attacks. Against this consideration must be placed, however, the knowledge that the GoS is already training selected janjaweed in advanced terrorist tactics, in Sudan as well as in other countries. Evidence to this effect gathered by the authors of this report was submitted in early 2006 to US counterterrorism analysts. At the same time, of course, the GoS has posed as a leader in the war against terror, even hosting a conference on this subject in November 2005.
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| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
 أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-10-06, 09:16 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 10:46 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-11-06, 12:09 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 12:42 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 12:45 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 12:54 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 04:34 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | محمدين محمد اسحق | 09-11-06, 04:41 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mohamed Suleiman | 09-11-06, 04:51 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 07:00 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 07:03 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-11-06, 07:59 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mohamed Elgadi | 09-12-06, 08:17 PM |
 Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mohamed Adam | 09-11-06, 08:21 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 11:51 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-12-06, 12:08 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-12-06, 12:10 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 12:42 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 12:59 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Kostawi | 09-12-06, 01:05 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | حيدر حماد | 09-12-06, 03:01 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | ابراهيم بقال سراج | 09-12-06, 03:03 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mohamed Adam | 09-12-06, 03:37 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 06:30 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shams eldin Alsanosi | 09-12-06, 06:44 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 06:57 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-12-06, 07:07 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-12-06, 10:59 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 09:45 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 11:11 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-13-06, 11:34 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | محمدين محمد اسحق | 09-13-06, 02:27 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 03:33 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mustafa Mahmoud | 09-13-06, 03:45 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Hashim Badr Eldin | 09-13-06, 04:42 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-13-06, 05:59 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mustafa Mahmoud | 09-13-06, 06:24 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 06:29 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 06:42 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-13-06, 06:45 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shams eldin Alsanosi | 09-13-06, 11:25 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-14-06, 10:53 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-14-06, 11:54 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mustafa Mahmoud | 09-14-06, 12:09 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-14-06, 12:50 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-14-06, 01:03 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-14-06, 03:45 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-15-06, 02:40 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-15-06, 11:33 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-15-06, 12:58 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | bakri abdalla | 09-15-06, 01:15 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | محمدين محمد اسحق | 09-15-06, 03:19 PM |
 Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-15-06, 05:37 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Marouf Sanad | 09-15-06, 05:51 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-15-06, 05:58 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-16-06, 03:58 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-16-06, 12:44 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Shao Dorsheed | 09-16-06, 01:56 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-16-06, 03:21 PM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Ahmed Mohamedain | 09-21-06, 02:42 AM |
| Re: أعلان من رابطة دارفور بكندا بمناسبة اليوم العالمى للتضامن مع دارفور | Mustafa Mahmoud | 09-21-06, 12:56 PM |
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