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 Re: رسالة للقائد سلفا كير ميارديت (Re: Haydar Badawi Sadig)
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أخي د.حيدر
تحية وتعضيد على المثابرة
أولاً أعجبني كثيراً ما كتبه الأخ د.النور فله مني التحية، وأكرر طلبي له التنظير لآلية الجماعة في العمل وأهميتها في تحقيق الأهداف .
ثانيّا :لقد خبرنا الإسلامويين وخبرنا ما تربّوا عليه عمليّاً ولن يحدث تغيير في هذه الناحيّة إلا بقوّة دفع لها وزن ونفاذ ولا أتوقع أن لديهم إحساس بالتاريخ كما أفترض تشرشل في القيادة ولن يذرفوا دمعة واحدة فيما لو انفصل الجنوب أو تشتت رصاص السودان، أما إذا كان الإتجاه نحو الديمقراطيّة سيمنع عنهم مكتسباتهم ليخسروا كل ما عملوا من أجله طيلة هذه السنوات فسيمارسوا أساليبهم القديمة الغليظة لأنهم يلعبون على ورقتين مهمتين في الداخل كما قال الترابي جهل الشعب السوداني بالدين وعاطفته القوية تجاهه،وعلى الصعيد الخارجي أنت تعلم أنهم تمرّسوا في لعبة المصالح وسيوفِِّروا لكل إدارات القوى السياسيّة والمالية المؤثرة في العالم الغطاء القانوني والإعلامي المجمِّل حتى يتسنى لهم بيع هذا الشعب في سوق النخاسة كما فعلوا مع صندوق النقد الدولي فاستمرأوا شي جلود مواطنيهم بالجباية ووقف الخدمات ونشر ثقافة الإستهلاك....الخ ما تعلمونه عنهم، ثم بيعهم لأخوانهم في الدين لمخابرات العالم لتقطيع أوصالهم.
أخيراً على الرغم مما يبدو أنه ضغوط من المنظمات العالميّة فإن الإدارات لها حسابات تختلف عن طوباوية الأخلاق التي تنادي بها هذه المنظمات ومجتمعاتها وبنظرة سريعة لخارطة العالم تجد أن الولايات المتحدة وزبانيتها يشكلون أقوى حماية لأنظمة خارج التاريخ بكل المقاييس حتى أن بعضها لا يملك دستوراً أو قانوناً للحكم .
أبوحمــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــــد
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Re: رسالة للقائد سلفا كير ميارديت (Re: عثمان عبدالقادر)
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عزيزي أبو حمد،
تحيتي ومحبتي، وحار التهانئ بمناسبة ذكرى استشهاد الأستاذ محمود محمد طه. كل عام وأنت والأسرة والجميع بخير.
أحسنت، يا أخي العزيز، حين عالجت المسألة السودانية باعتبارها قضية مركبة لا يجوز فيها التبسيط. فالأشياء ليست كما تبدو. هناك مصالح دنيوية محضة تتحكم في مدعي التدين، القابضين على مفاصل الاقتصاد والسلطة، المحمية بالجيش والشرطة والأمن والمخابرات. الأخلاق والقيم الفاضلة في هذه المعادلة ليست إلا أدوات خطابية للتمويه والتغطية على السوءات. والشئ نفسه ينطبق على حماة المصالح الغربية. التلاقي بين مصالح الإسلامويين ومصالح الرأسمالية الغربية لا يخطئه إلا التبسيطيون الذين لا يرون أبعد من أرنبة الأنف.
ما يبشر بالخير هو أن الفكر الجمهوري سيظل يلح على الناس لمقاومة شرور الهوس الديني والهوس الرأسمالي. فهذان الأخيران يتصارعان في سبيل السلطة والثروة. أما الفكرة الجمهورية فهي الساعي الأخلاقي الأساس -في حالة السودان على الأقل- لمقاومة التطرف بوجهيه، الديني والرأسمالي.
أشكرك على إضافة هذه النظرة الثاقبة للخيط!
