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 Re: Sudan: Flogging and Harassment of Women Continue (Re: nada ali)
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In light of on-going, very complex political processes in Sudan, such as a referendum where the people of Southern Sudan will vote on unity of Sudan or independence for South Sudan in less than a month; recent arrests of Darfuri activists in Khartoum, and planned popular consultations in two regions of Sudan to determine, among other things, whether the CPA and its implementation has met the aspirations of the people of these two regions, some may question the outrage that burst around the flogging of the woman. Some voices sympathetic with the regime see it as yet another ‘Western conspiracy’ against Islam that aims to divert attention from other, ‘more fundamental issues’ in Sudan.
In fact, in the case of Lubna Ahmed Hussein, the ruling National Congress Party has used one of the on-going political processes to criticize the Western media’s focus on Lubna’s case. The Sudanese embassy in London, for example, issued a statement in response to media reports and articles about Lubna Hussein, pointing to “the floodgate of expert and non-expert comments on Sudan [that] opened suddenly on 29 July in the wake of an indecency and antisocial behavior [sic] involving journalist Lubna A Hussein” on one hand, and lack of coverage of a landmark arbitration ruling on the region of Abyei, contested by the north and the south on the other. The statement said “The real question, which is relevant to the deep-rooted Islamophobic and anti-Arab prejudice, is the selective spotlight on Ms Lubna Ahmed Hussein and determined neglect of Abyei dispute's result for eight long days."
While it is important to pay due attention to the key on-going and upcoming political processes in Sudan, the logic in the statement above is flawed. It is true that the Public Order Law affects all women in Northern Sudan, and it is also true that, at times, the issue has been sensationalized in the media. Nonetheless, it is often women from marginalized areas, such as Abyei, who live in the North, who are most affected by these laws. As far back as 1992, independent research has documented the racialized and selective use of the law in states like Khartoum, and the way this specifically affected economically disadvantaged women, especially those from historically marginalized regions displaced by war. For example, a study by a women’s legal aid organization in 1992 showed that out of a total number of 825 in Omdurman women’s prison, the majority were from the South and the Nuba Mountains. Those comprised 35.7 percent and 32.3 percent of the imprisoned women respectively. According to the same study, over 60 percent of these women were illiterate, and 58 percent had been arrested for selling liquor. Activists in another Khartoum-based women’s organization told me in 1995 that most of the imprisoned women were unaware of their legal rights, did not speak Arabic well, and often had to bribe police officers.
Moreover, in his report to the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights in January 1995, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Sudan Mr. Gaspar Biro cited independent sources showing that prisoners from western and Southern regions of Sudan in Khartoum constituted 95.17 percent of the total number of women prisoners (about 6,000 annually). According to Biro, 88.3 percent were sentenced under section 79 of Sudan’s criminal Act (brewery), and 2 percent for prostitution (Articles 154 and 155 of the Act).
In recent years, numerous reports, including by Refugees International and Doctors without Borders have shown how Sudan’s criminal Act has deterred women victims and survivors of rape in the Darfur conflict from seeking justice. Article 149 of the criminal act conflates rape with the offence of Zina (intercourse between a woman and a man who are not married to one another) that is performed without consent. If a woman is unable to prove lack of consent on her part to intercourse she can face charges of zina as she has confessed to sexual intercourse outside marriage. In such cases, a woman can receive a sentence of up to 100 lashes if unmarried, or to death by stoning if married.
More recently, a report by Amnesty International published earlier this year documented the experience of a 16 years old young Southern Sudanese woman who was flogged in Khartoum for ‘indecent dressing’. Moreover, a submission to the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights in November 2009 and 2010 by the regional network ‘the Strategic Initiative on Women in the Horn of Africa’ (SIHA) similarly underlined the specific effects of the Public Order Regime as a whole on women and girls from marginalized areas of Sudan. Lubna herself, in her commentary on the YouTube video, wrote,
"It is even more painful when Randa, Reem and Riham [names that often denote affluent, Northern Sudanese background] escape the flogging because they bribed the police, whereas Bakhita, Hawa and Kaltum [names that often denote belonging to historically marginalized groups and regions of Sudan] are flogged because they were not wearing golden rings or necklaces they could use as a bribe"
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According to the state’s news agency (SUNA), Sudan’s National Judicial Service Commission has launched an investigation in relation to the video of the flogging, to establish whether the punishment was implemented improperly. As several commentators have argued, however, the question is not whether the punishment was implemented properly. The question is whether sharia is relevant as a source of legislation in Sudan.
The flogging incident --or rather the video on YouTube-- brings to the forefront debates around secularism and the application of Sharia law in Sudan. This question was among the key points of contention during the negotiations of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the CPA) between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the Government of Sudan. At the end, the CPA (and Sudan’s Interim National Constitution) identified Sharia as the source of legislation in Northern Sudan. It is widely held in Sudan at present that the two systems-one state arrangement under which Sharia prevailed in the North has contributed to an almost–certain vote for secession in the upcoming South Sudan referendum. Similarly, the question of Sharia is relevant to the process of popular consultations, where the people of Southern Kordufan and the Blue Nile, through their elected legislature will eventually decide whether the CPA and its implementation (including in the area of the relationship between religion and the state) reflects the aspirations of the people of these two states.
Despite harassment by the National Congress Party’s security and police, now more than ever, women’s groups and other civil society organizations and movements in Sudan need to be vigilant and on a stand-by gear, including around the question of Sharia; but also around other on-going and upcoming political processes. Other protests should immediately follow the action to protest the abhorring flogging incident: Protests for the release of recently arrested and detained Darfuri activists; protests to support the rights of Southern Sudanese women (and men) to a free and fair ballot; protests to ensure that Southerners, especially in Northern cities, are not the victims of violence or of violation of their citizenship rights, regardless of the outcome of the referendum; protests to ensure gender and women’s concerns are is taken into account in post-referendum arrangements, protests to show solidarity with the women and men in the Western Equatoria state of South Sudan--currently regular victims to attacks by the Lord Resistance Army-- to live in peace; protests to ensure women’s meaningful participation in a free and fair ballot in Abyei, and protests to ensure popular consultations in the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states take place, with meaningful participation for women.
(عدل بواسطة nada ali on 12-15-2010, 03:05 PM)
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nada ali
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