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HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA
| 06-17-2005, 08:20 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
 Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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 HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA
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This study examines the rise and present state of militant Islamist groups in the Greater Horn of Africa with particular focus on the countries of Eritrea , Kenya , Somalia , Sudan and Tanzania . The National Islamic Front government of Sudan and Al Qaeda, which was based in Sudan from 1991 to 1996, fueled Islamist ambitions in the region and helped set into motion most, if not all, of the radical Islamic movements operating in the Greater Horn of Africa.
In Somalia , Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AI AI) or Islamic Union emerged as the most militant Islamist group and a major military force, following the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. The United States has described AI AI, an Al Qaeda ally. AI AI became closely allied with Al Qaeda in opposing in 1993 the U.S. military presence in Somalia known as Operation Restore Hope, and likely provided logistic support to Al Qaeda in its 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and in its 2002 attacks near Mombasa , Kenya , on an Israeli-owned hotel and airliner. AI AI also acted in consort with Sudan to destabilize neighboring Ethiopia . AI AI has also been active in Kenya 's North Eastern Province in generating support for its vision of a pan-Somali Islamic Caliphate. Within Somalia , AI AI transformed itself into "Islamic Courts," and many of its cadres have been absorbed into the security and judicial apparatus of the so-called Transitional National government installed in Mogadishu.
In Kenya , the successful emergence of multi-party democracy appears to have undercut the development of local militant Islamic groups. However, an undercurrent of resentment by many Kenyan Muslims at their perceived second-class status remains strong, and may have helped fuel the very small-scale local support that Al Qaeda needed to carry out its 2002 attacks in Mombasa . In the past, Al Qaeda was able to exploit Kenya 's open political and economic systems to establish a regional operational center there. However, the increasing vigilance of the Kenyan government appears to be limiting the capacity of international terrorists to operate within its territory.
In Tanzania , the appeal of radical political Islam remains weak though groups of hard-core radicals seek to gain adherents by exploiting the growing suspicions between the Christian and Muslim communities, Muslim resentment of their real or perceived second class status, and frustration with the multiparty system's unfulfilled promise to deliver an alternating disposition of power in the country. A convergence of various political and ideological strands has contributed to the growth of this radical minority in Tanzania . The semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar has emerged as a hotbed of radical Islamic activism as Islamic nationalists seek the restoration of the Sultanate.
In Eritrea , the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) has been the main focus of Islamic extremism. The EIJ advocates the establishment of an Islamic State in Eritrea and has engaged in an armed struggle to achieve it. Under the name of the Islamic Salvation Front, the EIJ is currently a member of the Eritrean National Alliance, an umbrella organization that opposes the Eritrean government led by President Isaias Afwerki. The umbrella Eritrean National Alliance, which is supported by Ethiopia and Sudan , espouses a strategy of armed action against strategic targets such as radio and TV stations inside Eritrea . However, the EIJ has been much more aggressive militarily than the Eritrean National Alliance and has engaged in an intermittent armed conflict with the Eritrean government since late 1992. At times, the EIJ has targeted civilians, especially foreign civilian targets. During the course of its history, the EIJ has received support from the National Islamic Front government in Sudan and from Al Qaeda.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:22 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Sudan , Al Qaeda and the Greater Horn of Africa
Overview
In the early 1990's, the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan sought political hegemony in the Greater Horn of Africa region by promoting armed opposition against neighboring countries and by harboring and abetting Islamic terrorists who backed Sudan's strategy of Islamic expansionism. From 1991 to 1996 the linchpin terrorist organization operating from within Sudan was Osama bin Laden's nascent Al Qaeda organization, which worked hand in glove with the Sudanese government in supporting terrorists and armed insurgents in an effort to undermine the governments of neighboring states. What follows is an examination of Sudanese and Al Qaeda aggression against Ethiopia , Eritrea , Kenya , Uganda and their combined efforts both to drive the United States out of Somalia and to bring about an Islamist state in Somalia . During the 1990's both the Khartoum government and Al Qaeda fueled Islamist ambitions in the region and helped set into motion most, if not all, of the radical Islamic movements operating in the Greater Horn of Africa.
Sudan's aggression toward its neighbors stemmed in part from its bid to cut off support for the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and other Sudanese armed rebel factions. In1983, civil war broke out in Sudan , following the attempt by the northern Islamic political elite in the country to control the oil wealth located in the south. Sudan 's government based in the largely Muslim northern region has been pitted against rebel forces based in the southern part of the country inhabited predominately by people practicing Christian and traditional African faiths.
Of the estimated Sudanese population of more than 35 million, Sunni Muslims comprise 70%; traditional African religions 25%; and Christians 5%. The NIF government in Khartoum views itself as the protector of Islam in Sudan . Political opponents are viewed as anti-Islam and the civil war in southern Sudan is considered a Jihad, or Holy War. For the SPLM/A, the war is to free southerners from political domination and religious persecution. In mid-2004, at which time the present study was undertaken, the two sides appeared near to achieving a breakthrough peace accord.
Muslim groups based in the north have launched two other sets of rebellions. In 1997, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)-a coalition of northern Sudanese parties in a loose alliance with the SPLM/A -- carried out intermittent military offenses in eastern Sudan from bases inside Eritrea . In 2003, the Sudanese Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement created a third rebel front in the Muslim Darfur region of western Sudan .
The Sudanese state organized several wars by proxy in its strategic quest to gain regional dominance and to undermine regional support for the Sudanese opposition based in the southern Sudan and later Eritrea . It preferred supporting armed Islamist groups in Eritrea , Ethiopia , Somalia and Uganda , when possible, but also backed non-Muslim insurgencies, when necessary, as it did in Ethiopia and Uganda . Additionally, Sudan sponsored terrorist activities and armed rebel forces in Algeria , Chad , Egypt , Libya , Tunisia and Yemen . These countries lie outside the scope of the present discussion.
