HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

The Eritrean Front
Khartoum backed the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which launched an armed struggle against what it termed the "Christian regime" governing Eritrea with the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Al Qaeda also gave training and financial support, and reportedly considered the taking of Eritrea as a strategic prize that could be used as a staging area for operations against Ethiopia and against Yemen, where Al Qaeda-allied groups were already ensconced. The first serious incidents occurred at the end of 1992. Jihad members laid mines on desert tracks near the Sudanese border and infiltrated small groups of fighters inside Eritrea . In September 1993, new clashes took place, and the government captured several members of the Jihad who confessed they had been trained in camps inside Sudan . The government also said it killed several Jihad fighters from Afghanistan , Morocco and Yemen who were most likely part of Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network then operating from Sudan . The EIJ has carried on an intermittent, low intensity war with the Eritrean government since then, and seem to be ready for action when called on by Khartoum .
The Ethiopian Front
Against Ethiopia , the Sudanese government tried to recruit the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF, which calls for an independent Oromia state, has engaged in an armed struggle with the Ethiopia government since it pulled out of the provisional Ethopian government in 1992 over allegation of political harassment and a demobilization dispute, but the predominantly Christian leadership was not comfortable working with Islamist Khartoum. To allay such concerns, the Sudanese government set up alternative, purely Islamic Oromo organizations like the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). In the mid 1990's, IFLO operated out of bases inside Somalia and with Sudanese support worked in alliance with the Somali fundamentalist militia AI AI to carry out actions inside of Ethiopia. IFLO military actions were intermittent and relatively ineffective. It reportedly receives support from Oromo clans such as the Jara in the eastern Oromo area of Haraghe. This Oromo grouping consists of the urban Muslim inhabitants of Harar and Dire Dawa, and the rural populations living around these towns and in the area to their west.
The Somali Front
The intensity of Sudanese involvement in AI AI, which began in 1993, led many Somalis to regard it as a foreign puppet. AI AI emerged as a dominant military force in Somalia after the collapse of the central government in 1991 and launched a campaign to secure territory in the north and south of the country. It received support both from Sudan , Al Qaeda and Saudi sources. By the end of 1993, AI AI began small-scale actions in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in a bid to establish a greater Islamic Somali state that would include Somali-speaking peoples within Ethiopia , Kenya and Djibouti . In December 1994 AI AI began operations in parts of Ethiopia 's Somali region, forcing the Ethiopian government to send troops to contain the situation. By the end of 1996, the Sudanese charge d'affaires in Mogadishu called publicly for a holy war against Ethiopia during a meeting with supporters of AI AI.
The Kenyan Front and Al Qaeda's East Africa Cell
Sudan 's support for the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was consistent with Khartoum 's policy of promoting an Islamists agenda in the region and as a means of undermining Kenyan support for the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The Sudanese government, however, specifically denied allegations in the press that it was training armed IPK insurgents in Sudan , and this author has not seen any credible evidence of a Sudanese-backed armed opposition to the Kenyan government. During the period when the radical Sheikh Balala became de facto head of the IPK, Sudanese and Iranian support reportedly helped the IPK to effectively mobilize a mass following in Coast Province . Sheikh Balala had cemented his relationship with the Sudanese regime during his several trips to Khartoum . However, Sheikh Balala's leadership of the IPK was short lived due to a power struggle within the organizations that resulted in a victory by moderate forces. Kenyan government actions that forced Balala to live in exile for a number of years also undercut his political aspirations.
In East Africa , including Kenya , Tanzania and Uganda , Al Qaeda set up an active operation. Kenya operated as a "gateway" for its operations in Somalia . Members of the group blended into Kenyan and Tanzanian society. It opened legitimate businesses that sold fish and dealt in diamonds and other gems, and operated two Islamic charities. In 1993, Al Qaeda began assessing sites in Nairobi to hit American targets in retaliation for the U.S. intervention in Somalia . The East Africa cell remained active after Al Qaeda's departure from Sudan and was responsible for bombing the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998. Uganda broke up plots to bomb the U.S. embassy in Kampala and the Ugandan parliament. The Ugandan government claims that Al Qaeda also plotted to assassinate President Yoweri Museveni in Kampala in 1999.

Arabic Forum