We never forget those who died in Mostapha Mahmoud

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
FORCED MIGRATION AND REFUGEE STUDIES (FMRS)
A TRAGEDY OF FAILURES AND FALSE EXPECTATIONS
Report on the Events Surrounding the Threemonth
Sitin
and Forced
Removal of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo, September–December 2005
June 2006
The Forced Migration and Refugee Studies program (FMRS) is a program of
education, research, and outreach that seeks to improve the understanding, policies,
and practices of those who are concerned or work directly with refugees and other
forced migrants. While maintaining a global and comparative perspective, FMRS
focuses on the particular issues and circumstances of displacement in Africa, the
Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin from multiple viewpoints, including those
of host societies, policy makers, states, humanitarian organizations, and, in
particular, of the forced migrants themselves.
FMRS offers a multidisciplinary
graduate diploma for that purpose and supports
research and service activities that are mutually reenforcing,
grounded in the needs
of stakeholders, and promote a growing appreciation of the social, psychosocial,
economic, cultural, legal and political relevance of forced migration to academics,
practitioners, and the general public.
* * *
Forced Migration and Refugee Studies
The American University in Cairo
113 Kasr AlAini
Street, P.O. Box 2511
Cairo 11511, Arab Republic of Egypt
Telephone: +2027976921,
7976626
Fax: +2027976629
[email protected]
http://www.aucegypt.edu/fmrs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………………1
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………2
BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS…………………………………………………………5
THREE MONTHS OF PROTEST………………………………………………………...15
FORCED REMOVAL……………………………………………………………………...31
THE AFTERMATH………………………………………………………………………...36
COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS…………………………………………………………...52
APPENDIX A: Protest demands with explanation………………………………………….59
APPENDIX B: December 17 agreement with UNHCR…………………………………….63
1
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Report Editor
Fateh Azzam
Editorial Assistance
Jasmina Brankovic
Nora Danielson
Research and First Drafting
Introduction: Fateh Azzam
Background to the Crisis: Maisaa Youssef, Andrew Woods
Three Months of Protest: Nora Danielson, Themba Lewis
Forced Removal: Laura Maxwell
The Aftermath: James Pearce, Sarah Sadek
Comments and Analysis: Fateh Azzam
Many thanks to all the refugees and eyewitnesses who gave testimonies and to all who
participated in the preparation and factchecking
of this report, especially the following, with
apologies in advance to all who are not specifically mentioned below:
Assad Khalid, Barbara HarrellBond,
Chiara R., Courtney Mitchell, Emily Eidenier, Gafar
Salim, Karen Zamperini, Leigh Sylvan, Martin Rowe, Maysa Ayoub, Minal Giri, Musafiri
Sebbi, Naaz Khan, Omar Idriss, Sara Sevcik, Shadrick King, Stacy Shafer, Viviana Mazza,
Yasser Omer Mustafa, and Ahmed AbdelRahman.
Thanks are also due to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to UNHCR for
willingness to meet and share perspectives and for providing information and statistics.
Special thanks are due to Africa–Middle East Refugee Assistance (AMERA) and the
Association for Human Rights Legal Aid (AHRLA) for their collaboration and sharing of
information.
2
INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2005, dozens of Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees initiated a sitin
near the offices of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in Cairo to protest
UNHCR’s ongoing suspension of refugee status determination procedures as well as their
conditions in Cairo, a situation they considered unbearable. Their number quickly grew to an
average of 1,800 to 2,500 and remained at those levels throughout the following three
months. Periodic meetings and negotiations among the sitin
leadership, UNHCR, and a
number of other parties failed to meet the demonstrators’ demands or to result in a
satisfactory end to the protest.
In the early morning hours of December 30, 2005, thousands of Egyptian security personnel
forcibly removed the protestors to various holding centers in and around Cairo. Tragically,
27 refugees and asylum seekers were killed in the removal, at least half being children and
women. A 28 th person, a 14yearold
boy, died in hospital a month later, and one man
committed suicide in detention.
Most cardholding
refugees and asylum seekers were released within a few days, but more
than six hundred remained in detention until their status was clarified between UNHCR and
the government of Egypt. The tragedy continued for weeks, with families trying to find loved
ones, children being left unaccompanied overnight or held in separate facilities from their
parent(s), and people not knowing whether their relatives were in another detention facility,
in hospital, or in the morgue. Two months after the event, no one remained in detention, but
several children were missing and families still were not allowed to take possession of the
bodies of relatives for burial.
Calls by national and international human rights organizations for an international inquiry
into the deaths were rejected by Egypt, which was rumored to have initiated an internal
investigation. The forced removal and its aftermath elicited criticism locally and abroad,
strained relations between UNHCR and the government of Egypt, and exacerbated an
atmosphere of distrust between UNHCR and Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers.
Egyptian and international media coverage of the event was replete with charges of police
brutality and racism, and countercharges of abuse of Egyptian hospitality by “drunken” and
“diseaseridden”
refugees and other xenophobic statements. At the same time, human rights
and other civil society organizations worked hard to provide needed assistance by tracing
families, identifying the deceased, and raising funds to aid the victims. The Mufti Dr. Ali
Gomaa issued a fatwa approving Sadaqah (charitable giving) for all Sudanese refugees
during Eid AlAdha.
There is little information in the public domain on what happened that day or what led up to
it. Many questions surrounding the issue remain unanswered. Who was protesting in the first
place, and why? Why did they reject several offers by UNHCR? Could UNHCR and the
government of Egypt have offered the protesters more? Why was such excessive force used
in the removal, and how did so many people die? Why were autopsy reports not released?
Why did it take so long before bodies of victims were released to their relatives for burial,
3
and why were none allowed to be transferred to Sudan for burial? Why was there so little
information and care in the immediate aftermath, when dazed asylum seekers and refugees
were left wandering the streets of Cairo? Who is responsible and who should be held
accountable for which aspect of the problem? Could this tragedy have been avoided and,
most important, could it happen again?
One week after the tragedy, FMRS initiated an investigative research in an effort to find
answers to some of these questions. From the start, the purpose of the investigation was not
so much to assign responsibility as it was to promote a thorough understanding of the
problem: why it happened, what are the issues, and what could have been done or should be
done in the future and by whom in order to prevent such a tragedy.
This is not the first effort by FMRS faculty, students, and researchers to shed light on the
particular issues and problems facing refugees in Egypt and the region, including the
Sudanese. Thus, the report builds on previous FMRS research and on other sources. 1 In order
to identify the particular events that occasioned the threemonth
sitin,
the removal of the
protestors, and the aftermath, an FMRS team of more than 10 researchers gathered eyewitness
testimonies, met with officials from UNHCR and the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and relied on information from a number of nongovernmental
organizations active
in providing assistance to the asylum seeker and refugee community in Egypt.
FMRS undertook the complicated task of wading through a large amount of sometimes
contradictory and confusing bits of information to corroborate testimonies and newspaper
accounts, to separate fact from rumor, and to navigate the passions on the different sides of
this event and the issues that gave rise to it. This report is the result of more than two months
of these efforts. Preliminary findings were presented on February 8, 2006, at an FMRS
Wednesday Seminar and the final version—insofar as any analysis of this event can be
final—is in your hands.
Terminology
It is difficult but important to identify correct terminology in clarifying a highly intricate and
nuanced situation. On the one hand, not everyone who crosses a border is automatically a
“refugee,” and not all those who apply for this legal status are granted it. 2 On the other hand,
because of the rigors of the refugee status determination (RSD) process, not everyone who is
denied the legal status of refugee should be automatically termed an “economic migrant” or
an “illegal migrant.” They may be refugees who simply did not fit the criteria at a particular
1 See www.aucegypt.edu/fmrs, under “Reports.”
2 Article 1 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as an individual who,
“owing to a wellfounded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Article 1(2) of the 1969 OAU Convention adds that a refugee is an
individual who “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or in whole of his country of origin…is compelled to leave his place of habitual
residence.”
4
Asylum
Seeker
(Yellow
Card)
Refugee Status
Determination
(RSD)
Process
Legal
Refugee
(Blue Card)
Appeal
Closed File
Internally
Displaced
Person
time or for a particular reason. Individuals in the middle of their RSD process are generally
referred to as “asylum seekers,” while those who applied and were rejected are termed
“closed files” if no further action is taken or if they appeal and are rejected again.
In interviews and general discussions, FMRS researchers were sometimes confronted with
confusion concerning these terms. Users of the term refugee are not always cognizant of the
distinctions described above, and the word is often used to describe anyone who is in a
refugee situation, whether legally recognized as such or not. This report makes an effort to
navigate these complications, clarifying the differences as thoroughly as possible. Where it
suits the main purpose of the discussion, the report defers to the general usage, referring to
refugees in broad terms without distinction. Most of the time, however, the report does make
a distinction between asylum seekers, recognized refugees, closed files, and others. The
following chart shows various stages and acknowledged categories in an attempt to delineate
the differences. The specific situation described by each of those categories is discussed in
the report.
Process, Status, and Terminology
Cross Successful
Borders
Rejected Resettlement
Local
Successful Integration
Voluntary
Unsuccessful Repatriation
Return to Move Elsewhere,
Country of Origin or Are “Smuggled”
Disappear in Country
and Wait
5
BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS
Not all Sudanese in Egypt are asylum seekers or refugees. There is a long history of
migration between Egypt and Sudan, spanning centuries, facilitated by the geography of the
Nile and the populations’ linguistic and cultural affinities. Estimates of the number of
Sudanese nationals in Egypt vary widely, ranging from 750,000 to 4 million. 3 The majority
has enjoyed longterm
residence and successful careers in business or academia. Some
intermarry with Egyptians and are fairly well integrated into Egyptian society, but maintain
their Sudanese nationality.
One expression of neighborly relations between Egypt and Sudan was the 1976 Wadi ElNil
(Nile Valley) Treaty, which provided for reciprocal treatment of the nationals of both
countries. Under the treaty, Sudanese nationals were granted the right to live in Egypt with
near citizenship. They were permitted to enter without a visa and were, in theory, given
unrestricted access to employment, education, healthcare, and ownership of property.
In 1995, an assassination attempt was made on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in
Ethiopia that was attributed to Sudanese Islamist extremists, after which the Wadi ElNil
Treaty was abrogated. That year, the Egyptian government began requiring Sudanese asylum
seekers to carry an entry visa and a residence permit, and their rights reverted to those
accorded to any foreign national on Egyptian soil. As we shall see, this cutoff
date
corresponds roughly with when the question of Sudanese refugees became a significant issue
in Egypt.
Because of growing political unrest in Sudan, increasing numbers of Sudanese came to Egypt
specifically to seek refuge. The first major wave came in 1955 with the start of Sudan’s civil
war. This wave extended into the mid1980s,
and included opponents of the Nimeiri regime
and to the imposition of Islamic law in southern Sudan. The next major wave came in 1983
with another outbreak of civil war in the South. The most recent wave was created by the
ongoing conflict in Darfur. These conflicts all but destroyed the country, and millions ended
up in camps surrounding Sudan and in camps for the internally displaced within the country.
Escapees from political repression in all parts of Sudan continued to come to Egypt, with tens
of thousands arriving in Egypt over the past ten years, though even more fled to the south or
west of Sudan.
As Egypt increasingly became a recipient country for refugees seeking not just immediate
asylum but also eventual resettlement to third countries, responsibility for the asylum seekers
fell to UNHCR, whose Cairo office eventually developed one of the largest resettlement
operations in the world. Interviews conducted with Sudanese asylum seekers show that
resettlement to the United States, Canada, Australia, and other Western countries has
consistently been the ultimate goal for refugees. Many asylum seekers came to view
resettlement almost as a right, but only about a quarter of them have had this expectation met.
The rest remain in Egypt, severely disappointed and surviving in an Egyptian urban
environment under difficult circumstances.
3 Katarzyna Grabska, “Living on the Margins: Analysis of the Livelihood Strategies of Sudanese Refugees
with Closed Files in Egypt,” FMRS Working Paper 6, June 2005, p. 17.
6
Egypt, UNHCR, and International Law
Egypt is a signatory to both the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (and its
1967 Protocol) 4 and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa. The conventions grant recognized refugees a set of basic rights, starting
with the specific prohibition in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention of refoulement, the forcible
return of an asylum seeker to the country of origin where his or her life may be threatened.
Other rights provided to various degrees by the two conventions include free practice of
religion, continuity of residence, access to courts, employment, welfare, healthcare,
education, and freedom of movement and documentation.
Egypt has no single guiding policy for the treatment of refugees, however, and it has not
taken steps to fully implement the principles of the conventions through its national
legislation. At the same time, as discussed above, Egypt has parallel policies that relate
entirely to its special relationship with Sudan, and these policies often conflict with or
confuse the information regarding services and rights available to Sudanese asylum seekers
and refugees.
Importantly, the government of Egypt has deferred responsibility for those who seek asylum
and refugee status in Egypt to UNHCR, including the conduct of refugee status determination
(RSD) and the provision of assistance in its various forms. UNHCR has often called upon the
Egyptian government to take on the responsibility for RSD in meeting its legal commitments
under the conventions, which the latter has consistently refused to do. 5 Moreover, Egypt sent
UNHCR a letter entering a number of significant reservations to the conventions, limiting
access to education, healthcare, and employment. 6 In practice, however, Egypt has
ameliorated these reservations by softening the restrictions on access to some of these basic
services (see discussion below).
UNHCR continues to be responsible for determining who qualifies for refugee legal status
and its practices in this regard have received some criticism. 7 After initial registration with
UNHCR, an asylum seeker is given a yellow card, granting him or her temporary residence in
Egypt until status is determined. The agency has been criticized by researchers as well as
refugees for having lengthy and unfair procedures, including cursory interviews by
insufficiently trained staff, lack of transparency, lack of adequate and clear information, and
4 Ratified by Egypt in 1981. UN Country Report available at <
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/locations/818.htm> (last accessed 15 January
2006).
5 Interview with Damtew Dessalegne, Deputy Regional Representative, UNHCR Regional Office in Cairo, 16
February 2006. This position was also held by the government of Egypt during an interview with Nasser
Hamzawy, Refugee Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 January 2006.
6 These include: Article 12(1) (personal status); Article 20 (rationing); Article 22(1) (access to primary
education); Article 23 (public relief and assistance); and Article 24 (labor legislation and social security).
These reservations were not mentioned in the official Egyptian Gazette and thus may not have the force of law
in Egypt.
7 See Michael Kagan, “Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedure at UNHCR’s Cairo Office,
2001–2002,” FMRS Working Paper 1, December 2002.
7
at times even arbitrary and unreasonable determinations. Diminishing UNHCR resources
have been straining the agency’s capacity to deal with increasing numbers of applicants in the
past 12 years, which has elicited more complaints of inadequate assistance to the most
needy. 8
Suspension of RSD Interviews for Sudanese Asylum Seekers
In June 2004, as a result of the ceasefire declared earlier in the year between the government
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, UNHCR suspended RSD procedures for
all Sudanese asylum seekers, regardless of whether they originated from the South, Darfur, or
elsewhere. Instead, UNHCR automatically provided all applicants with yellow asylum seeker
cards, which offer temporary protection against refoulement (forced repatriation). The
agency’s rationale was that, given the potential for peace in Sudan, this move offered better
protection than the rejection of a large number of applicants on the basis of a fundamental
change of circumstances in the country of origin, which would undermine the reasons for
granting refugee status. The decision was subsequently reviewed and renewed every six
months.
Sudanese asylum seekers were deeply disappointed and worried by UNHCR’s decision,
especially as it put a heavy damper on their hopes for resettlement and relegated them to a
longer waiting period under difficult conditions in Egypt. Not long before, in May 2004, the
Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan was signed. The agreement, ratified in
September of that year, promised a partial return to the Wadi ElNil
Treaty of 1976,
guaranteeing reciprocal rights of residence, work, movement, and ownership of property. It
was unclear how this agreement would be implemented and whether it would have any
impact on asylum seekers and refugees from Sudan; clearly, many worried that its effect on
them would be negative.
In August 2004, a number of refugees were prompted by an Egyptian organization to gather
in front of UNHCR’s offices to present a memorandum protesting the agency’s change in
8 Ibid., pp. 4041.
In September I was beaten up by some Egyptians in Maadi who took all my documents. I tried
to file a report at the police station, but they wouldn’t let me. Finally after several tries they
agreed and I got a police report. Then I went to take the police report to UNHCR so I could get
a new yellow card. I went there eight times, but they refused to let me enter. One night [before
the sitin]
I slept in Mustafa Mahmoud Park so I could get there early, because I heard that they
only let in a limited number of people a day.
On that eighth day, I saw that there was a group of people in the park, including two women
with their children. I asked them what they were doing there, and they told me they were
protesting. I was already having problems with my flat, so that night I came back with my eight
children and husband and mother, and went and joined the protest and stayed at the park.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006.
8
policy and the announced reduction in some of UNHCR’s assistance to refugees. 9 Confusion
about who would meet with UNHCR staff and misinformation about UNHCR “refusing”
such a meeting led to an open riot and some damage to UNHCR premises. Police were called
in and dozens of protestors as well as 10 police officers were injured. Twentytwo
protestors
were detained but eventually released. In the end, the concerns of the 2004 protestors were
not addressed. 10
One result of the 2004 protest was the decision by UNHCR to move its first meetings with
asylum seekers and refugees to the nearby Mustapha Mahmoud Park, about one block from
the agency’s offices in Mohandeseen, a Cairo neighborhood. For the following year, initial
interviews were conducted at the park and appointments made there for applicants to come to
the office for more extensive meetings and followup.
UNHCR’s holding of asylum seekers
and refugees “at arm’s length” in this fashion can be seen as a physical representation of the
increasing distance between UNHCR and the population it purported to protect. Justified or
not, Sudanese refugees’ longstanding
frustration with UNHCR’s lengthy procedures,
diminishing resources for assistance, and perceived low rate of acceptance (let alone
resettlement), as well as their dissatisfaction with the interview process and their treatment by
some UNHCR staff and security personnel, combined to fuel loss of trust in the agency. At
the same time, asylum seekers could turn to no other agency.
Statistics on Sudanese “of Concern”
Statistics released by the UNHCR Cairo office show that between 1994 and the end of 2005,
58,535 Sudanese nationals sought asylum and registered with the agency. By December
2005, 31,990 of these asylum seekers had been accorded refugee legal status and 16,675 had
been resettled in third countries. An additional 15,000 of the recognized refugees did not
meet the resettlement countries’ criteria and most, if not all, remained in Egypt under “local
integration” status. This leaves just over 315 individuals who, according to UNHCR, were
referred for resettlement but whose procedures for travel have not yet been completed. Of
those who sought refugee status with UNHCR, 16,000 were rejected and eventually became
“closed files,” and another 10,200 were given temporary asylum seeker protection. As of the
end of 2005, 13,327 recognized refugees remained in Egypt. 11 These numbers undergo
monthly revision by UNHCR as decisions are made and individuals shift between categories.
Importantly, the numbers only include those Sudanese who approached UNHCR and
received interviews. Many more may have arrived in Egypt for similar or other purposes; if
they have not approached UNHCR, there is no way to accurately count them.
9 The South Center for Human Rights called for a “demonstration” in front of UNHCR offices but failed to be
present in the morning when dozens of refugees and asylum seekers appeared. See Sudan Human Rights
Organization, Cairo Branch, at org/pressreleases/04/august/26august04.htm>.
10 Leben Nelson Moro and Gamal Abdel Rahman Adam, “The Slow Death of Darfurians Out of Sight in
Egypt,” Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy, 28 July 2005, available at <
http://www.damanga.org/slow_death_in_egypt.html>.
11 Dessalegne, op. cit.
9
UNHCR Statistics on Sudanese of Concern to UNHCR, 19942005
1. Total seeking asylum/registered 58,535 100%
2. Total recognized refugees 31,990 54.6% of applicants
3. Resettled refugees – no longer in
Egypt
16,675 28.48% of applicants
52.1% of those recognized
4. Pending resettlement +/315
5. Recognized but not referred for
resettlement – ‘local integration’
15,000 25.62% of applicants
46.9% of those recognized
6. Asylum seekers with suspended
interviews since 2004
10,200 17.4% of applicants
7. Closed files 16,000 27.3% of applicants
8. Other (for integration, or suspended
interviews)
+/345
Total not resettled (categories 58)
41,545 71%
The statistics above show that approximately 71 percent of all Sudanese who have come to
Egypt seeking asylum (and eventual resettlement) did not get resettled. A number of them
have left, either returning voluntarily to Sudan on their own or trying to make another journey
through smuggling networks or by other means to where their hopes may be met. A
significant majority of the people in categories 5 through 8 remains in Egypt, however,
although exactly how many cannot be ascertained. It is this group of Sudanese refugees,
asylum seekers, and closed files who decided to protest their living conditions and uncertain
future.
Life as a Sudanese Refugee in 2005: Themes and Livelihood Issues
Sudanese refugees in Egypt cite difficult or inadequate access to education, healthcare,
housing, and employment as pressing concerns. Each of these livelihood issues is colored by
the larger themes of racist attitudes and misinformation, as well as increasing frustration with
an ambiguous, suspended existence for an indefinite amount of time. 12
Work
Recognized refugees in Egypt are given the opportunity to work, provided they obtain a work
permit in accordance with Egyptian law. To do so, they must meet strict criteria, including
sponsorship by an employer, legal residence and travel documents, proof of specialized skills
that do not put them in competition with Egyptian workers, HIV tests, and the payment of
processing fees. Few employers choose this route, so few Sudanese refugees are able to get
such work permits. In 2004, the Egyptian government changed its visa stamp format and
added “not permitted to work” to the residency stamps of recognized Sudanese refugees.
After more than a year of effort, UNHCR succeeded in having that addition removed in May
2005. 13
12 For a detailed discussion of livelihood issues among Sudanese with closed files, see Grabska, op. cit.
13 Dessalegne, op. cit.
10
Asylum seekers who do not yet have legal status as refugees, along with closed files, are not
guaranteed the right to work in Egypt. Consequently, they, as well as recognized refugees
without work permits, can only get temporary employment in the informal and unregulated
sector, along with many poor Egyptians and illegal aliens. The refugees’ special vulnerability
makes them subject to exploitation by employers. Many start their own enterprises, buying
and selling handmade crafts and other merchandise on the streets. All have to keep a watchful
eye out for police raids and are often subject to roundups,
fines, and detention. Many
Sudanese women find work as cooks and maids in private homes, but there, too, the risk of
harassment and abuse is high.
Thus, most Sudanese refugees, regardless of their official status, are only able to work
sporadically, for little money, with no job security, and often under exploitative conditions.
The lack of sufficient employment opportunities causes many refugees to become
impoverished. While UNHCR gives minimal financial support to recognized refugees, it does
so only to specific vulnerable or destitute families. Indeed, UNHCR reports that while the
cost of living in Cairo has increased substantially in the last few years, the subsistence
allowance allocated to vulnerable refugees has dropped by an average of 72 percent from
US$55 in 1998 to US$15.5 in 2002 per person each month, leaving many refugee families
well below Egypt’s poverty line. 14
Without a steady income, refugees have difficulty paying rent, educational fees, and costs of
healthcare, the quality of which depends on one’s ability to pay. While several NGOs,
churches, and community groups have developed education and healthcare initiatives, many
services are only available to holders of blue and yellow cards, with yellow cardholders
only
allowed access to emergency healthcare.
Education
Prior to 1995, all Sudanese, including refugees and asylum seekers, could access Egyptian
public schools. This arrangement was separate from Egypt’s obligation to provide primary
education under the 1951 Convention, a commitment to which it entered a reservation. 15
Regardless, Egypt is bound to provide basic educational services by treaties such as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights. In 1992, the
Ministry of Education issued a decree allowing recognized refugee children to attend
Egyptian schools, thus meeting these commitments and bypassing the reservation.
14 UN news story, “Hard Times for Cairo’s Refugees,” 25 November 2002, available at <
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibin/
texis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&id=3de201595&page=newsR>.
15 See footnote 5.
I know this Sudanese woman who worked for an Egyptian family in the North coast. She died.
Her employer claimed that she died in an accident in the swimming pool, but the autopsy
showed that she was hit in the head. I ask the UNHCR to give us protection and to address the
problems of refugees. We are not migrants. We are refugees.
FMRS interviews with demonstrators, 14 January 2006
11
Attempts by Sudanese refugees to enroll their children in Egyptian public schools are often
unsuccessful because of the current overpopulation of classrooms and the unwillingness of
many school headmasters to accommodate new students. In addition, school fees must be
paid. UNHCR provided a fund for educational grants managed by Catholic Relief Services
and made them available for asylum seekers and recognized refugees, but many were either
unaware of the grants or chose not to apply for them. Because of a preoccupation with and
desire for resettlement, many refugees prefer to educate their children in English rather than
in Arabic, which is possible only at more expensive private schools. Those who cannot afford
a private education must depend on charitable community or churchbased
schooling, and the
largest such program uses an Egyptian curriculum. This type of schooling is unaccredited and
may not be recognized by other schools.
Health Services
The Egyptian Health Ministry issued a directive in 2005 making primary health services at
governmental health institutions available to everyone. This subsidized healthcare does not
include complicated or longterm
medical treatment, surgeries, and costly medicines.
Recognized refugees have access to subsidized medical services through UNHCR via its
partnership with CARITAS.
Many refugees expressed serious concern with and a deep distrust of the public healthcare
system in Egypt, complaining of poor quality, disrespect, and lack of proper attention to
medical problems. 16 Despite assurances to the contrary, many cite fears of organ theft or even
intentional malpractice as reasons for not going to public institutions and for preferring
churchbased
clinics for basic medical treatment. A number of mosques offer free healthcare
assistance, but few refugees are aware of these unadvertised services. Religious sensitivities
are often transmuted into a firm belief on refugees’ part that some churches only offer their
services to Christians or that Christians cannot approach mosques for medical treatment.
Housing
Refugees and asylum seekers do not have access to the rentcontrolled
housing available to
Egyptians and have to find housing on the private rental market. With no standardized
estimates of property values, the prices of apartments in Egypt are often arbitrary and
increase exponentially for foreign renters, including refugees. Because most refugees do not
have a stable income, they are forced into overcrowded living quarters, which results in poor
sanitation, minimal personal security, and a stressful home environment. Without regulation,
16 Alexandria is an exception in terms of the services available to Sudanese refugees in Egypt. Cooperation
between the city, the refugee community, and a number of churches has resulted in better living conditions for
refugees, including easier access to health services. In some cases, however, health services provided in
cooperation with churches is limited to refugees from southern Sudan. Grabska, op. cit., pp. 4142.
Refugees need to be provided with medical care and with shelter. A huge problem is
malnutrition. For example, for three months the protesters were eating terribly. There is a
lack of food and many people died from malnutrition. There should be a special group of
the UN who deal with nutrition.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 3 January 2006
12
Sudanese refugees are subjected to arbitrary increases in monthly payments and may be
evicted without just cause. Although they have a right to do so in theory, refugees do not
easily access Egypt’s justice system when this happens or when they are cheated out of rental
deposits. Under these conditions, refugees often have no permanent home address, and many
are vulnerable to exploitation by landlords and by other refugees in seeking to secure a place
to sleep at night.
Closed files and, significantly, new arrivals have even more limited means of providing for
health, housing, and education.
Racist Attitudes
Although most Egyptian Cairenes would deny that their society is racist, 17 racism presents a
significant, if not welldocumented,
obstacle for Sudanese and other refugees in Egypt.
Sudanese refugees widely report discrimination—which they attribute to racist attitudes—in
the realms of employment, access to housing, healthcare, and everyday interactions with civil
society. 18 Southern Sudanese, who often have a darker complexion than the average
Egyptian, bear the bulk of this abuse. They report being verbally harassed by Egyptians, who
shout names such as “oonga boonga” or samara (meaning “black”) at Sudanese and other
African migrants. Stories of attacks by both the police and street thugs circulate widely. One
doctor has reported seeing an average of one violent attack on African refugees per month. 19
Police occasionally round up people on the streets who “look” African and subject them to
verbal and physical abuse until UNHCR intervenes to have them released, if they are listed
with the agency as an asylum seeker or a refugee. 20 Such roundups
have occurred with far
less frequency in the past two years.
