|
|
 Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا (Re: Abdel Aati)
|
2. History of Federalism in Western Thought until 1900
Johannes Althusius (1557-1630) is often regarded as the father of modern federalist thought. He argued in Politica Methodice Digesta (Althusius 1603) for autonomy of his city Emden, both against its Lutheran provincial Lord and against the Catholic Emperor. Althusius was strongly influenced by French Huguenots and Calvinism. As a permanent minority in several states, Calvinists developed a doctrine of resistance as the right and duty of "natural leaders" to resist tyranny. Orthodox Calvinists insisted on sovereignty in the social circles subordinate only to God's laws. The French Protestant Huguenots developed a theory of legitimacy further, presented 1579 by an author with the telling pseudonym "Junius Brutus" in Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos. The people, regarded as a corporate body in territorial hierarchical communities, has a God-granted right to resist rulers without rightful claim. Rejecting theocracy, Althusius developed a non-sectarian, non-religious contractualist political theory of federations that prohibited state intervention even for purposes of promoting the right faith. Accommodation of dissent and diversity prevailed over any interest in subordinating political powers to religion or vice versa.
Fundamentally dependent on others for the reliable provision of requirements of a comfortable and holy life, humans require communities and associations that are both instrumentally and intrinsically important for supporting [subsidia] their needs. Families, guilds, cities, provinces, states and other associations owe their legitimacy and claims to political power to their various roles in enabling a holy life, rather than to individuals' interest in autonomy. Each association claims autonomy within its own sphere against intervention by other associations. Borrowing a term originally used for the alliance between God and men, Althusius holds that associations enter into secular agreements -- pactum foederis -- to live together in mutual benevolence.
Ludolph Hugo ((ca.) 1630 -- 1704) was the first to distinguish confederations based on alliances, decentralized unitary states such as the Roman Empire, and federations, characterized by ‘double governments’ with territorial division of powers, in De Statu Regionum Germanie (1661) (cf. Elazar 1998; Riley 1976).
In The Spirit of Laws (174 Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) argued for confederal arrangements to ensure the ideal scale of government required for political liberty understood as non-domination -- that is, security against abuse of power. A ‘confederate republic’ with separation of powers secures the requisite homogeneity, identification and self-sacrifice within sufficiently small sub-units where the common good subdues private interests thus preventing tyranny and ‘internal imperfection’. The sub-units pool powers sufficient to secure external security, reserving the right to secede (Book 9, 1). Sub-units also serve as checks on each other, since other sub-units may intervene to quell insurrection and power abuse in one sub-unit.
David Hume (1711-1776) disagreed with Montesquieu that smaller size is better. Instead, "in a large democracy ... there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy." In "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" (Hume 1752) Hume recommended a federal arrangement for deliberation of laws involving both sub-unit and central legislatures. Sub-units enjoy several powers and partake in central decisions, but their laws and court judgments can always be overruled by the central bodies, hence it seems that Hume’s model is not federal as the term is used here. He held that such a numerous and geographically large system would do better than small cities in preventing decisions based on “intrigue, prejudice or passion” against the public interest.
Several 18th century peace plans for Europe recommended confederal arrangements. The 1713 Peace Plan of Abbé Charles de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) would allow intervention in sub-units to quell rebellion and wars on non-members to force them to join an established confederation, and required unanimity for changes to the agreement.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-177 presented and critiqued Saint-Pierre’s proposal, listing several conditions including that all major power must be member, that the joint legislation must be binding, that the joint forces must be stronger than any single state, and that secession must be illegal. Again, unanimity was required for changes to the agreement.
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) defended a confederation for peace in On Perpetual Peace (1796). His Second Definite Article of a Perpetual Peace holds that the right of Nations shall be based on a pacific federation among free states rather than a peace treaty or an international state: "This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature."
The Articles of Confederation of 1781 among the 13 American states fighting British rule had established a center too weak for law enforcement, defense and for securing interstate commerce. What has become known as the U.S. Constitutional Convention met May 25 -- September 17 1787. It was explicitly restricted to revise the Articles, but ended up recommending more fundamental changes. The proposed constitution prompted widespread debate arguments addressing the benefits and risks of federalism versus confederal arrangements, leading eventually to the Constitution taking effect in 1789.
The "Anti-federalists" were fearful of undue centralization. They worried that the powers of central authorities were not sufficiently constrained e.g. by a bill of rights (John DeWitt 1787, Richard Henry Lee) -- which was eventually ratified in 1791. They also feared that the center might gradually usurp the sub-units’ powers. Citing Montesquieu, another pseudonymous ‘Brutus' doubted whether a republic of such geographical size with so many inhabitants with conflicting interests could avoid tyranny and would allow common deliberation and decision based on local knowledge (Brutus (Robert Yates?) 1787).
In what has become known as The Federalist Papers, James Madison (1751-1836), Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804) and John Jay (1745-1829) argued vigorously for the suggested model of interlocking federal arrangements (Federalist 10, 45, 51, 62). Madison and Hamilton agreed with Hume that the risk of tyranny by passionate majorities was reduced in larger republics where sub-units of shared interest could and would check each other: "A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any improper or wicked project, will be less likely to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it." (Federalist 10). Splitting sovereignty between sub-unit and center would also protect individuals’ rights against abuse by authorities at either level, or so believed Hamilton, quoting Montesquieu at length to this effect (Federalist 9).
Noting the problems of allocating powers correctly, Madison supported placing some authority with sub-units since they would be best fit to address “local circumstances and lesser interests” otherwise neglected by the center (Federalist 37).
Madison and Hamilton urged centralized powers of defense and interstate commerce (Federalist 11, 23), and argued for the need to solve coordination and assurance problems of partial compliance, through two new means: Centralized enforcement and direct applicability of central decisions to individuals(Federalist 16, also noted by Tocqueville 1945). They were wary of granting sub-units veto power typical of confederal arrangements, since that would render the center weak and cause “tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue; contemptible compromises of the public good.” (Madison and Hamilton, Federalist 22; and cf. 20).
They were particularly concerned to address worries of undue centralization, arguing that such worries should be addressed not by constraining the extent of power in the relevant fields, such as defense, but instead by the composition of the central authority (Federalist 31). They also claimed that the people would maintain stronger "affection, esteem, and reverence" towards the sub-unit government owing to its public visibility in the day-to-day administration of criminal and civil justice (Federalist 17).
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), in chapter 17 of Considerations on Representative Government (1861), recommended federations among "portions of mankind" not disposed to live under a common government, to prevent wars among themselves and protect against aggression. He would also allow the center sufficient powers so as to ensure all benefits of union -- including powers to prevent frontier duties to facilitate commerce. He listed three necessary conditions for a federation: sufficient mutual sympathy "of race, language, religion, and, above all, of political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of political interest"; no sub-unit so powerful as to not require union for defense nor tempt unduly to secession; and rough equality of strength among sub-units to prevent internal domination by one or two. Mill also claimed among the benefits of federations that they reduce the number of weak states hence reduce temptation to aggression, ending wars and restrictions on commence among sub-units; and that federations are less aggressive, only using their power defensively.
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), in Du Principe fédératif (1863) defended federalism as the best way to retain individual liberty within ‘natural’ communities such as families and guilds who enter pacts among themselves for necessary and specific purposes. The state is only one of several non-sovereign agents in charge of coordinating, without final authority.
Philosophical reflections on federalism during the 20th century has addressed several issues, including reasons for federalism to concerns for stability, the legitimate allocation of authority between sub-unit and center, distributive justice and challenges to received democratic theory.
|
|
 
|
|
|
|
|
| العنوان |
الكاتب |
Date |
| لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرالي | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 08:57 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:00 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:03 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:05 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:07 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:09 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:11 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:13 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:14 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 09:17 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-24-04, 08:47 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 09-25-04, 05:59 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-01-04, 06:45 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 07:52 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | محمد الامين احمد | 10-08-04, 09:00 AM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:38 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:41 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:44 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:45 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:46 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:47 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:48 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:50 PM |
| Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | Abdel Aati | 10-08-04, 05:51 PM |
 Re: لماذا ندعو للفيدرالية وكيف نراها؟ مساهمة في تطوير برنامج الحزب الليبرا | معتز تروتسكى | 10-08-04, 08:22 PM |
|
| |
Abdel Aati
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست