Self-determination is Not the Culprit: The Password to Unity is
Democratic Transformation
Dr. Elwathig Kameir
[email protected]Prelude
I wish start by thanking the conference organizers for granting me this opportunity to address this distinguished gathering. The theme chosen for deliberations, challenges and options for Sudan after 50 years of independence, is not only pertinent, it is also timely at this critical juncture in the country’s historical evolution. Unity is and has always remained during this entire period both a cherished objective for the Sudanese masses, particularly in the north, and a paramount and overarching challenge that may result in detrimental consequences for their future, if not realized. One could not, however, talk about unity of the Sudan without paying tribute to the late Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the great Sudanese leader whose zeal, enthusiasm and genuine efforts at maintaining the unity of the country were, and are noted, even by non-Sudanese observers, as exceptional. Though he did not live long enough to see the outcome of his 22 years of struggle, the late Garang fought for decades to achieve a just peace that could furnish the ground for uniting the Sudanese on the basis of equality and human dignity for all. The essence of his vision was equitable management of diversity and respect for the identities and cultures of all national groups. Although Sudan was his base and the focus of his vision, his horizon extended far beyond and embraced the sub-region and the whole continent of Africa. Indeed, the ideals he stood for in the Sudanese and the African contexts could apply globally to countries and regions torn apart by racial, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and disparity.
In this presentation I intend to share with you some thoughts underpinned with two-fold objective of 1) clearing the misunderstanding and confusion that have surrounded the political discourse and intellectual debate on the question of unity, and 2) clarifying the role (s) that the various Sudanese political forces need to play to sustain this unity. Though the Northern political forces assume the lion’s share of this responsibility, a sizeable share lies on the shoulders of the SPLM, which claims to be a national political actor that has been espousing and promoting “unity on new bases” for nearly a quarter of a century now. My thesis is that: the threat to unity does not stem from embracing the right of self-determination, as is commonly believed by many. Rather, unity, and thus any danger to it, is an outcome of, and inherent in the unfolding process of building the Sudanese state, which evolved in the context of two forms of struggle in the process of national liberation and nation building. The first phase was characterized by the struggle against external domination and colonial rule. Post-independence marked the second era, which witnessed an ensuing internal struggle between the different social and political forces over the tasks of nation building: a struggle that is still raging on. It is the myopic and narrow-minded vision of the political forces that led the struggle for independence, especially those who inherited, and wielded power in the post-colonial era, and their failure to build an “inclusive” Sudanese state, that has placed in jeopardy the unity of the country.
A common misperception in the ensuing political and intellectual debate over the question of unity, however, is that the right of self-determination is seen, in emotional terms, to represent the underlying threat to this unity. Fears and concerns regarding the outcome of the exercise of the right of self-determination are, of course, legitimate. However, such understanding or rather misunderstanding, is perplexing and makes one wonder as whether its proponents seriously or really mean what they are saying! A couple of pertinent issues must be underlined to clear this misconception.
First, self-determination is a fundamental political and democratic right for all the peoples of the Sudan. Thus, The IGAD Declaration of Principles in 1994 endorsed that “extensive rights of self-determination on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc, to the various peoples of the Sudan must be affirmed”. The rest of the Sudanese political forces in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) confirmed the same right in the Asmara Declaration in 1995 to all the peoples of the Sudan. This, in a very deep sense, means that the Sudanese people themselves must achieve the unity of the country, which is synonymous with the building of the Sudanese nation-state, through self-determination. On the other hand, the right of self-determination became a demand for southern Sudanese only in the early 1990s in response to objective political conditions both in Khartoum and the south as a tool or a mechanism for achieving voluntary unity in an adverse environment. This is simply why it was invoked 9 years following the inception of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM).
Second, and most importantly, what should be of utmost and overriding concern is not the right of self-determination, but rather the definition of, and agreement on “what is this unity we are talking about” and “what are its constituent parts and parameters”? Thus, though Sudan was ushered into independence formally, and “ostensibly” united in 1956, the southern Sudanese vehemently contested the constitutional bases of this unity in 1955 before even the country’s independence was consummated. The call from the south for regional self-autonomy went unheeded by northern political leaders, resulting in a deep rift between the north and the south that ignited a bloody civil war, which continued for 17 years in its first phase only. At the time, the term “self-determination” was unheard of, except in the context of Sudan’s relationship with the colonial powers at large.
Indeed, the Sudanese “nationalist” movement was largely a “northern” phenomenon! By the turn of the 20th century, the national struggle against British colonial rule took various forms, beginning with tribal-based revolts that engulfed various parts of the country. The struggle saw the development of armed political movements with the emergence of the White Flag League in 1924. The suppression of the mutiny by the colonial powers succeeded in temporarily crippling the nationalist movement. Nationalism, however, re-emerged in the 1930s and was a product of the British colonial policies. The British colonial political economy was based on a semi-articulated pattern of colonial capitalism with pre-capitalist modes and forms of production that, to a large extent, left little room for fundamental changes in the structures of Sudanese society. Colonial capitalism integrated both urban and rural sectors into wider national and international political-economic structures. It was within these structures that the leadership of the “nationalist” movement was, therefore, constituted as an alliance between the middle-class intelligentsia, the rural aristocracy and the urban-based “Jallaba” merchants.
On the other hand, the hostility of the people of South Sudan to colonial rule, coupled with other cultural and religious differences with the North, forced the colonial authorities to adopt different policies for the administration of the South. This was exacerbated by the rebellion in 1924 by the White Flag League when the South, the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessina Hills were sealed off from the rest of Sudan under the Closed Districts Ordinance, and a separate policy for the southern provinces was formulated to enforce the complete and separate development of the two parts of the then Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. From that time until the reversal of the policy in 1947, South and North Sudan were separate entities with their own formal travel and consular arrangements. The most critical factor overlooked by the northern “nationalist” leaders in the process of national formation was the colonial concentration of economic, political and administrative development in the north at the expense of the south, thereby creating socio-economic and political disparities between the center and the marginalized regions of the country, particularly the south. This gap, which over the years widened in every respect, was heightened by the attitude of the Northern political elite who excluded the South from the political process vis-à-vis the independence struggle. Indeed, the civil secretary between 1938 and 1945, Douglas Newbold, realized that the Northern elite were in a position to dominate the process of de-colonization and to rule a post-colonial Sudan. Referring to the monopoly of the riverain groups, Newbold asserted that the immediate political future of the country obviously rested in their combined hands. Later on many among the non-Northern elite argued that the early movement, which claimed for itself the title of the “Sudanese nationalist movement”, had no grounds to claim that name.
Equally, it is imperative to note that the colonial policy of unequal development and the political hegemony of the Northern riverain elite caused much disgruntlement among the regional elites in other less developed parts of Sudan. Anticipating that an alliance of traditional leaders and educated elite of the north would replace the British, thus perpetuating the colonial structures, some members of the elite in western Sudan therefore formed their own al-Kutla as-Sawda (the Black Bloc) organization in 1938. As with many other anti-colonialist movements in Africa, the Black Bloc began as a regional social movement. It expanded very rapidly, attracting people from the Nuba and the Fur, as well as West Africans and former slaves. Furthermore, regionally based political organizations and parties also emerged in the 1960s. Ethno-regional parties are not exclusively confined to ‘ethnic’ or ‘regional’ membership, but the general characteristics defining these parties include that they were formed in response to regional grievances, their policy platform is always anti-the Khartoum government, and they were transformed from peaceful movements to armed rebel groups fighting against the central government. This was exactly what happened in Eastern Sudan and Darfur after decades of political and cultural exclusion and economic marginalization in a bid to restructure power in the center, as well as power relations between the center and the peripheries.
What was strongly needed to stop the civil war and restore the country’s unity, however, was an inclusive constitutional and governance framework that would guarantee effective participation of the marginalized groups in political power, as well as an equitable share in national wealth. Ironically, it was the authoritarian military May regime (1969-1985), building on the recommendations of the Roundtable Conference organized in 1965 during the 2nd Democratic Republic (1964-69), which succeeded in introducing a considerable measure of power restructuring, thus putting an end to 17 years of bitter fighting. Backed by the popular support of the “modern forces” and the trade union movement, the military regime signed the Addis Ababa Accord in February 1972, which granted autonomous self-rule, but within a united Sudan, to the South as one region with various defined powers, inaddition to representation of southerners in the natinal government, incuding the position of a vice-president. According to the Agreement, all revenues from resources and exports in the south should acrue to the regional government.
The agreement of the May government with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement represented the second major constitutional restructuring after independence. Thus, willingly surrendering the demand for separation, southerners were content to live in a united Sudan as long they enjoyed regional autonomy, while participating in the power structure of the center. As such a measure of political stability engulfed the country in the wake of the conclusion of the Peace Accord. This has, however, proved to be short-lived as the power alliances shifted following the National Reconciliation and the ascendance of the “Islamists” in the power structures of the authoritarian regime, who regarded the Agreement as a form of surrender to southerners. The nascent democratic practices in the south (an elected Southern Regional Assembly and High Executive Council) and relative political freedoms were a source of sabotage and disruption for the northern political establishment.
Fearful of the South’s growing political power, Nimeiri used all manner of machinations and political intrigue to dismantle and abrogate the Addis Abba Peace Accord. Thus, Presidential Decree No.1 of June 1983 divided the Southern region into the three old provinces. This was followed in September by the proclamation of the Shari’a as the basis of the Sudanese legal system. These drastic decisions came against a backdrop of many contentious issues and contradictions, which pitted the South directly against Nimeiri’s regime. These included: the issue of the Jonglei canal (1974); the provincial border disputes (1980) in which Nimeiri attempted to redraw the provincial boundaries, carving off oil-rich areas in Bentiu (including building a pipeline that would directly carry oil from Bentiu in the south to Port Sudan) and the fertile agricultural lands of northern Upper Nile, with the intention of annexing them to the North; and the unprovoked and continuous interference by Nimeiri in the political and democratic process in the South, demonstrated by the unconstitutional suspension of the Southern Regional Assembly. The failure of the government in Juba to respond appropriately to Nimeiri’s unilateral decisions resulted in sporadic armed uprisings between the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. These developments culminated in the formation of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M) in May 1983, which heralded the outbreak of the second civil war that lasted for another 22 years.
Haydar Badawi Sadig
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست