HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

In June 1998, Al Qaeda's cell in East Africa attacked with suicide bombers the U.S. embassies in Nairobi , Kenya , and Dar es Salaam , Tanzania , killing hundreds, mostly Kenyans and Tanzanians. A plot to blow up the U.S. embassy in Kampala was reportedly foiled. In retaliation, on August 20, 1998 , the U.S. struck Khartoum with two cruise missiles, destroying the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, which the U.S. suspected of involvement in the embassy bombings and in chemical weapons manufacturing. One person was killed and eleven workers injured in the nighttime attack. A United Nations report later disputed the U.S. claim that the plant had been used for the production of chemical weapons.
Al Turabi's Ouster
In 1999 Sudanese President al-Bashir and his erstwhile ally, al-Turabi, became locked in a power struggle as al-Turabi maneuvered to acquire some of al-Bashir's presidential powers. The struggle between al-Bashir and al-Turabi played out in the context of the Sudanese government's desire to end its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. This desire certainly grew after the U.S. bombing of the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant. The military strongman dealt decisively with al-Turabi, who has been in and out of prison and house arrest since then. Al-Turabi's ouster marked a turning point for a regime that had become increasingly isolated in the international arena. It also saw a moderation in the Islamist aggressiveness that had characterized the regime since the early 1990's.
Al Turabi's ouster also highlighted an emergent division in the government regarding the continuation of an Islamist agenda. Just as control of oil resources lay at the heart of the outbreak of the civil war with the "South" in 1983, so too did the future dispensation of the country's petroleum wealth reportedly give context to how factions within the government regarded their Islamist options.
The "doves," led by then minister for peace, Ghazi Salah al-Din Attabani (presidential advisor and spokesman), and backed by the foreign minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail, promoted peace with the Sudanese armed opposition based on an economic rationale. For Ghazi and his supporters, the Islamic regime would end up better off sharing the country's oil wealth with the south, since normalization of the situation would attract new Western companies with the proper technological resources to exploit deposits.
Another faction within the government, led by Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, was opposed to this, seeing it as a trap because the regime would have to question its Islamic credentials, at least in part. This faction believed that investment, which was an alternative to expanding Western engagement, remained a viable option and argued that Chinese, Russian, Indian and Algerian companies already on the ground would suffice. This split in the government may not have been fully resolved and offers an explanation as to Khartoum 's slow pace of reconciliation with the southern rebels and its continued, if lackluster, support for terrorist and armed insurgencies.

Arabic Forum