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Re: رسالة للقائد سلفا كير ميارديت (Re: Haydar Badawi Sadig)
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The SPLM
The SPLM, on the other hand, is equally required to translate its vision of “unity on new basis” in a working program and build a robust organizational structure on the national level. This is not to underestimate the profound challenges that the Movement is destined to face. The CPA has, thus, ushered the SPLM into a new phase/Republic with multiple transitions that need to be effectively managed. In the transition from war to peace, the Movement is facing a critical 3-fold transformation trajectory: from a military/politico organization to one that is politically-based; from regionally/ethnically-bound to a movement that is national in both character and outreach; and from opposition to partnership in government. The sudden and tragic loss of the Movement’s leader has compounded the burden of dealing with these multiple transitions. However, as the Old Sudan undergoes fundamental change in its transition to the New Sudan, the SPLM/A itself is bound to evolve and undergo fundamental change. So, while its basic content has remained the same, the SPLM/A has undergone a process of metamorphosis over the years, and in its various stages of transformation it appeared different to various people (or interest groups) at different times.
At this critical moment in the Sudanese history, the SPLM is obligated by virtue of its vision and supporters, as well as by the CPA, to promote the cause of unity “on new bases”. This is an obligation that the SPLM cannot shun without loosing both credibility and popular support, besides seriously flouting the CPA. The only route for sustaining the unity of the Movement, thus the unity of the Sudan at large, is through genuine adherence to the New Sudan vision at the program and policy levels, and vigorous engagement in national politics. For the aspirants for either unity or separation of the south, their respective objectives would not be met through withdrawal or retreat from the center of power, where the fate of land and people has been, and is determined! Indeed, demand of the SPLM for an effective presence in legislative and executive institutions throughout Northern Sudan, and its participation in the governance of those states for the duration of the pre-elections period, was made with the objective of making it possible for the Movement to advocate, on an equal footing with the NCP, unity of Sudan on new basis. Paradoxically, even for the “southern nationalists” would harvest the wind at the end of the day if the SPLM failed in making use of the powers, at the national level, accorded to it by the CPA. This is simply because the self-determination referendum) has to pass through the gate of elections. The outcome of those elections would be disastrous for the SPLM, as well for the cause of the “southern nationalists”, in case it failed to secure a comfortable representation in the national parliament. Otherwise, the CPA will turn into Addis Ababa Agreement II. Elections, however, add yet another national responsibility to the SPLM to initiate a process of national dialogue and political discourse with all the political and social forces. The objective is to arrive at a social contract that encompasses issues of the CPA, national reconciliation and democratic transformation as basis of national consensus. “Nationalism” is not a “northern” phenomenon!
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Re: رسالة للقائد سلفا كير ميارديت (Re: Haydar Badawi Sadig)
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Concluding Remarks
I cannot conclude before making two important caveats. First, the intended focus of the speech on the political discourse on unity does by no means denote any underestimation on my part to the equally important social, cultural, and economic dimensions of unity. By extension, underlying the role of political forces only is not meant to belittle or overlook the tremendous responsibility of the civil society actors, in their various areas of competence, in cementing the social fabric of the Sudanese society. Secondly, I am also cognizant of the regional and international context within which the post-CPA situation is evolving and the roles of the external forces in the process. Indeed, the CPA itself has largely been a product of international mediation and pressures, maintaining the country’s unity, however, its implementation remains the national responsibility of the Sudanese political and social forces.
The message of these remarks is that the threat to unity is rooted in the failure of the Sudanese post-colonial state in establishing a national identity framework of governance accommodative of the country’s multiple diversities. The CPA, a product of a protracted struggle over restructuring of the Sudanese state, provides all the Sudanese political forces with the opportunity (possibly the last) to build the Sudanese citizenship-state; the shortest-cut to unity. These forces must abandon wild speculations about the outcome of the self-determination referendum, which is believed to be a synonym for separation, and instead seriously contemplate the fate of the country if it fails to consummate the constitutional restructuring process, initiated by the CPA. It is only in the context an inclusive framework of governance that the ensuing political and humanitarian crisis can be approached and addressed. This would be unfeasible if not all the political forces seriously assumed their respective shares of national responsibility towards building a Sudanese socio-political commonality. These forces should act as “stakeholders”, and not as mere “beneficiaries”, of the CPA, if they were sincere in their call for the country’s unity. The Southerners then will self-determine to remain an integral part of this commonality. This is the task to contend with in order to keep the country united, albeit on new bases. Self-determination is not the culprit: the password is democratic transformation; elections and the self-determination referendum are merely the keys!