In some cases, negative relationships between refugees and locals are perpetuated by the
resentment felt by Egyptians, who may be just as povertystricken
but are unable to access
the services available to refugees. In addition, refugees are often blamed for taking jobs away
from locals, an especially sensitive issue in a country with an estimated 30 percent rate of
unemployment.
The already negative experience of becoming a refugee is magnified in Cairo by the absence
of sufficient services and the poverty experienced by many refugees. Refugees in Cairo are
17 See Anita Fábos, abstract from “Cosmopolitan Racism? Nationalism, Refugees, and Integration in Cairo,”
unpublished presentation at the University of Ghent, 17 December 2001, available at <
http://www.evensfoundation.be/PDF%20documents/Intcul_Conf_Fabos.pdf>.
18 See Cynthia Johnston, “Feature: Egypt’s African Migrants Dodge Rocks, Fight Racism,” Reuters, 24 June
2005, available at .
19 Ibid.
20 See Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Mass Arrests of Foreigners, African Refugees Targeted in Cairo,” 10
February 2003, available at .
A group of Egyptians beat me and broke my leg and stole my money when I was on my way
home from work. When I complained to UNHCR, they told me to bring the abusers. How am I
to bring them? This kind of treatment is intolerable.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 12 January 2006
13
subjected to both racial and class discrimination, the overall effect being one of extreme
frustration, marginalization, and loss of dignity. Many refugees feel so marginalized in Egypt
that they complain of “not being treated like a human being.” 21
Some Egyptians’ racist attitudes shock incoming asylum seekers into negative assumptions
about Egyptian society, producing counterracist
attitudes that lead to selfmarginalization,
which compounds difficulties. Because of widespread high expectations for resettlement,
Sudanese refugees often refuse to engage with Egyptian society except at the most necessary
levels, viewing their sojourn in the country as temporary. Attitudes such as preference for
English over Arabic and for foreign services over Egyptian ones sometimes produce what
may be characterized as racist attitudes among refugees, which exacerbate selfmarginalization.
Misinformation
Experiences and attitudes of racism are closely linked to the information vacuum. Most
Egyptians are misinformed about refugees’ role in Egypt, with many ascribing the
responsibility for the country’s poor job market and even a perceived decline in moral values
to refugees. In addition, few Egyptians become friendly enough with refugees to appreciate
the reality of their situation or their positive contribution, especially economic, to Egypt.
Refugees suffer even worse information failure than Egyptians. They face a glaring absence
of reliable and trusted sources of information, and they often do not know what assistance is
available. This is partly due to the size and density of Cairo, but it also points to the failure of
UNHCR, the government of Egypt, and service NGOs to provide clear and accessible
information on what is available, how it can be accessed, and who qualifies. What the law
provides is often not available in practice, and what is available is at times more than the law
allows for and more than refugees and asylum seekers know about. 22
In the absence of credible information, refugees rely on rumors that spread quickly through
the community. 23 These rumors often relate to resettlement promises or programs that do not
exist. The community is victimized by rumors about churches and mosques only “serving
21 Stacy Schafer, “Sudanese Demonstrators in Mohandeseen: Who They Are and Why They’re Here,”
unpublished paper on file with FMRS, p. 15.
22 UNHCR publishes a booklet in English that describes RSD procedures and some of the assistance available
for asylum seekers and refugees. FMRS has a list on its Web site of organizations that provide services for
refugees, available at . Little information is
available in Arabic, however.
23 See Shafer, op. cit., p. 14.
I’m from Darfur, from the war, where I had very hard troubles. There I witnessed my father
being killed and my mother’s legs being broken. Then I fled from my town to a camp in
Darfur, and then to Khartoum, where I was beaten by police and other people, who said, “You
make the capitol’s face ugly,” because we were refugees. And then I came to Cairo and went
to UNHCR because I heard that they offered protection, but I found that the situation here is
just as bad: there are also beatings and killings and persecution.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006
14
their own,” about gangs of Egyptian youths attacking Africans, assumptions about the
disappearance of young Sudanese men and women, poor explanations of deaths, and invasive
surgeries on the part of Egyptian medical personnel, including organ theft. Many refugees are
convinced to refuse interaction with Egyptian society, often confining themselves to their
homes and minimal social networks. 24
Growing Frustration
These factors have combined over the past two years to create growing frustration within the
Sudanese refugee community in Egypt. Frustration is not only the result of the community’s
disappointment about the lack of resettlement opportunities. Refugees have had to contend
with staying in Egypt for an indeterminate amount of time under difficult living conditions,
with only patchy access to basic rights. They are buffeted and confused by rumors, and few
receive the minimal assistance available from UNHCR and NGOs working on their behalf.
They feel marginalized by the lack of understanding and, at times, outright hostility displayed
by Egyptian society, and react by further marginalizing themselves.
A great many refugees are convinced that a longterm
stay in Egypt is untenable. This
opinion is held by recognized refugees, asylum seekers who were told that their RSD
interviews would not occur in the foreseeable future, and closed files not willing to return to
Sudan. Their decision to sit in at Mustafa Mahmoud Park and to demand fundamental
changes in their circumstances should have come as no surprise.
24 See Pasquale Ghazaleh, “In ‘Closed File’ Limbo: Displaced Sudanese in a Cairo Slum,” Forced Migration
Review, January 2003, available at .
I was in the park for 91 days. I went there because, 1) I went to get resettled to a secure
country. There is no security here. The Sudanese and Egyptian governments have a
relationship. I could be deported at any time. 2) I had no where to live at that time. 3) The
UN doesn’t give money, shelter, education. 4) The protesters were demanding the same
things as me.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 2 February 2006
15
THREE MONTHS OF PROTEST
The sitin
began on September 29, 2005, with several dozen participants. Refugee Voices, a
group of Sudanese in Cairo who had been gathering information about refugee rights and
international refugee law since January 2005, organized the protest. 25 According to Refugee
Voices, the purpose of the demonstration was to draw the “attention of the international
community to find solutions to [their] problems.” 26
Mustafa Mahmoud Park was an obvious choice for the sitin:
it is close to the offices of
UNHCR and large enough to accommodate many people, it allowed for the demonstrators to
access water and bathrooms at the adjacent mosque, and, being next to a busy intersection, it
provided public visibility. The start date roughly coincided with the beginning of Ramadan
and the end of seasonal employment for some demonstrators.
In only a few days, the park’s population grew into the hundreds. Within the first month,
between 800 and 2,000 people were living in the park full time. An average of 1,500 to 2,000
were present for the duration of the sitin.
Many would leave during the day for work and
return to sleep in the park at night. 27 The demonstrators moved onto the surrounding
sidewalks when the park became full, and some estimates show that there were 3,000 to
4,000 people at the park by the end of December. 28 Evidence suggests that initial
mobilization was spontaneous, and that the majority of those who joined the protest heard
about it through word of mouth.
The demonstrators were a mix of men, women, children, and the elderly, though about half
were single men between 20 and 35 years old. The numbers of Christians and Muslims were
roughly equal. At least 16 tribes from all parts of Sudan were represented, and the three
largest ethnic groups—Dinka, Nuba, and Nuer—comprised only 30 percent of the total. 29
25 UNHCR reports that the sitin
began with 20 demonstrators (see “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,”
UNHCR Cairo, 30 October 2005, on file with FMRS). Protest representatives report that it began with 70; see
statement by members of Refugees Voice in Egypt, “Appeal for Group Protection and Humanitarian
Assistance to the Members of ‘Refugees Voice in Egypt,’” 23 February 2006, on file with FMRS. The
organizers referred to themselves in written publications in English alternately as Refugees Voice in Egypt,
Refugee Voice in Egypt, Refugee’s Voice, and The Voice of Sudanese Refugees in Cairo.
26 See statement by members of Refugees Voice in Egypt, op. cit.
27 One demonstrator said, “Most of us stayed in the park all the time. Very few left and came back.” FMRS
interview, 14 January 2006.
28 Estimates include: 20 on 29 September, 300 on 3 October, and 1,500 during peak hours on 9 October in
“Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, op. cit.; 3,000 in Abeer Allam and Michael Slackman,
“23 Sudanese Die in Raid in Egypt,” New York Times, 31 December 2005, p. A.1; and 4,000 in Ranyah Sabry,
“Harsh Life in Egypt Protest Camp,” BBC News, 30 December 2005. One demonstrator stated that some
Sudanese from outlying areas, including Nasser City, Arba wa Nus, and Heliopolis, were prevented from
coming to the demonstration by Egyptian police. FMRS interview, 17 October 2005.
29 See Schafer, op. cit. Egypt Today reported that “a visit to the square reveals that refugees hail from all parts
of Sudan….Some are from southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, others from Darfur and eastern Sudan.”
Viviana Mazza, “Enemy Camps?”, Egypt Today, December 2005.
16
Media and Civil Society Response
The demonstration quickly received attention from the public and the media. Because
Mustafa Mahmoud Park is bordered on all sides by streets, one of which is a primary
commuter thoroughfare, as well as by small businesses, restaurants, and residential buildings,
the park’s fence was used to display banners with slogans in Arabic and English, such as “We
are the victims of mismanagement,” “We reject local integration,” “Where is the international
media?” and “Attention please: Who will restore our rights?” They included tributes to
Sudanese killed or missing in Egypt.
Some of the park’s neighbors complained about the demonstration, 30 while others gave the
protesters words of support and donations of food, blankets, and clothing. One neighbor said:
I was not bothered by [the demonstrators]. Most of the people in the area
were complaining saying that they should go back to their homes or even
their country because we as Egyptians have lots of problems. Some people
also complained that they were drinking alcoholic drinks; this is true but not
all of them so I don’t see it as the general behavior of the park….Since they
came to the park, the park was freed from those youth who were hanging
around at night till early hours in the morning running around with cars and
loud music; honestly, I was bothered by such behavior, not by the peaceful
protest by the Sudanese. 31
In the first two weeks, Egyptian authorities blocked some news agencies, journalists,
photographers, and human rights advocates from accessing the demonstrators, 32 but as the
protest wore on, they usually allowed visitors to enter the park at will. Visitors were asked for
identification by the sitin’s
internal security, often identifiable by red badges and vests, and
were usually introduced to a media spokesman.
30 See Jamal Al Keshkie, “Radical Refugees,” AlAhram
Weekly Online, 1723
November 2005, available at
.
31 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006.
32 One report said, “News agencies have not been given access to the participants. Journalists reported being
turned away and having their film confiscated. In addition, attorneys for the AMERA Center, an organization
of Egyptian human rights lawyers, attempted to reach the refugees but were kept away by Egyptian
authorities.” See “Darfur Refugees Protest UN Policies in Cairo, Egypt,” Damanga Coalition for Freedom and
Democracy, 13 October 2005, p. 1, available at < http://www.damanga.org/refugee_protest.html>.
I don’t believe this thing will happen again, because all the people stayed like one
person, if you are from South, West, East, if you are Muslim or Christian, no difference
because you can meet five Christians and two Muslims and they stay together and cook
together.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 13 January 2006
17
Both Englishand
Arabiclanguage
Egyptian media covered the demonstration from its start.
Statements by journalists and demonstrators attest to a certain amount of distrust between
those in the park and the Egyptian media. 33 Most print stories included the views of both
demonstrators and UNHCR representatives, and several publications wrote features that
presented multiple perspectives, including those of UNHCR representatives, protesters,
university professors, Egyptian security personnel, and the park’s neighbors. The
demonstration was also covered in several African refugee and Sudanrelated
publications, as
well as at least nine online Web logs. 34 No major international newspapers picked up the
story until the week before the forced removal.
Cairo NGOs and churches continued to provide services to Sudanese asylum seekers and
refugees. Some met with UNHCR to discuss how to resolve the demonstration, and many
were present at an October 26 meeting between demonstration and UNHCR representatives. 35
On October 26, FMRS hosted a standingroom–
only seminar about the demonstration. 36
33 One report stated, “It seems like that most of the people there don’t want to give or show us a lot of
information, especially to Egyptian journalists and press, because they think it’s not their business and they
don’t care about their problem. On the other hand, they are so helpful and grateful with the foreign and
international press and channels.” Mehana Nour and Mohammed Rabie, “They Transformed Mustafa
Mahmoud Garden into a Refugee Camp,” October Magazine, 29 October 2005, p. 79, translated by Omar
Idriss.
34 For sample blog entries, see “Rebelman,” So Much Things, 9 October 2005, <
http://somuchthings.blogspot.com/2005/10/blogpost.
html>; Sarah Sevcik, “Massive Sudanese
Demonstration/Protest!”, A year in Cairo Egypt, 27 October 2005, <
http://smsevcik.blogspot.com/2005/10/massivesudanesedemonstrationprotest.
html>; “Refugee tragedy
Unfolds Amid Eid Celebrations,” Darfur Daily News, 4 November 2005, <
http://darfurdaily.blogspot.com/2005/11/refugeetragedyunfoldsamideid.
html>; “Madmonk,” “Sudanese
Refugees Protest in Cairo,” 11 November 2005, N01>; “Scott,” “The Sudanese Regional Government…,” 12 November 2005, <
http://scottymac.blogspot.com/2005/11/sudaneseregionalgovernmentcommander.
html>; “Sudanese refugees
in Cairo Start Hunger Strike…,” Blogging Web, 15 November 2005, 2005/11/sudaneserefugeesincairostart.
html>; Youssef M. Assad, “Photos of the Sudanese
Protests in Cairo,” Youssef, or Perhaps Not, 27 November 2005, <
http://youssefassad.blogspot.com/2005/11/photosofsudaneseprotestsincairo.
html>; and “Sudanese
Refugees,” Brian’s Study Breaks, 28 November 2005, <
http://bjulrich.blogspot.com/2005_11_01_bjulrich_archive.html>.
35 Refugee Egypt, Catholic Relief Services, the Association for Human Rights Legal Aid, Heliopolis
Community Church, and Musa’adeen were present at the meeting. See “Meeting with demonstrators and
NGOs; Date: Thursday 26 October,” on file with FMRS.
36 Demonstration representatives were invited to present their demands and express their points of view, with
discussion from the audience. UNHCR had been invited to do a separate presentation on its perspective on the
sitin,
but declined the invitation.
On the fourth day, as we became more and we were almost 800, so we realized that
we had to be organized. So there were committees, one for the press, one who
collected money and gave donations, and there was one for security. The members in
this committee searched anybody who came into the camp. They did not want anyone
to enter with alcohol. When some came drunk to the camp, the security committee
held them for some hours, until they became sober.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 14 January 2006
18
Requests, Demands, and Responses
Participants distributed a list of requests early in the demonstration. The list was handed out
at the park to visitors and the media, sent around on email lists, and distributed and explained
at meetings with UNHCR and NGOs. Several versions of the list, with different titles,
authors, emphases, and demands, eventually circulated. An early list, given to a visitor to the
park on October 10, was entitled “Requests” and contained a list of 13 points in English.
Another early, slightly different version of the list, with 20 points written in Arabic, was
given to the Damanga Coalition for Freedom and Democracy; this list was translated and
published by Damanga on October 13. A third list was distributed at the FMRS seminar on
October 26. It was entitled “Statement” and contained a list of 12 points, written in better
English than the first and with each point explained more fully. A UNHCR statement on
October 30 under the heading “What are the demands of the Sudanese demonstrators?”
contained a list of 19 points, rewritten, reordered, and rephrased again. The specific names of
the authors and editors of each list are unknown.
At the FMRS seminar, demonstration representatives on the panel used their time to go
through the list and explain each point in detail. Common to all versions of the list were calls
for the resumption of the individual refugee status determination interviews suspended in
2004, a clearer and more transparent RSD process, the opening of closed files by UNHCR,
protection from the Sudanese government, extra protection for the vulnerable, registration of
asylum seekers upon arrival, and investigations of arbitrary detentions and missing persons
cases. The lists also called attention to the problem of pressuring refugees to return to
Sudan—what they called “compulsory voluntary repatriation.” The lists also described the
difficulties of local integration due to discrimination and lack of basic rights, the geographical
and ethnic distinctions made in RSD interviews, and negative reactions to the Four Freedoms
Agreement, which the demonstrators worried would adversely affect their protected status.
The lists ended with a demand for a “radical solution” to the problems facing Sudanese
refugees in Egypt, and for resettlement if another viable solution is not found. An explanation
of each of the points on the lists can be found in Appendix A.
On October 3, five protest representatives began a series of meetings with UNHCR protection
officers and others to discuss a solution. UNHCR also held a meeting with several NGOs on
the same topic. At around this same time, UNHCR temporarily closed its offices, citing
security considerations. On October 26, three UNHCR representatives, five demonstration
representatives, and parties from five Cairo NGOs and churches held a second meeting. Little
progress was made in these early discussions. UNHCR’s early public reactions had a clearly
adversarial tone toward the protestors.
For example, the first known list distributed by the protestors, titled “Requests,” stated, “The
Sudanese refugees object the UNHCR programme of compulsory voluntary repartition.” The
list distributed at the FMRS seminar, entitled “Statements,” explained, “We, the Sudanese
refugees in Cairo, fear that UNHCR or the Egyptian government will impose compulsory
involuntary repatriation to the South because we read in UNHCR’s newsletters about
repatriation how things have improved there. We have contrary information and are afraid to
return.” On October 30, UNHCR released a statement that outlined the agency’s views of the
19
demonstrators’ requests. The press release called the demonstrators’ requests “demands” and
stated simply that “Sudanese refugees reject any notion of voluntary repatriation.” The
demands mentioned by UNHCR also contained several surprising points that had not
appeared before, including “UNHCR should stop holding meetings with Sudanese
community leaders and communitybased
organizations to discuss about voluntary
repatriation or local integration” and “There should be no police officers guarding UNHCR
premises.” These points may have been based on discussions between UNHCR and
demonstration representatives on October 3 and 26, but they were not published in any
demonstrator statement before or after the sitin.
The tone of UNHCR’s October 30 press release was surprisingly combative. It addressed the
“demands of the Sudanese demonstrators” alternately as “priority areas of concern to
UNHCR,” “selfserving,”
and “allegations unsupported by any piece of evidence.” In the
same document, UNHCR attempted to distance itself from the demonstrators by stating as
“clear fact” that the protesters were primarily economic migrants who fell outside the
agency’s mandate and that they were almost all from southern Sudan, undermining their
claim to refugee status and protection:
Firstly, the vast majority of the Sudanese demonstrators are southern
Sudanese….Secondly, a great many of them are unsuccessful asylumseekers
(the socalled
“closed files”) who are not of concern to UNHCR
and new arrivals who have registered themselves as refugee applicants
with the hope of immigration to America or Australia….The situation of
the demonstrating Sudanese nationals, many of whom are not refugees as
defined by the 1951 Convention or the 1969 OAU Convention, demands
national legislation and/or policy measures outside the frame of refugee
protection and indeed of UNHCR’s mandate….Objective factors in south
Sudan indicate that these people are generally not fleeing persecution or
even generalized violence, but economic deprivation….It is this often
deliberate blurring of the distinction between refugees fleeing persecution
and migrants in search of economic opportunities that for the most part
characterizes the Sudanese “protest” against UNHCR office in
Cairo….In addition, the signing of the peace agreement in southern Sudan
increased nexus requirements for status recognition and created new
opportunities for protection in Sudan, so that UNHCR’s responsibility to
refugees from that area changed. 37
The italicized segments above are a series of subjective and judgmental determinations by
UNHCR that display a negative if not hostile attitude toward the protestors. It is important to
note that UNHCR’s insistence that the protestors were not really refugees was echoed in
much of the media. 38
37 Emphasis added. See “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, op. cit.
38 For example, “These people see themselves as refugees, fleeing a country that offered little hope for a better
life, and yet the law does not consider them refugees,” in Allam and Slackman, New York Times, op. cit.
20
The facts eventually spoke otherwise. As noted earlier in this report, the demonstrators were
from all parts of Sudan, including Darfur, the East, and the North. More importantly, a
December 16 study of the park population showed that 43 percent had yellow asylum seeker
cards and 24 percent had blue recognized refugee cards, which made a total of 67 percent of
the protesters of immediate concern to UNHCR. Of the remainder, 13 percent were closed
files cases and only 15 percent had neither a card nor a closed file. 39 These estimates were
later confirmed by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which showed that of the 2,174
people removed from the park at the end of December, around 70 percent were almost
immediately released as registered asylum seekers or refugees. UNHCR staff advocated for
and obtained the release of those from Darfur and of the vulnerable women and children
population. Only 169 individuals were left who may have been considered “of no concern to
UNHCR,” and even they were eventually released. 40
The October 30 UNHCR press release pointed out that the demonstration was illegal and
would have to end, praising the Egyptian government’s restraint in dealing with the
protesters. The document concluded with the suggestion that obstinacy on the part of the
“selfappointed
organizers” was the root of the failure to reach a compromise and that “this is
regrettable, and many innocent men, women and children who joined the demonstration,
misled by rumors, are paying the price.”
On the same day, UNHCR released another document titled “Rumours, Myths and
Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations.” This statement charged that “persons
have been spreading false and misleading information in order to induce many into joining
the sitin.”
41 Since knowledge of the protest was primarily spread through word of mouth, it
is difficult to confirm the validity of this charge. Demonstrator testimonies reveal that a large
majority of the participants held strong convictions about why they were demonstrating and
that few, if any, needed to be induced to move out of their flats and into the park. In fact,
several demonstrators said that they learned about and joined the protest after discovering it
during independent visits to UNHCR’s offices.
39 See Schafer, op. cit. The study included a survey of 150 demonstrators and 15 group interviews. Shafer
witnessed an Egyptian television news crew ask everyone at the demonstration to hold up their blue or yellow
cards, if they had them, and found that “an overwhelming majority of the refugees immediately produced
UNHCR cards, with yellow cards dominating.” Schafer photographed the event; photos are on file with
FMRS.
40 See “The Aftermath” in this report, which provides more detail on these efforts.
41 UNHCR, “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations,” 30 October 2005, on
file with FMRS.
I went to UNHCR office weekly to inquire with them about my status, and three days of
the start of the demonstration, I went to the office and saw all the people there in the
park. I asked what everyone was doing there and they said they all have a lot of
problems, and so I went there and joined the protest. I was upset with UNHCR and
decided to stay. I stayed until it was broken up. I was disappointed in the office, because
I had gone repeatedly for the year, putting in inquiries into my situation, and they never
helped me.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006
21
The Response of Egyptian, Sudanese, and Resettlement Country Governments
The Egyptian government’s role during the demonstration’s first month was primarily
protective. Police maintained a constant presence around the park, with some officers in plain
clothes and most in uniform. They had a peaceful relationship with the demonstrators. As one
demonstrator said,
The relationship with the police was very good; we respected them and
they respected us and they were guarding us. That’s why we brought our
bags and clothes and money to the park; we knew the police were around
the park and it was a safe place. If they found children wandering outside
they would direct them back in the park, with no problem. 42
Many expected that the park would be cleared in time for Eid AlAdha
celebrations at the
beginning of November, but it was not. Instead, the police continued to play what seemed a
protective role throughout the threemonth
period. One article quoted a brigadier, Mohamed
Ibrahim, as saying, “Security is there to protect them there around the garden twentyfour
hours a day.” The article went on to claim that the security staff’s orders to treat the protesters
well came directly from Interior Minister Habib AlAdly.
43 In a speech in the park in late
December, one protestor said, “We thank the Egyptian government…since we came here in
this park, we find there is police around us protecting our lives. I am quite sure—250
percent—if not this Egyptian government protecting us, we shouldn’t stay here in this park
for three months. I give many, many, many thanks to the Egyptian government.” 44
Unfortunately, this protection and its appreciation were not to last beyond December 29.
According to a UNHCR representative, the Egyptian government’s patience with the protest
was not due to prompting from UNHCR. 45 Egyptian government representatives charge that
they faced continual pressure and even threats from UNHCR to end the protest, although
UNHCR has denied these allegations. In a statement made several days after the forced
eviction of the demonstrators, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry said that “throughout the three
months…the Egyptian authorities faced continued pressure from the regional office of the
UNHCR [which] demanded in writing [three times] and verbally the need for the authorities
to intervene and end the protest and held [Egypt] responsible for any possible harm on its
staff and offices.” 46
42 FMRS interview, 29 January 2006.
43 October Magazine, 29 October 2005, op. cit., p. 79.
44 Speech given 21 December 2005. Transcript on file with FMRS.
45 The UNHCR representative said the police “have shown remarkable restraint and should be commended.
They have had no prompting from UNHCR.” See Alex Gomez, Themba Lewis, Martin Rowe, Assad Khalid
Salih, Leslie Sander, Stacy Schafer, and Helen Smith, “UNHCR Responds to the Cairo Refugee Sitin:
An
Official Response,” Pambazuka News, 27 October 2005.
46 “Egypt Deflects Blame for Deadly Sudanese Protest Breakup,”
Agence France Presse, 4 January 2006,
available at .
This charge was repeated in an FMRS interview with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see Hamzawy, op. cit.),
but has been denied as “nonsense” by UNHCR (see Dessalegne, op. cit.).
22
It remains unclear, and subject to much speculation, why the government of Egypt was
uncharacteristically lenient toward the protesters for such a long period. Some believe this
patience should be seen in the context of the government’s historical disagreements with
UNHCR over who ought to be responsible for refugees, and even that Egypt may have
allowed the protest to last so long in order to pressure UNHCR to deal with the mounting
problems of Sudanese asylum seekers.
In an article in AlNaba
newspaper, a UNHCR representative was quoted as saying that
“Egypt since President Gamal Abd El Nasser has refused to handle the responsibility of
refugees in their land, placing the responsibility on UNHCR. With the large number of
problems for refugees inside Egypt and the small amount of funding UNHCR receives,
discussions with the Egyptian government about who will be responsible for the refugees will
occur. In the next two years, the government will take responsibility for those refugees.” 47
Statements by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasize that the government
was particularly conscious of Egypt’s special relationship with Sudan in its handling of the
demonstration. 48
The Sudanese government, meanwhile, took an interest in the sitin
in its early months, a
matter of grave concern for many asylum seekers and refugees, who were worried that the
government might target them for having fled Sudan. Demonstrators reported that
representatives of the Sudanese government often circled the park at night in embassy
vehicles. In the early hours of the morning on October 15, a few Sudanese men in a jeep with
diplomatic license plates arrived and allegedly infiltrated the camp, distributed alcohol, and
attempted to start a fight. The intruders were stopped by demonstrators and handed over to
Egyptian police. The rear license plate was removed from the intruders’ vehicle to keep as
evidence and was photographed. Later, the same vehicle was photographed on a street
adjacent to the Sudanese embassy, with its rear license plate missing and a replacement paper
license in the window. Sudanese officials indicated that the men using the vehicle that night
were friends of embassy employees but that they were not affiliated with the Sudanese
government in any official capacity. 49
47 Ahmed Baraka, “The Secrets of the Sudanese Demonstration in Front of Mustafa Mahmoud Mosque and
Their Demands to Create Camps for Them in Egypt,” AlNaba,
date unknown, translated by Omar Idriss.
Statement made by an Assistant Protection Officer at UNHCR.
48 For example, “The evacuation could have been done easy and without any loss if we had intervened from
the beginning, but we did not want to interfere because of the sensitive relationship between Egypt and
Sudan.” Hamzawy, op. cit.
49 “For the Seventh Week: The Sudanese Refugees Keep Going in Front of UNHCR Office,” AlWafd,
14
November 2005. The photos are on file with FMRS.
It’s a conspiracy between the Sudanese government and the Egyptian government since
they both want us sent to Sudan. The Egyptian government wants refugees out of their
country and the Sudanese government doesn’t want to look bad by the people who fled
their regime.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 12 January 2006
23
Representatives of resettlement countries chose not to get involved in the protest and
supported UNHCR’s negotiation efforts. When asked about the protest in October,
representatives from the Australian and the United States governments, which are among the
handful of large donors to UNHCR and hosts to resettled refugees, affirmed their support for
UNHCR’s efforts and gave no indication of any change of policy regarding resettlement
programs. 50
Daily Life During the Sitin
Although uncomfortable, the park became a refuge for the protesters and many noted that
they felt safe there. Their voices were being heard and recognized on a global scale; UNHCR
was in dialogue with them about their futures; they did not have to pay rent and thus worry so
much about money; and, more than anything, they were together, surrounded by security, in
the public eye, and enjoying a strong sense of community and solidarity. Many moved all
their belongings and family out of their previous dwellings and into the park.
As the demonstration gained participants and longevity, more comfortable arrangements and
structures were created in the park. The ground was covered with a layer of mats and
blankets. Luggage and other items formed partitions with narrow walkways between living
spaces. Separate sections were built for men and for women and children. Media reports
describe how, at first, sheets were hung as shelter from the sun. As the weather turned colder,
the sheets were replaced with tarps.
Meals were prepared in a communal kitchen area on gas stoves, with food bought with
money pooled from those in the park and shared. Clothes, food, and blankets were donated by
community members, neighborhood residents, and Egyptian and international
organizations. 51 Makeshift shops inside the park offered snacks. In addition to the mosque’s
toilets, some people used the nearby houses of friends.
Still, living conditions were difficult. Demonstrators reported having too little food: “We only
had one sandwich to eat everyday, and milk was given only to the children and the elderly.”
50 United States Regional Refugee Coordinator for North Africa and the Middle East Gerard Cheyne said, “We
will work with UNHCR in Cairo and elsewhere in the region to encourage the Sudanese to return to Sudan. At
the same time we will continue to consider for resettlement any Sudanese for whom repatriation is not possible
and for whom resettlement is believed to be the best durable solution—as determined by the UNHCR.” The
Principal Migration Officer for the Australian Embassy in Cairo, Ross Wilkie, stated that “any decision by
UNHCR is one for them to comment on. Our large refugee resettlement program in Africa, which includes
significant numbers of Sudanese from Cairo…is continuing.” Pambazuka News, 27 October 2005, op. cit.
51 For a report on donations, see AlAhram
Weekly Online, 1723
November 2005, op. cit.
I felt very safe and very relaxed in the park, except for the final day when it was broken up.
We received no alarm or warnings.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006
24
Showing the level of distrust in the community, protesters accepted food contributions from
some Egyptians, but several said, “We were afraid that it may have been poisonous.” 52
The park had a makeshift hospital with equipment for administering intravenous medication
and a small supply of oral medications. A Sudanese refugee doctor regularly visited the
park. 53 An Egyptian NGO reported that four babies were born in the park during the protest’s
three months. There were seven confirmed deaths prior to the forced eviction, including a
toddler, twin infants, and an adolescent female, although the number is disputed. One
protester reported as many as 11 deaths. 54
Many visitors and members of the media remarked on the orderliness of the sitin,
despite the
presence of a large number of people in a small space:
They maintained a level of cleanliness in proportion with their numbers—
3,000 persons in a park without a lot of services. I saw them more than
once collecting their garbage and putting it away. It is not their problem
that it was never collected by the garbage collector. I think they were
organized and they had a great sense of community. Every one of them
was responsible for a particular job, and there were always group
meetings. They were also proactive—they prepared for the rain before the
rain started. 55
Demonstrators themselves highlighted the respectfulness and organization of the sitin.
Protesters organized English, Arabic, and art lessons for children. On one occasion,
demonstrators made puppets from disposable items and performed a puppet show for the
children in the park. Daily speeches were given in which speakers reminded those present to
“respect this place, it is your community,” to “respect the police,” and to ignore the insults of
passersby,
stay in the park, “stay orderly, and avoid violence and rowdy behavior.”
Demonstrators entering the park were checked, and alcohol and potential weapons were
confiscated.
Inside, the park was very organized. It became an independent life….The
people tried to reflect civilized behavior, especially because we were
portrayed in the Egyptian media as being uncivilized, drinking, etc. We
had a time to sleep, a time to wake up. We wanted to deal well with the
media coming, with the police outside the park. Even the guards inside the
park searched anyone coming into the park to make sure that they didn’t
have any alcohol with them, and if they did, they would be handed to
Egyptian security….The internal environment was very respectful, and
everyone respected the other, Muslim or Christian, living together in
peace.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006
52 FMRS interview, 3 January 2006.
53 Shafer, op. cit.
54 See AlAhram
Weekly Online, 1723
November 2005, op. cit.; email from protest leader to Nora Danielson,
17 May 2006; transcript of speech, 21 December 2005, op. cit.
55 FMRS interview, 8 January 2006.
25
Some accused the demonstration’s internal discipline of going too far. A number of firsthand
accounts describe how those who came to the park drunk or who misbehaved were punished.
A tree in the middle of the park apparently served as a makeshift prison, where individuals
were sometimes tied up, covered by blankets, and doused with water if they cried for help. 56
Even visitors, including suspected security personnel from the Sudanese embassy, were on
occasion “disciplined” in such a manner. Personality and political conflicts seemed to mesh,
and one interviewee accused the security detail in the park of making up its own law and of
stealing mobile phones and money. He said he tried to report the perpetrators but that the
police did nothing. 57 Several demonstrators vehemently denied these allegations.
Ongoing Negotiations with UNHCR
Soon after the demonstration began, participants held elections to choose representatives for
public relations work and to negotiate with UNHCR. Committees were created to oversee
donations and security. With few exceptions, the Sudanese interviewed by FMRS, especially
those who participated in the sitin,
spoke at length and with pride of the level of organization
and decisionmaking
within the park.
The dynamics of leadership changed as the park’s population grew. From the outset of the
demonstration until the fateful December 17 agreement, five male organizers maintained a
visible public presence. These five leaders, although initially referred to as “selfappointed”
in UNHCR documents, 58 were nonetheless viewed by UNHCR, possibly for lack of
alternatives or out of convenience, as representing the demonstration as a whole. They were
present at multiple meetings and were authorized to negotiate on behalf of the protestors. The
five were routinely interviewed by local and international media, met and hosted visitors to
the park, and were the main negotiators in meetings with UNHCR and others. In addition,
these leaders were responsible for supervising the high level of internal organization in the
park.
In the beginning of December, the five began backing away from the term “leaders” and
began referring to the demonstration as a spontaneous and selforganized
event. 59 Media
attention also shifted away from individuals who previously had prominent media and public
relations roles.
56 Leigh Sylvan, “Revised News Article,” unpublished, January 2006, on file with FMRS.
57 FMRS interview, 3 January 2006.
58 See UNHCR documents, “Rumours, Myths and Speculations Behind the Sudanese Demonstrations” and
“Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo,” op. cit.
59 FMRS interview, 13 January 2006.
We wrote our requests on a list and gave the leaders the list and said please talk to the
office about them. The leaders were chosen through election….The first five leaders, they
were very strict and frank and we trusted in them. If they said, “Go to the moon,” we’d go
to the moon, because they were trying to give us our rights.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006
26
On November 17, demonstration representatives met with UNHCR representatives, Goodwill
Ambassador Adel Imam, senior Egyptian government officials, and several Sudanese
community leaders. The meeting resulted in an offer of onetime
housing assistance for
demonstrators who had lost their homes while at the sitin,
as well as help with the costs of
elementary education and assisted return to southern Sudan for those refugees and asylum
seekers who chose to repatriate. During the meeting, the demonstrators were told that
residency permit fees had been lifted and that the Four Freedoms Agreement would not be
applicable to Sudanese asylum seekers. Finally, UNHCR said it would investigate detentions
and missing persons if names were provided.
After the meeting, UNHCR issued a press release that announced the involvement of
Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam and of the government of Egypt in working to resolve the
Sudanese sitin.
The release is the first official document to recognize direct cooperation
between the Egyptian government and UNHCR in relation to the demonstration, and it is the
only public statement by UNHCR that addressed the demonstrators directly, with the term
“you.”
Demonstration representatives, in turn, released a statement entitled “In Response to
UNHCR’s Statement Dated 17 November 2005,” which acknowledged that since “most of
the demands do not fall within the mandate of UNHCR, it is therefore logical to omit some of
the 20 demands despite their legitimacy and importance so that we can reach a point of
understanding and a meeting point through which UNHCR can respond to the demands of the
Sudanese refugees based on the rules and regulations of asylum.” This statement
demonstrates that the protesters understood the nonapplicability
of the Four Freedoms
Agreement to Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees, accepted the offers of assistance, and
acknowledged that UNHCR was not compelling them to repatriate. The statement reiterated
the view that assistance should not be used as indirect pressure to convince refugees to
repatriate. It also repeated demands for an honest and transparent RSD process with
individual interviews as well as for the opening of closed files. These specific points
remained obstacles to fruitful negotiation. 60
On November 24, a “highlevel
delegation from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva,” held a
meeting with “the five leaders of the demonstration,” Adel Imam, Sudanese community
leaders, and Egyptian government representatives. Showing an increasingly conciliatory
attitude, UNHCR addressed the demonstrators directly in the park, apparently in an effort to
reach the demonstrators through channels other than their leaders. Radhouane Nouicer,
Deputy Director of UNHCR’s Genevabased
Bureau for Central Asia, Southwest Asia,
Northern Africa, and the Middle East, declared to the crowd:
We can talk about assistance for the most vulnerable or the reopening of
files if there are new and valid arguments, something UNHCR always
does. Some other demands, however, are based on false information—
60 Voice of Sudanese Refugees public statement, “In Response to UNHCR’s Statement Dated 17 November
2005,” November 2005, on file with FMRS.
27
such as forced repatriation, which does not occur—or not realistically
feasible, such as massive resettlement to third countries. 61
A UNHCR press release that followed expressed “extreme concern” on the part of the agency
and the Egyptian government about the “deteriorating humanitarian situation” in the park. 62
On November 27, a meeting was held between the organizers of the demonstration and
UNHCR in the presence of Farouk Abu Issa, the former Sudanese Minister for Education,
former SecretaryGeneral
of the Arab Lawyers’ Union, and current spokesperson for the
National Democratic Alliance. On November 29, UNHCR released a public statement
entitled “Sudanese Demonstration at UNHCR Cairo,” which described the progress of
negotiations. According to the statement, “Although the meeting reached a positive
conclusion, it now seems that the leaders of the demonstration have once again changed their
mind about ending the sitin
unless all their original demands are met immediately.” 63
The December 17 Agreement
On December 17, UNHCR announced that an agreement had been signed by the five leaders
of the demonstration, which set forth the responsibilities of UNHCR and the demonstrators in
ending the sitin
amicably (see Appendix B). The agreement would apply only to
demonstrators whose names were included in a definitive list submitted to UNHCR by the
protest leaders. While much of the agreement offered little new, it did contain several
significant offers. 64
For the first time, UNHCR offered a conditional opportunity for the opening of closed files
through a written request submitted by the individual seeking review. Additionally, any
person on the list from Darfur with a closed file could approach UNHCR to obtain a yellow
card. Under the agreement, all yellow cardholders
could have their files reviewed for valid
status claims. After an initial interview, if individuals insisted on RSD, it would be
undertaken. The offer, however, included an implied threat that, if rejected, individuals would
automatically become of no concern to UNHCR and would “no longer be eligible for
ongoing assistance.” While appointments for RSD interviews would be provided by the
agreement, there was no mention of when or under what circumstances the interviews would
take place. The agreement authorized eligibility for those on the sitin
list for oneoff
61 As quoted in “UNHCR and Adel Imam Address Sudanese in the Park and Appeal for the End of the Sitin,”
UNHCR Media Relations and Public Information Service, Geneva, 24 November 2005, on file with FMRS.
62 See “Sudanese Demonstration at UNHCR Cairo,” UNHCR Cairo, 29 November 2005, on file with FMRS.
63 Ibid.
64 See UNHCR, “Cairo, 17 December 2005,” 17 December 2005, on file with FMRS.
They brought the agreement to us and told us that this is our limit after three months; this
is all we can get from UNHCR office, the office can’t offer more than this from us. We,
the refugees, replied, “Okay, but let them write us a guarantee, a document, promising that
this will happen,” but the leaders said, “This is the UN, they won’t give a written
guarantee to refugees, we are just refugees.”
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 28 January 2006
28
financial assistance for housing. It also provided for monthly meetings between UNHCR
Cairo senior management and the demonstration leaders.
The other major focus of the December 17 agreement was on how to clear the park
logistically. The document outlined that park residents could approach UNHCR for
processing in groups of 20 at a time, with priority given to those in need of special assistance
and those who came directly from Darfur to Egypt. The demonstrators would be interviewed,
their situation decided, and then they would be sent home or to new accommodations with
offers of assistance. They were not to return to the park. The entire process was given four
days to be completed. The agreement precluded a mechanism for feedback to those remaining
in the park, a problem that would prove to be its undoing.
Mixed Reactions among Protesters
On the morning of December 19, UNHCR representatives went to the park to explain the
agreement. Although demonstration representatives had signed the agreement, protesters
were not in agreement and did not reach a consensus about whether to accept or reject the
solution. Confusion and uncertainty reigned, and a few protesters publicly stated their
intention to remain until UNHCR finished all interviews. Evidently, the protesters were afraid
that by not getting feedback on the initial interviews and by being dispersed, they would lose
the momentum and collective strength they had gained over the previous months. Again and
again, protesters interviewed for this report emphasized that they had wanted guarantees in
writing or from embassy officials. UNCHR tried to reassure them that public and
international media attention to the agreement was sufficient guarantee of UNHCR’s
intentions to honor it. However, no evidence was found to suggest that UNHCR had
requested the presence of embassy representatives in the park in order to lend credence to the
agreement. 65 A UNHCR representative acknowledged this concern in a December 19 address
to the demonstrators, saying, “I know this is the reason why you will not leave the park,
because of the guarantees.” Agency representatives noted the empowerment experienced by
the demonstrators and understood that this perceived power was connected directly to the
protesters’ presence in the park.
Most demonstrators seem to have consented to the agreement but wanted to stay in the park
until all cases were processed. On December 19, one protester declared to the large crowd
and in front of UNHCR personnel: “The refugees, they did not refuse a solution. All of us, we
did agree to basically all the demands [but] we agree to remain here until all the process is
65 One representative said, “This is the first time we hear of this request.” See FMRS interview with Eric Audet,
23 March 2006, on file with FMRS.
After the agreement between the leaders and UNHCR, most of us waited for UNHCR to
call us to come for interviews/processing. We were waiting for normal procedures from
the office to start, like getting tickets for interviews, or, for people with blue cards, for
RSD interviews. However, we doubted that there would be enough time to process
everyone, because they had allocated three days only and there were more than 2,000
refugees.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 29 January 2006
29
finished. I’m trying to give you the information….So, we agree that we have to go to the
office and meet them.” 66
In response, a UNHCR representative said:
I do not want to participate in this political rally. I am only here to clarify
some issues for you. Okay, you know the process takes long. To remain
here for two, three, four, five, possibly six months will also mean that you
will have casualties, not only in terms of physical suffering but also in
terms of the legal implications [in the Egyptian system]. And we cannot be
held responsible for the casualties or the failure to meet the legal
requirements. And the reason I say this is because UNHCR has…done
everything that is required of us, but you are not willing to vacate this
park. Then it is your responsibility and the international community will
view it as such. 67
The discussion continued until the crowd was eventually asked whether it would accept the
agreement as is or with the condition of continuing to occupy the park until all cases were
processed. Loud cheering confirmed the protesters’ preference for the second option, and the
speaker finished his statement by saying, “If each and every individual, refugee, woman, and
child, if you want to go there, that you can solve the problem, then they can go. We don’t stop
anybody. If each anybody want to go there, let him go. We don’t stop him.” 68
The most visible division in the leadership and among the protesters came as a result of the
December 17 agreement. Some suggest that the tragedies that occurred during the forced
eviction are the result of an overlong stay in the park and of repeated refusals of solutions
proposed by UNHCR. As mentioned above, a UNHCR representative warned of possible
casualties and “legal ramifications” in the December 19 speech. A November 17 UNHCR
press release maintained that the offer the agency made “represents a final opportunity to
resolve the sitin
peacefully and quickly.” 69
66 “UNHCR Speech to Sudanese Refugee Demonstrators,” transcribed by FMRS researcher,19 December
2005, on file with FMRS.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 UNHCR, “Goodwill Ambassador Adel Imam Works with UNHCR and the Government of Egypt to
Resolve the Sudanese Sitin,”
17 November 2005, on file with FMRS.
The UN agreed to take a look at yellow cards cases. Eighty percent of the refugees at the
sitin
approved of this agreement. They were made up of mostly Northerners, Westerners,
and Easterners. The remaining 20 percent were made up of South Sudanese who would
probably be deported since the war is over in their area. All the refugees of the park
remained there for this 20 percent. They felt that it would split up the Sudanese
community if not everyone got what they wanted.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, 3 January 2006
30
Communication between UNHCR and the demonstrators ceased. On December 22, UNHCR
sent an official letter to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying, once again, that it
could do no more and paving the way for the forced removal. Despite growing rumors that
security forces would break up the protest, demonstrators continued to settle in for winter,
reinforcing their makeshift homes with plastic tarp roofs and expanding out onto the
pavement surrounding the park.
We demanded that representatives from the embassies guarantee us that the resettlement of
Sudanese was open as an option. But the UNHCR said that it would be unable to do that.
On the 17 of December, after the meeting with the UNHCR, there was a press conference
in the park. Sadiq El Mahdi came. In fact, personnel from the Australian, American, and
Canadian embassies were also supposed to attend, but they did not show up. We were told
by Sadiq that this was due to security problems.
Sadiq said that the agreement between the UNHCR and the refugees would be fulfilled.
But these are only empty words. If any representative of the embassies would have turned
up, I am sure that the demonstrators would have left the park.
FMRS interview with demonstrator, date unavailable.
31
FORCED REMOVAL
The forced removal of the Sudanese protesters was an emotionally and politically charged
event. Although it is difficult to determine a precise chronology, the following timeline is
based on accounts by protesters, the Egyptian authorities, journalists, human rights activists,
local residents, and other eyewitnesses and bystanders who were present on the night of the
forced removal.
Afternoon and evening, December 29
· Witnesses notice an increased police presence in the area of the park.
· Police tell a number of protesters that the officers are there to protect them from a Muslim
Brotherhood demonstration. Many protesters accept this explanation when they see a
group of 20 to 40 bearded men dressed in traditional gellabiyas gather outside the
Mustapha Mahmoud mosque.
The police gave protesters no warning that they would be removed from the park, with force
if necessary. Throughout the day, the authorities seemed to be deliberately avoiding telling
the protesters their intentions. One protester commented:
In the afternoon, many police vehicles began arriving close to the park. We could see
how cars from the parking lot in front of the park had been removed. I heard two
different answers from the police. One officer said that this was in preparation for a
speech by a Sudanese minister about our rights. Another policeman said that Egyptians
wanted to demonstrate against our sitin
; therefore, they had to remove the cars fearing
that they might be damaged. 70
Around 1:00 a.m.
· Approximately 4,000 riot police surround the park. An Egyptian bystander counts “60
state security wagons, 10 armored cars, [and] six ambulances.” 71
· A group of highranking

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