An ideology of expansionist Islamic fundamentalism, which sought to "Arabize" all of Sudan and the region and to impose strict adherence to Sharia, underpinned Sudan 's regional aggression. The Sudanese state became Islamist when a 1989 military coup d'etat brought Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir to power. The ideological driving force behind the regime's effort to propel political Islam as the dominant regional force was Dr. Hassan al-Turabi and his
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| 06-17-2005, 08:24 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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A number of factors have contributed to an eventual moderation of the regime's policies, including a weakening of its support for international terrorism and armed Islamist groups, and have helped to hasten the ouster of al-Turabi from power. These factors included;
Sudan 's increasing international isolation, including UN sanctions; Concerted diplomatic engagement by the U.S. government: and The patent failures of Sudan 's Islamist policies to provide the hoped-for security in both the international and domestic spheres.
Nonetheless, it appears that Sudan continues to maintain relations with many, if not all the Islamist and other groups that it supported in the 1990s. These groups can be deployed as a part of Sudan 's arsenal when or if they are needed to threaten neighboring states. In addition, new Al Qaeda training camps have been identified on Sudanese soil, which leaves the unsettling impression that the Sudanese government, or at least elements of it, also maintains relations with international terrorism, even as the government has officially began to cooperate with the United States in its war on terror.
Hassan al-Turabi
Hassan al-Turabi was the architect of Khartoum 's Islamist ideology that buttressed the regime's hold on power and quest for regional dominance. With advanced degrees from the University of London and the Sorbonne, al-Turabi's intellectual brilliance and personal charm often masked his political cunning and ruthlessness.
As a young man, al-Turabi came to Khartoum in 1951 to study law. While other students promoted secular solutions to the problems in Sudan , al-Turabi joined the Al-Ikhwan Al-Moslemoon," or Muslim Brotherhood, in Sudan -- just as the parent organization in Egypt was entering a phase of fomenting political revolution.
A 22-year-old elementary school teacher, Hasan al-Banna, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 as an Islamic revivalist movement following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent end of the Caliphate system of government that had united Muslims in the region for hundreds of years. Al Banna contended that Islam was more than a religious observance; it was, rather, a comprehensive way of life. He propagated the tenets of puritanical Wahhabism, better known today as "Islamism," and he insisted that the Brotherhood's male students receive Jihadia training rather than what had been traditional Islamic education. Soon after its founding, the Muslim Brothers set up branches in neighboring countries including Sudan , and worked actively to spread the principal Islamist idea: That Islam is "creed and state, book and sword, and a way of life." These principles conflicted with what was then the mainstream view of Muslim scholars, namely that Islam should be restricted within the walls of the mosque. The Muslim Brothers also adopted an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist stance in their rhetoric about the West.
The Muslim Brotherhood sought to institutionalize Islamic law throughout Sudan , and the legal scholar, al-Turabi, became secretary general of Sudan 's Muslim Brotherhood in 1964. When General Jafa'ar Nimeiri took power in a coup in 1969, he dissolved the Brotherhood and arrested its leadership, including al-Turabi. Dr. Turabi returned to political life in 1977, upon reconciliation with Nimeiri. General Nimeiri then designated al-Turabi his attorney general. A former dean of the Law School at the University of Khartoum , al-Turabi, played a leading role in the introduction of Sharia. The enforcement of Sharia-dictated amputations and hangings provoked a public outcry that contributed to the popular and nonviolent overthrow of Nimeiri in 1985 and a brief reinstatement of parliamentary democracy.
After the overthrow of Nimeiri, al-Turabi proved instrumental in setting up the NIF, a Brotherhood-dominated organization that included several other small Islamic parties. Following al-Bashir's 1989 coup, the military government arrested al-Turabi, as well as the leaders of other political parties, and held him in solitary confinement for several months. Nevertheless, this action failed to dispel a pervasive belief in Sudan that Turabi and the NIF actively collaborated with the Colonel Bashir in the coup. Not long after Bashir's rise to power, the NIF influence within the government became evident in its policies and in the presence of several NIF members in the cabinet. From that time until 2001, al-Turabi was the power behind the throne. He maneuvered the NIF police state and associated militias to consolidate Islamist power and prevent any popular uprisings.
Throughout his long political career, al-Turabi maintained links with the wider Islamist international movement. Indeed, he reportedly was a mentor to Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri founded Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which he merged with Osama bin-Laden's al-Qaeda group to create the "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders." Al-Zawahiri became Bin Laden's personal physician and close confidant and is currently his second-in-command.
The National Islamic Front in Sudanese National Politics
Bashir's government forged an alliance with the NIF in an attempt to create legitimacy for his military regime. The Mulsim Brotherhood and later the NIF drew its support almost exclusively from university-educated, middle class males. The NIF never succeeded in growing much beyond this traditional base of support, which remained a small minority within Sudan . Bashir's and the NIF's political success lay largely in repressing the democratic opposition. They moved to undermine the trade union movement, which historically opposed the authoritarian military state, and purged democratic sympathizers within the military and government bureaucracy. The regime also employed divide and rule tactics when dealing with different ethnic groups within the country.
The failure of the NIF to broaden its base of support is explained, at least in part, by Sudan 's Islamic history. Al-Turabi's austere legalistic view of Islam remained at odds with mainstream Islam in Sudan , which is heavily influenced by the Sufi orders or brotherhoods. Sudan is one of the remaining strongholds of Sufism in the Muslim world today, and although not directly involved in politics, Sudan 's traditional Sufi orders have historically been pillars of support to the moderate UMMA party of former Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi. The Sufi mandate of tolerance with "family, neighbors and all others in the world" is at odds with the al-Turabi's NIF view of Islam that preaches the Arabization of Africa and the Islamization of the United States . According to Dr. Hasan Al Fatih Qaribullah, a leading sheikh of the Sufi movement in Khartoum , "If there is a family in Sudan that does not have at least one Sufi member, it is not Sudanese." Sufi notions of moderation have hobbled al-Turabi's efforts to make his more intellectualized version of Islam the dominant tendency in Sudan .
PAIC: Al-Turabi's Internationalism
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| 06-17-2005, 08:26 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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PAIC: Al-Turabi's Internationalism
Under al-Turabi's guidance, the Sudanese government created an open-door policy for Islamic militants, which led the U.S. State Department to designate Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. In 1990-1991, al-Turabi established an international umbrella organization for political Islamist militants -- the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC), over which he presided as Secretary General. He formed the PAIC with the immediate aim of opposing U.S. involvement in the First Gulf War, which had received support from moderate Arab states. Al-Turabi envisioned the PAIC, which was headquartered in Khartoum , as a counterweight to the conservative Saudi-dominated Organization of Islamic Conference representing the governments of 56 predominately Muslim countries.
Al-Turabi's sense of Arab nationalism limited, however, the appeal of the organization and circumscribed its effectiveness in "black" Africa . The word Arab in the name, Popular Arab and Islamic Conference, posed a problem for non-Arab Muslims interested in the organization. Black African, Asians, European and North Americans delegates to the 1995 PAIC conference demanded that "Arab" be deleted from PAIC, contending they did not fit into an organization that was labeled Arab. The majority non-Arab delegates voted for a change of name, whereupon the Arab delegates walked out in protest. Al-Turabi intervened by postponing the issue with the promise of taking it up at the following year's meeting, but the name change never took place.
After al-Turabi's fall from al-Bashir's grace, the Sudanese government closed down the office of the PAIC in February 2000. According to the PAIC Assistant Secretary, Ibrahim al-Sanusi, the government's closure of the PAIC in Khartoum amounted to an attempt to further erode the influence of al-Turabi, who had been forced out as speaker of the parliament the previous December. The PAIC contended that al-Bashir had succumbed to pressure from the United States and other countries to rein in hard-line elements within his ruling elite.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:27 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Bin Laden Connection
Osama Bin Laden took advantage of Sudan 's "open door" policy for Islamic militants by relocating himself from Saudi Arabia and transporting his terrorist "shock troops" from Afghanistan to Sudan in 1992. There he established a powerful military and political presence, using a variety of business ventures to finance his activities. His move to Sudan came at the invitation of al-Turabi. He reportedly had known Bin Laden since 1984 when the Saudi-born Bin Laden first visited Sudan and became acquainted with the leadership of the Sudanese Islamist movement.
Bin Laden's relocation to Sudan paid big financial dividends for the cash-strapped NIF government and produced substantial economic benefits for the country. Bin Laden joined the Turabi-led NIF with an initial fee of $5 million. He also reportedly brought at least $350 million into the country, and provided valuable services to the Sudanese government, such as floating critical foreign exchange transactions when the government was short of foreign currency. Bin Laden operated through a number of business enterprises. Wadi al-Aqiq served as a holding company in Sudan and has, accordingly, been described as the "mother of other companies." As Al Qaeda solidified its position in Sudan, other business ventures followed, including the Ladin International Company, an import-export concern; Taba Investment, an investment firm; Hijra Construction, which built bridges and roads; Qudarat Transport Company; Khartoum Tannery; and the al Themar al-Mubaraka Company, which grew sesame, peanuts and white corn for the group on a farm near Ed Damazin. At this farm, Al Qaeda provided its members with refresher courses in light weapons and explosives. Among his biggest business achievements, one of Bin Laden's firms built the 700 kilometer road linking Khartoum , Shindi and Atbarah.
A defecting Sudanese military officer who worked closely with Bin Laden's operations in Sudan described Bin Laden's supporters as a highly organized network of armed Islamist groups that traced their roots to the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In an interview with Human Rights Watch, the defector said the groups were linked through an "advisory committee" which Bin Laden controlled. Among the more than 500 veterans of the Afghan war based in Sudan were Tunisians, Algerians, Sudanese, Saudis, Syrians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Chechnyans, Bosnians and six African-Americans. These fighters were organized into groups and dispersed to camps throughout Sudan -- near Khartoum , Port Sudan , the Damazin area of eastern Sudan and at a base in the southern Equatoria province, near the border with Uganda . One base, near Hamesh Koreb along the Eritrea border, was overrun in March 1997 by forces of the Sudanese opposition, who claim they captured large stores of Iranian military equipment there.
The main military camp of the Afghan Arabs, however, was near Soba, ten kilometers south of Khartoum , along the Blue Nile , the same officer said. The Soba camp covered twenty acres and was a highly restricted area. Iranians previously based in Lebanon 's Beka'a Valley were among those involved in training the mujahidin guerrillas at this camp. One account indicates that Bin Ladin financed the building and supervision of 23 camps for Afghanistan 's so-called Arab mujahidin. In 1993, 500 mujahidin fighters from Afghanistan, who were part of the Pakistani Islamist organization, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, were forced out of Pakistan and made their way to Sudan, from whence many went to Somalia to join forces with the Islamist Somali Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya (AI AI) militia.
According to the military defector, the advisory council included representatives from such far-flung armed groups as the Egyptian Islamic Group, the Oromo Islamic Front in Ethiopia, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, the Islamic forces of Sheikh Abdullah in Uganda (which later joined the Uganda's rebel Allied Democratic Forces), Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, and the Moro Liberation Front from Mindanao, Philippines. At the camps, guerrillas were schooled in the use of explosives, forgery, coding, and related skills. Weapons for the guerrillas were imported mainly from Iran and China through Port Sudan , and then trucked to Khartoum where the Ministry of Defense turned them over to Bin Laden's representatives. Some arms were also routinely relocated to a warehouse in Yemen for forwarding to other operational areas on a ship owned by Bin Laden. Officers who carried out successful operations were rewarded with money and arms.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:47 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Wars by Proxy
1993 would prove to be a decisive year in Sudan 's efforts to launch a regional offensive. The al-Bashir government came to wage war through proxies with Eritrea , Ethiopia and Uganda and militarily backed the largest Islamist faction in Somalia . Al Qaeda launched numerous operations in these neighboring states at times in apparent coordination with Sudan , and also set up very active and large operations in Kenya , Somalia , Tanzania and Uganda .
In the case of Uganda , Khartoum was seeking to prevent the use of its neighbor's territory as a base and arms conduit for the rebel SPLM/A. As for Eritrea and Ethiopia , the Sudanese government was seeking to export Islamist revolution. When the governments in Addis Ababa and Asmara came to power in the early 1990's, they maintained cordial relations with Khartoum . Indeed, Khartoum had provided support for and harbored bases of the Ethiopian and Eritrean liberation movements that overthrew the Ethiopian dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam. However, by 1993 it was apparent that Khartoum was assuming a hostile stance with the result that both Ethiopia and Eritrea began to support Sudanese rebel groups including the SPLM/A, and later the northern-based NDA.
Islamist Khartoum also became alarmed that the U.S.-led United Nations intervention in Somalia in 1991 might shift the regional balance of power against Sudan and bring a large Islamic nation under Western influence. The United Nations entered Somalia to supply humanitarian relief to millions of Somalis facing the specter of starvation after the collapse of the central government. However, the mandate of the U.N. mission expanded to include nation-building until continued opposition by Somali military-political factions forced the U.N. to withdraw in 1995. Sudan and Al Qaeda were determined to undermine U.S. influence in the region, and Al Qaeda took center stage in the targeting of Kenya for hosting considerable U.S. diplomatic and intelligence assets that provided support to the SPLM/A.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:49 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Ugandan Front
In 1993, the Khartoum regime began supporting a small and relatively inactive residual guerrilla force on the Ugandan border in an area inhabited by Acholi-speaking people. This was the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a millenarian movement inspired by the prophetess Alice Lakwena, who rebelled against the Ugandan government in 1987 and took refuge in Kenya after her defeat. The LRA leader, Josephy Kony, is a visionary who claims to be guided by spirits and daubs his fighters with a magic substance that is supposed to protect them against bullets.
In 1996, the Sudanese made contact with another anti-Ugandan organization, the Nile West Bank Liberation Front. It has operated from bases within Democratic Republic of Congo and has carried out its actions largely in the far northwestern Kaya region of Uganda . It is predominantly made up of Muslims from the local Nubi, Kakwa and Aringa ethnic communities. Its officers are mainly ex-members of Idi Amin's army. It has been both less violent and less militarily active than the LRA.
Another Ugandan group that received support from Sudan and also from Al Qaeda was the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The ADF, which adopted an Islamist ideology, emerged out of a core group of puritanical Moslems from the Tabliq sect, whose members portray themselves as "Moslem evangelists." Determined to put an end to what they considered to be the marginalization of Muslims in Uganda , a faction of Uganda 's Tabliqs resorted to armed struggle in the hopes of establishing an Islamist state that would respect their interests.
Together with the obscure and largely defunct National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the Tabliqs moved to western Uganda to start the rebellion under the ADF umbrella. Among ADF's recruits, there were Rwandan Hutu supporters of the former government responsible for the 1994 genocide, fighters from the local Bakonja ethnic community in the Congo, and unemployed youth from various Baganda, Banyoro and Batoro ethnic communities The ADF set up rear bases in neighboring Congo where it could receive military support from Sudan and from whence it began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and education. Al Qaeda helped to set up camps for training ADF fighters, and when Osama bin Laden's organization settled in Afghanistan in 1996, ADF members traveled there to undergo training as explosives experts. The Ugandan government attributed numerous terrorist bombings that occurred in the capital, Kampala , between 1997 and 1999 to the ADF.
Even after bin Laden's departure, Sudan continued to support the Ugandan Islamic fundamentalists. As late as June 2004, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo were engaged in negotiations on how to dispose of about 2.5 tons of arms that the Sudanese government had supplied to ADF rebels based in the Congo
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| 06-17-2005, 08:51 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Eritrean Front
Khartoum backed the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ), which launched an armed struggle against what it termed the "Christian regime" governing Eritrea with the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Al Qaeda also gave training and financial support, and reportedly considered the taking of Eritrea as a strategic prize that could be used as a staging area for operations against Ethiopia and against Yemen, where Al Qaeda-allied groups were already ensconced. The first serious incidents occurred at the end of 1992. Jihad members laid mines on desert tracks near the Sudanese border and infiltrated small groups of fighters inside Eritrea . In September 1993, new clashes took place, and the government captured several members of the Jihad who confessed they had been trained in camps inside Sudan . The government also said it killed several Jihad fighters from Afghanistan , Morocco and Yemen who were most likely part of Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network then operating from Sudan . The EIJ has carried on an intermittent, low intensity war with the Eritrean government since then, and seem to be ready for action when called on by Khartoum .
The Ethiopian Front
Against Ethiopia , the Sudanese government tried to recruit the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The OLF, which calls for an independent Oromia state, has engaged in an armed struggle with the Ethiopia government since it pulled out of the provisional Ethopian government in 1992 over allegation of political harassment and a demobilization dispute, but the predominantly Christian leadership was not comfortable working with Islamist Khartoum. To allay such concerns, the Sudanese government set up alternative, purely Islamic Oromo organizations like the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). In the mid 1990's, IFLO operated out of bases inside Somalia and with Sudanese support worked in alliance with the Somali fundamentalist militia AI AI to carry out actions inside of Ethiopia. IFLO military actions were intermittent and relatively ineffective. It reportedly receives support from Oromo clans such as the Jara in the eastern Oromo area of Haraghe. This Oromo grouping consists of the urban Muslim inhabitants of Harar and Dire Dawa, and the rural populations living around these towns and in the area to their west.
The Somali Front
The intensity of Sudanese involvement in AI AI, which began in 1993, led many Somalis to regard it as a foreign puppet. AI AI emerged as a dominant military force in Somalia after the collapse of the central government in 1991 and launched a campaign to secure territory in the north and south of the country. It received support both from Sudan , Al Qaeda and Saudi sources. By the end of 1993, AI AI began small-scale actions in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in a bid to establish a greater Islamic Somali state that would include Somali-speaking peoples within Ethiopia , Kenya and Djibouti . In December 1994 AI AI began operations in parts of Ethiopia 's Somali region, forcing the Ethiopian government to send troops to contain the situation. By the end of 1996, the Sudanese charge d'affaires in Mogadishu called publicly for a holy war against Ethiopia during a meeting with supporters of AI AI.
The Kenyan Front and Al Qaeda's East Africa Cell
Sudan 's support for the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) was consistent with Khartoum 's policy of promoting an Islamists agenda in the region and as a means of undermining Kenyan support for the rebel Sudanese People's Liberation Army. The Sudanese government, however, specifically denied allegations in the press that it was training armed IPK insurgents in Sudan , and this author has not seen any credible evidence of a Sudanese-backed armed opposition to the Kenyan government. During the period when the radical Sheikh Balala became de facto head of the IPK, Sudanese and Iranian support reportedly helped the IPK to effectively mobilize a mass following in Coast Province . Sheikh Balala had cemented his relationship with the Sudanese regime during his several trips to Khartoum . However, Sheikh Balala's leadership of the IPK was short lived due to a power struggle within the organizations that resulted in a victory by moderate forces. Kenyan government actions that forced Balala to live in exile for a number of years also undercut his political aspirations.
In East Africa , including Kenya , Tanzania and Uganda , Al Qaeda set up an active operation. Kenya operated as a "gateway" for its operations in Somalia . Members of the group blended into Kenyan and Tanzanian society. It opened legitimate businesses that sold fish and dealt in diamonds and other gems, and operated two Islamic charities. In 1993, Al Qaeda began assessing sites in Nairobi to hit American targets in retaliation for the U.S. intervention in Somalia . The East Africa cell remained active after Al Qaeda's departure from Sudan and was responsible for bombing the American embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in 1998. Uganda broke up plots to bomb the U.S. embassy in Kampala and the Ugandan parliament. The Ugandan government claims that Al Qaeda also plotted to assassinate President Yoweri Museveni in Kampala in 1999.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:52 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Sudan supported other militias operating in the continent such as the Islamic Group (Egypt), the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF, Algeria), the Tunisian Islamic Front (TIF, Tunisia), and groups in Niger, Gambia and Senegal. These groups were trained in areas such as Damazin, Equatoria, and Hamesh Koreb, near Eritrea .
International Resistance to Sudan 's Aggression
After 1989, when the al-Bashir-led coup deposed the elected government and imposed a military-Islamist junta on Sudan , the Sudanese government became internationally ostracized for its gross human rights abuses. Over the next several years, the United States and the international community carried out a number of actions in response to Sudan 's aggression and that of Al Qaeda, which would ultimately oblige the regime to moderate its policies. U.S. actions culminated in a military strike in Khartoum in retaliations for Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam .
The first U.S. actions against the al-Bashir regime were legislatively mandated votes preventing the Sudanese government from receiving aid from international lending institutions. In 1993, the U.S. State Department designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism, whereby additional sanctions were imposed. It was Sudan 's complicity in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, however, that galvanized international opposition to Sudan and ultimately prompted Osama bin Laden's flight from Sudan to Afghanistan .
The U.S. implicated Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and elements within the Sudanese government in the 1995 Mubarak assassination attempt. Three suspected members of the Egyptian terror organization, Jama'at al-Islamiyaa, survived the foiled operation. The suspects fled to Sudan where they found safe haven. An Islamic charity operating in Sudan , Blessed Relief, which was reportedly a front for Bin Laden activities, acted as a conduit for funds that helped finance the failed assassination attempt. The son of Khalid bin Mahfouz, a controversial, Yemeni-born Saudi tycoon worth an estimated $2.5 billion, was on the board of the charity. Bin Mahfouz founded and ran the world's largest private bank until 1999, when the Saudi royal family quietly arranged for a government investment fund to buy out his 50% stake in the National Commerical Bank, then forced his dismissal. Mahouz was confined to a military hospital in Taef , Saudi Arabia . One of his sisters is married to bin Laden.
After Khartoum refused to extradite the suspects in the assassination attempt to Ethiopia , the United Nations imposed diplomatic sanction on Sudan . The UN sanction in 1996 was for Khartoum 's failure to turn over the fugitives and for general Sudanese support of international terrorism. Minor diplomatic and air travel sanction went into effect; these were not lifted until September 2001; and the extradition order was never honored. For the same reasons, the U.S. implemented additional diplomatic and economic sanctions on Sudan , including in late 1997 the imposition of sanctions that prohibited U.S. entities from doing business with the Sudanese government. The United States and Saudi Arabia pressured Sudan 's government to expel Bin Laden and his terrorist network. Bin Laden then left Sudan in 1996 and headquartered Al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan in an alliance with the Taliban.
In response to Sudan 's regional aggression, including its sponsorship of terrorism, Ethiopia , Eritrea and Uganda entered into what amounted to an U.S.-led "Frontline States" alliance against Sudan , and shortly after the imposition of UN sanctions, the US government announced that Uganda , Ethiopia and Eritrea were to be given non-offensive military equipment worth $20 million. It was widely perceived that this gesture was aimed at Sudan . The Frontline States' strategy unraveled, however, when war broke out between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, and when Uganda, the most pro-SPLM/A country in the region, became deeply embroiled in the Congo conflict and had fewer resources to share with the Sudanese rebels. To offset the shortfall in regional support to the SPLM/A, the U.S. increased significantly its commitment of humanitarian aid to southern Sudan , allowing the SPLA to spend more of its meager funds on military equipment.