Finally, I also cannot afford not to share with you some thoughts on a couple of prospective research area since this gathering also marks the inauguration of the Sudan Policy Research Institute.
Immediately after the departure of the late Dr. John Garang, a group, of what we call “New Sudansists” (denoting those who believe in the New Sudan vision, but not necessarily affiliated with the SPLM), loudly spoke about the imperative of establishing a policy research center. Dr. Francis Deng took a step further in a bid for keeping the discussion alive by contributing with a written-concept note. Besides commemorating the achievements and legacy of Dr. John Garang, the central idea is to promote the values, principles, and develop programs and policies, and strategies, embodied in the vision of the New Sudan. The vision of a New, United, Democratic Sudan provides an entry point for addressing the broader challenges facing the Sudan and the African continent. As a racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural microcosm of Africa, Sudan offers the possibility for reconciling on a country basis some of the dilemmas and contradictions of nation-building that plague the continent. This is a rich and wide research area that allows ample room for identification and prioritization of the pertinent specific research issues.
“Popular” or civil society-based monitoring of the CPA is another pertinent, and perhaps mostly needed, research and advocacy project. The CPA is a turning point and a landmark in Sudan’s contemporary history as it denotes the most radical constitutional restructuring in the country since independence. It represents a milestone in the transition towards a democratic united Sudan, albeit on new basis. The novelty of the transition, predicated on the CPA, lies in the recognition for the first time of the root causes of the war, especially in the south, and that those root causes transcended the South. However, two years have already passed since it was signed, the CPA is showing signs of strain. The recent crisis that recently ensued between the two partners, following the SPLM withdrawal from the GONU, is indicative. Given the radically contrasting visions of the two partners in power, tension will certainly persist. Observers (both inside and outside the country) have recognized the selective and slow pace of the implementation process. The two parties to the Agreement themselves have problems that impact the implementation. The SPLM has to contend with all the organizational and programmatic hurdles inherent in the transition from peace to war. Though the CPA caters for the NCP’s continued dominance in Northern Sudan, it also provided for a significant opening of the political space and the sharing of the previously NCP-controlled state power and wealth. Despite being the most powerful and best-organized political force, the ruling NCP therefore finds itself increasingly threatened by the direction the country is heading to.
On the other hand, the rest of the political forces in Sudan particularly those brought to power in the earlier democratic transitions (1953, 1964 and 1985) – have never experienced a similar situation whereby management of the transition is out of their control. Not only that, but it is the first time that a political party with a large constituency in the South is to share power as a major partner of a party with a predominantly Northern constituency. The situation is further compounded by feelings among some main political groups and other opposition and civil society organizations - which were not signatories to the CPA but are now expected to take part in its implementation. These groupings have been calling for an all-inclusive conference to endorse and build consensus around the CPA.
In light of these profound challenges to the implementation of the CPA, the overall goal of the proposed project is to keep all the Sudanese social forces (civil society), truly committed to peace within the country, diligently engaged to ensure the credible implementation of the CPA and counteract potential spoilers. Though the primary responsibility of implementing the CPA lies on the shoulders of the Parties, other key political and social actors are stakeholders in the peace process with a critical role to play. Though the CPA provides for a built-in mechanism to monitor the implementation process (the Assessment and Evaluation Commission), its composition, mandate, and diplomatic nature raises series impediment to the work of the Commission, particularly when the two parties have divergent views on the implementation process. Besides, the inter-governmental nature of the Commission is likely to emphasize diplomatic sensitivities that might understandably limit candid exposure of violations and recommendations of particular solutions and activities.
The specific objectives of the project/program may include: a) monitor the progress of, and identify impediments to the implementation of the CPA through collecting information from all relevant sources, b) disseminate gathered information to the Parties, other stakeholders, and the civil society (including political parties, trade unions and community leaders), c) engage and mobilize civil society, and consolidate public support to the credible implementation of the CPA by engaging civil society actors and all stakeholders to discuss emerging issues, and identify potential obstacles, appropriate solutions and resource needs, and d) garner the support of the international community (in terms of resources, attention and influence) through calling upon the good offices of numerous governments, institutions, statespersons, diplomats, and leaders of international and regional inter-governmental organizations.
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عثمان عبدالقادر
Haydar Badawi Sadig
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست