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 Re: الدكتور احمد دالى يتحدث فى واشنطن عن الوضع الراهن ومستقبل الدولة السودانية (Re: طلعت الطيب)
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Ten Key Findings
The oil figures published by the Khartoum government do not match those from other sources. These figures determine the revenues disbursed to the Government of Southern Sudan. The Khartoum government has reported that a smaller volume of oil was produced in southern oil blocks than is reported by the company that operates the blocks. It is not clear which set of figures, company or government, are the correct ones, but the discrepancy highlights the need for the oil figures to be independently verified. The southern government received $2.9 billion in oil revenues in 2009 and the discrepancies revealed here are of the order of 9%-26%, so if any underreporting by the Khartoum government is found the sums of money owed to the southern government would be large. 1
the volume of oil that the Khartoum government states was produced in blocks 1, 2 and 4 in 2007 is 9% less than that stated in the annual report of the company operating these blocks, the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).
the volume of oil that the Khartoum government states was produced in blocks 3 and 7 in 2007 is 14% less than that stated in the annual report of the company operating these blocks, CNPC.
the volume of oil that the Khartoum government and other sources* state was produced in blocks 1, 2 and 4 and block 6 in 2005 is 26% less than that stated in the annual report of the company operating these blocks, CNPC.
the volume of oil that the Khartoum government states was produced in the only oil block which is located entirely in the north and therefore not subject to revenue sharing between north and south, is approximately the same as that stated by the operator of the block, CNPC
the oil prices published by the Ministry of Finance in Khartoum and those published in the oil industry press for sales in the same month do not match.Neither the southern Government nor Sudanese citizens are able to verify whether the oil revenues received from the Khartoum government as part of the peace agreement are correct. It is the Khartoum government that compiles the figures on how much oil is produced and the price for which it sold. The revenues owed to the southern government can be deduced from the figures published by the Khartoum government, but the deduction will only be correct if the underlying oil production and sales figures are correct. The southern government is not involved in 2
* The CNPC annual report states the combined volume of oil produced in blocks 1, 2, 4 and 6. The Khartoum government published figures for the volume of oil produced in blocks 1, 2 and 4 in 2005 but did not publish figures for block 6. For the purposes of this analysis, three estimates of the volume of oil produced in block 6 were obtained and the largest figure – actually a figure published by CNPC – was used. 4
these processes. The ability to verify that the oil revenues received from the Khartoum government are correct is important not least because they make up 98% of the southern government’s income.
The oil is marketed by just one of the governments that share in its revenues – the Khartoum government. This makes it impossible for the southern government to verify that the price stated by the Khartoum government for which the oil was sold is correct. The pricing of some of the sales of Dar blend, when it first came onstream in 2007, raise suspicion. In February 2007 there were four sales that went for between 15 and 23 cents a barrel, despite the fact that Dar blend in the previous month sold for more than a hundred times this amount. At times, the Khartoum government has sold oil via closed tenders in which only Chinese companies were able to bid. 3
The southern government does not receive half of the oil revenues from southern oil wells. The Khartoum government deducts a three percent ‘management fee’ from revenues shared with the south. It seems difficult to justify this fee as the Khartoum government already receives half of the revenues from southern wells. Pipeline fees are also deducted. In August and September 2008 these amounted to between three and eight percent of the value of the governments’ oil. It is not clear who receives these fees: the companies that operate the pipelines, the Khartoum government or both. In addition, the stateowned oil company, Sudapet, which owns equity stakes in all the Sudanese oil blocks, does not share its profits with the south. 4
“The [southern government] leadership has been throwing around accusations of oil revenue cheating much less. The best informed still complain though”
A diplomat2
The oil consortia employ oil service companies which come from the north of the country and are widely believed to be linked to the Khartoum ruling party. The oil consortia claim back the costs for employing these companies; the more costs they claim, the less that is left over for revenue sharing between the governments. If it is true that the service companies are linked to the ruling party in Khartoum, a larger share of the oil revenues goes to the north than is specified in the peace agreement. 5
There is insufficient oversight of the oil revenues. In Southern Sudan, there is no Auditor General, despite this being a constitutionally required post. There is insufficient oversight of the millions of dollars of oil money transferred to the oil-producing states, and little visible evidence of what this money has been spent on.
6 Both the national and southern state oil companies, Sudapet and Nilepet, are set up such that the same people are responsible for selling oil and regulating the sale of oil: a clear conflict of interest. At present, Sudapet, despite being a substantial oil-producing company, does not publish annual reports or accounts. 7
5
The Khartoum government owes the southern government millions of dollars in oil revenue arrears. As of March 2009, the arrears due to the southern government, excluding those due from Abyei, amounted to $180 million.
In addition to this, there are also arrears due to the southern government from the Abyei oilfields as even though the ruling of the tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration found some oil fields to be outside Abyei, there are still some productive oil fields inside the area.
8
The Khartoum government does not publish all of the figures upon which the revenue sharing depends, and those that it does publish are often published late. At times, the most recent data available have been two years out of date. The oil companies’ investment costs are not published, despite these having a large impact on the governments’ revenues from oil. The revenue available for sharing between north and south is only what is left over after the oil companies’ costs have been deducted. Opening the oil companies’ costs up to scrutiny is in the interests of both the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan: in other countries oil companies have been found to over-claim the amount of cost oil, leaving fewer revenues for the government. 9
Oil revenues from Abyei, a disputed area in central Sudan, are divided according to a slightly different formula than the oil revenues from the south. Determining the boundaries of the Abyei area has been controversial, but in July 2009, the governments in the north and south and leaders of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka tribes accepted a ruling of a tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. 10
In this report, maps showing the locations of the Abyei oil wells in relation to the various definitions of the boundaries of Abyei are published for the first time.
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طلعت الطيب
فيس بوك
تويتر
انستقرام
يوتيوب
بنتيريست