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea sought to normalize relations with Sudan , each in an effort to isolate the other. On December 8, 1999 Uganda and Sudan signed a peace agreement in Nairobi , Kenya . In the agreement the two signatories renounced sponsoring or harboring any rebel group fighting to destabilize the other's country. Nonetheless, support continued to flow to armed opposition groups in both countries, if at an abated level.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:55 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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In June 1998, Al Qaeda's cell in East Africa attacked with suicide bombers the U.S. embassies in Nairobi , Kenya , and Dar es Salaam , Tanzania , killing hundreds, mostly Kenyans and Tanzanians. A plot to blow up the U.S. embassy in Kampala was reportedly foiled. In retaliation, on August 20, 1998 , the U.S. struck Khartoum with two cruise missiles, destroying the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant, which the U.S. suspected of involvement in the embassy bombings and in chemical weapons manufacturing. One person was killed and eleven workers injured in the nighttime attack. A United Nations report later disputed the U.S. claim that the plant had been used for the production of chemical weapons.
Al Turabi's Ouster
In 1999 Sudanese President al-Bashir and his erstwhile ally, al-Turabi, became locked in a power struggle as al-Turabi maneuvered to acquire some of al-Bashir's presidential powers. The struggle between al-Bashir and al-Turabi played out in the context of the Sudanese government's desire to end its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. This desire certainly grew after the U.S. bombing of the Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant. The military strongman dealt decisively with al-Turabi, who has been in and out of prison and house arrest since then. Al-Turabi's ouster marked a turning point for a regime that had become increasingly isolated in the international arena. It also saw a moderation in the Islamist aggressiveness that had characterized the regime since the early 1990's.
Al Turabi's ouster also highlighted an emergent division in the government regarding the continuation of an Islamist agenda. Just as control of oil resources lay at the heart of the outbreak of the civil war with the "South" in 1983, so too did the future dispensation of the country's petroleum wealth reportedly give context to how factions within the government regarded their Islamist options.
The "doves," led by then minister for peace, Ghazi Salah al-Din Attabani (presidential advisor and spokesman), and backed by the foreign minister, Mustafa Osman Ismail, promoted peace with the Sudanese armed opposition based on an economic rationale. For Ghazi and his supporters, the Islamic regime would end up better off sharing the country's oil wealth with the south, since normalization of the situation would attract new Western companies with the proper technological resources to exploit deposits.
Another faction within the government, led by Vice-President Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, was opposed to this, seeing it as a trap because the regime would have to question its Islamic credentials, at least in part. This faction believed that investment, which was an alternative to expanding Western engagement, remained a viable option and argued that Chinese, Russian, Indian and Algerian companies already on the ground would suffice. This split in the government may not have been fully resolved and offers an explanation as to Khartoum 's slow pace of reconciliation with the southern rebels and its continued, if lackluster, support for terrorist and armed insurgencies.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:57 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Sudan Backs Away From Sponsorship of Terrorism
Despite displays of growing moderation within the Khartoum regime and measures to improve its record, Sudan is still considered a rogue state by the United States because of its support of international terrorism. Counter-terrorism cooperation began in mid-2000, but the government of Sudan did not offer significant assistance until after the September 11 terrorist attacks. In November 2001, President Bush renewed U.S. bilateral sanctions on Sudan and the State Department kept Sudan on the terrorism list. Yet, the U.S. State Department feels that Sudan is showing progress on the counter terrorism front. According to the State Department, Sudan has deepened its cooperation with the U.S. Government to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Overall, Sudan's cooperation and information sharing has improved markedly, producing significant progress in combating terrorist activity, but areas of concern remain for the United States.
In other areas of cooperation, the Sudanese Government also took steps in 2003 to strengthen its legislative and bureaucratic instruments for fighting terrorism by ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Sudan also ratified the African Union's Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating Terrorism. In June, Sudanese Minister of Justice, Ali Mohamed Osman Yassin, issued a decree establishing an office for combating terrorism. In 2003, Sudan signed a counter-terrorism cooperation agreement with the Algerian Government, which had during the 1990s accused Sudan of harboring wanted Algerian terrorists. Sudan also signed a counter-terrorism agreement with Yemen and Ethiopia .
U.S. officials confirmed that the Sudanese government has given U.S. officials unrestricted access to files of suspected terrorists and suggested that they might be willing to hand over some of these individuals. On March 19, 2002 , the Washington Post reported that a top Al Qaeda member was captured in Sudan and sent to Egypt . According to the Post article, Abu Anas Liby, wanted for the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania , is one of the 22 most wanted terrorists by the Bush Administration. A senior Sudanese official said the story about Liby was inaccurate.
Domestically, Khartoum stepped up efforts to disrupt extremist activities and deter terrorists from operating in Sudan . In May, Sudanese authorities raided a probable terrorist training camp in Kurdufan State , arresting more than a dozen extremists and seizing illegal weapons. The majority of the trainees captured were Saudi citizens. Sudan extradited them to Saudi Arabia to face charges in accordance with a bilateral agreement.
Al Qaeda also reportedly established three terrorist camps in the remote Jebel Kurush Mountains , which run parallel to the Red Sea . The specter of an Al Qaeda terrorist camp operating in Sudan raises concern that elements of the Sudanese government continue to cooperate with Al Qaeda. But, in its biggest gesture of counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States , Khartoum reportedly allowed U.S. Special Forces teams inside the country to hunt down Saudi Arabian terrorists who have re-established secret Al Qaeda training camps in these remote mountains in the northeastern quarter of the country. The terrorists are thought to take orders from Saudi Arabia 's most wanted man, Saleh Awfi.
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| 06-17-2005, 08:59 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Western diplomats in Saudi Arabia have said that the new Sudanese camps were established in late 2003 and have become a vital staging ground for Al Qaeda. As reported in one publication:
There is significant traffic from these camps to the peninsula across the Red Sea . There is no real Sudanese government or army control over the mountains. The terrorists slip through the cracks, up into the hills where they can train, rest and build up the spirit of jihad. With things getting hot over here [in Saudi Arabia ], they can get organized over there.
The Khartoum regime also continues to be peopled by many high-ranking officials who have been supportive of international terrorism and its aggressive stance in the region. In a February 2004 letter to President George Bush, U.S. Representatives Donald Payne and Thomas Tancredi asked the American administration to investigate the responsibility of Sudanese government officials in terrorist acts committed against U.S. interests and Egyptian President Mubarak. The Congressmen listed twelve individuals by name, including;
First Vice Preident Ali Osman Mohammed Taha
Dr. Nafee Ali Nafee, Minister of Federal Government and former Minister of Interior (External Intelligence)
Dr. Ghazi Salahadin, President Advisor and senior member of the NIF
Dr. Awad Ahmed El Jaz, Minister of Energy and Mining.
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| 06-17-2005, 09:19 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Al Turabi and the Rat's Bite
As of July 2004, Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi remained incarcerated in a Khartoum prison where he was bitten by a rat and, according to his wife, is in very poor health. Al Turabi, the former ally of President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and mastermind of Sudan 's Islamist aggression, was detained at the end of March when authorities accused him of inciting tribal tensions and his opposition political party of funding rebels in Sudan 's Darfur region. Turabi, 72, has been on an "Islamic hunger strike," feeding on dates and water, which has caused his blood pressure drop.
The Regional Legacy of Sudan's Radical Islamist Agenda
The Islamist onslaught in the Greater Horn of Africa in the 1990s spearheaded by Sudan and Al Qaeda has bequeathed a continuing legacy of armed violence and terrorism in the region. Khartoum appears to be continuing its direct support for the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and elements of the Sudanese military continue to back the Ugandan rebel Lord's Resistance Army. Al Qaeda operates out of Somalia apparently without Sudanese support, and Al Itihaad Al Islamiya continues its operations with new patrons, and Al Qaeda has a continuing presence in Somalia .
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| 06-17-2005, 09:21 AM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Eritrea
Indications are that Sudan has renewed its backing for EIJ offensive actions in Eritrea and to be behind the invigoration of the opposition Eritrean National Alliance (ENA) as a fighting force. Sudan's renewed interest in the Eritrean opposition is consistent with the regime's long-standing search for internal security and a counterweight to Asmara's support for Sudan's National Democratic Alliance, which includes the SPLM/A. After years of giving a cold shoulder to Eritrea 's dissident groups, the al-Bashir government has a new found interest in their activities. Sudan's ruling party, the National Congress Party, which replaced al-Turabi's NIF, has used two Eritrean occasions -- the Independence Commemoration of September 1 and the convention of the Eritrean Liberation Front-National Congress (ELF-NC) -- to provide material and moral support to the exiled Eritrean opposition parties.
Eritrean opposition groups who reportedly had grudgingly approached Ethiopia after giving up on Sudan are considering re-establishing home offices in Khartoum . Their decision is tentative because, according to one source, they are anxious about how receptive Sudan will be once a peace agreement with the SPLM is consolidated and SPLM rebel leader John Garang enters a government of national unity. Garang is considered a strong ally of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki.
Renewed Sudanese support for the EIJ appears to have led to a spate of sporadic attacks inside Eritrea . Operating from positions within Sudan , EIJ has planted mines in the buffer zone separating Eritrea and Ethiopia that is monitored by the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea . In March 2004, a mine blast killed five members of an Eritrean militia, including a colonel. The Eritrean government has implicated the EIJ in the killing of three civilians as a result of a bomb blast at a hotel in the town of Tesseney . Eritrea 's government also said an unspecified Jihadist organization based in Sudan was responsible for a May 2004 bomb blast in Barentu that killed five and wounded 90. The government also accused the EIJ of being behind the 2003 murder in western Eritrea of a British geologist and two local staff members of the international NGO, Mercy Corps. The EIJ denied involvement in these incidents.
The increased EIJ activity in 2003-2004 comes at a time when Sudan is giving material and moral support to the ENA, of which EIJ is a member (see discussion of EIJ). In September 2003, the ENA, which claimed its members were carrying out minor guerrilla attacks against President Isaias Afewerki's government, said that they would launch a joint armed action to end "dictatorship" in Asmara . According to Huroy Tadle Beyrow, ENA secretary general: "Each of the 13 organizations forming our alliance, having their troops on the ground, believe now in uniting our efforts in one army and moving for action inside Eritrea."
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| 06-17-2005, 09:31 PM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Uganda
On December 5, 2001 , President George W. Bush designated two Sudanese-backed armed insurgent groups in Uganda , the ADF and the LRA, terrorist organizations. As noted above, the ADF maintains an Islamist agenda, and the LRA is a millenarian militia with roots in Christianity and traditional African religious beliefs. Uganda sent troops to the Congo in 1998 to destroy camps of the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) and cut off its supply lines from Sudan . Its support appears to have ceased after Khartoum and Kampala signed a peace agreement in December 1999. As a result, the ADF has been fairly inactive, although there have been occasional reports, one as recent as July 2004, of ADF actions in western Uganda . The Ugandan government says that these reports are false; nonetheless, it has cautioned its citizens to be vigilant. Kampala has implemented what appears to be a successful reconciliation plan with exiled elements of the Tabliq sect, whose disaffected members formed the core of the ADF.
Cut off from Sudanese backing, the ADF made an apparently failed effort in 2001 to court Iraq as a new patron. In a letter to the head of the Iraqi intelligence agency, a senior ADF operative outlined his group's efforts to set up an "international mujahidin team." Its mission, he said, "will be to smuggle arms on a global scale to holy warriors fighting against US, British and Israeli influences in Africa , the Middle East , Asia and the Far East ." The letter, dated April 2001, was signed: "Your Brother, Bekkah Abdul Nassir, Chief of Diplomacy ADF Forces." Nassir offered to "vet, recruit and send youth to train for the Jihad' at a center in Baghdad , which he described as "...headquarters for international Holy Warrior network....We should not allow the enemy to focus on Afghanistan and Iraq , but we should attack their international criminal forces inside every base," the letter said.
The non-Muslim LRA has continued to wreck havoc in northern Uganda , although its intensity has diminished due to an aggressive amnesty program and anti-insurgency operations. In addition, a security agreement with the Sudanese government has given Uganda greater advantage in the field by allowing it to operate within a red zone inside Sudan . Nonetheless, the Ugandan government claims elements within the Sudanese military continue to support the LRA, and evidence from diverse sources suggest the LRA works hand in glove with the local Sudanese military in the Equatoria region against SPLA-allied militia, the Equatoria Defence Forces (EDF).
According to a statement issued by the EDF, the LRA raided villages at Gangala near the Government garrison position of Jebel Mille. The raids took place from June 25 to 27, 2004 . The EDF said the LRA, supported by the Sudan government army, also attacked Jebel Guttni and Kor Englizi, overrunning and burning villages and #####ng property.
In July 2004, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni appointed his Military Assistant and UPDF's Chief Political Commissar, Brigadier Kale Kayihura, as Uganda 's special military liaison officer to the town of Juba in southern Sudan to coordinate with the Sudanese military an offensive against the Ugandan rebel forces. Referring to the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, the army spokesman, Major Shaban Bantariza, said,
We need close cooperation with the Arabs [ Khartoum government]. Like now, Kony is in Nisitu. What is he doing there? ... They [ Sudan ] are giving him food, medicine. He sleeps on Sudan government mattresses. His greatest problem now is feeding well. There should be smooth exchange of information and understanding with each other at close range without ambassadors and ministers flying to Khartoum .
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| 06-17-2005, 09:33 PM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Somalia
Somalia 's premier Islamist militia, AI AI, which was once backed by Sudan , has morphed into an Islamic Court based in Mogadishu with its own militia to enforce Sharia and spread its operations beyond Mogadishu to the cities of Merca and Kismayo in the south. In August 2000, a so-called Transitional National Government (TNG) was installed in Mogadishu , and offered AI AI through the Islamic Courts an opportunity to become institutionalized in the new government. The TNG was the product of a national reconciliation conference held in Arta , Djibouti that received significant international support including the UN Security Council and Secretary-General, the Arab League, the OAU, and the EU, and nearly all neighboring states. A coalition of factional leaders, known as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council, that is backed by neighboring Ethiopia has helped to keep the TNG and its Islamist ally, AI AI, from expanding their influence in Somalia . In 2000 and 2001, AI AI unsuccessfully intervened in a power struggle between factions in the autonomous administrative region of Puntland.
Somalia appears to be host of an Al Qaeda cell that helped organize the failed missile attack against an Israeli airline and the suicide bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa , Kenya . Kenyan authorities, working with their U.S. counterparts captured Al Qaeda operative Suleiman Abdalla Salim Hemed in Mogadishu in March 2003. Also known by the noms de guerre, "Ngaka" and "Chuck Norris," Abdalla, who ran several businesses in Mogadishu , was implicated in the 1998 bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2002 Mombasa bombings. He is in U.S. custody awaiting trial. The extent of Al Qaeda's continued involvement with AI AI is not known. The Bush administration had designated two leading AI AI commanders as Al Qaeda allies and ordered their assets frozen, and, according to one source, after September 11, 2001 , AI AI sent 300 fighters to assist Al Qaeda against U.S. forces in Afghanistan .
Kenya
The greatest Islamist presence in Kenya is to be found in its Somali-inhabited North Eastern Province where the AI AI has actively recruited members over a number of years and has sought to spread Islamic fundamentalism. AI AI appears to have linked up with the now banned Kenyan branch of the Al Qaeda-associated Saudi-based charity Al Haramain to create support among Kenya Somalis and Somali refugees in Kenya . Al Qaeda appears to regard Kenya as a ready target for its anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorism. The Kenyan government's increasingly effective anti-terrorism campaign has led to the capture and expulsion of a number of suspected Al Qaeda operatives. However, the country's Muslim leadership has expressed its considerable concern over what it perceives as strong-armed tactics used in the Muslim community by Kenyan anti-terrorism agents. These tactics have provoked considerable resentment, and may be contributing to a radicalization of Kenyan Muslim youth, many of whom find seductive Bin Laden's rhetoric of social justice.
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| 06-17-2005, 09:34 PM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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Somalia : The Islamist Threat to the Region
Overview
Beginning in the early 1990's Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AI AI) or Islamic Union emerged as the most militant Islamist group in Somalia . Other radical Islamic organizations existed in Somalia, but none of them came close to AI AI in its influence within Somalia and its impact on neighboring states, as it used military force, terrorist tactics, and ideological persuasion to achieve its aim of an all Somali Islamic state. AI AI received training and financial support from the Sudanese government and from Al Qaeda, especially during the period 1992-1996 when Sudan was playing host to Osama bin Laden. These external sources of support helped AI AI become a major military player in Somalia , where diverse factional militias vied for power after the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991. This external backing also encouraged AI AI to carry out attacks within Ethiopia that advanced Sudan 's objective of destabilizing Ethiopia and conformed to AI AI stated irredentist aims of bringing all regions inhabited by Somalis into a single Caliphate.
Both Al Qaeda and AI AI are believed to have played roles in the battle against American forces that led to downing of the Black Hawk helicopter in Mogadishu in 1993 and the death of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis. This incident and the subsequent parading of the bodies of American soldiers that was seen on international television created the public opinion context in which President Bill Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia . Osama bin Laden has claimed that this action was part of his organization's campaign against an American presence in the Horn of Africa region. It was also at this time that AI AI reportedly called for a Jihad against the United States , as part of its opposition to the U.S.-led intervention. The U.N. and the U.S. later implicated AI AI cadre in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998, and in September 2001 President George W. Bush declared AI AI an ally of Al Qaeda and ordered all of AI AI's assets frozen. AI AI fighters also killed a U.S. aid worker in Ras Kamboni in southern Somalia in 1999.
In the late 1990's, Ethiopian forces allied with local Somali militias routed AI AI fighters in Somalia . After this reversal of military fortunes, AI AI deviated from what appears to have been its primary Taliban-like practice of achieving power through territorial conquest and adopted an approached similar to that of the National Islamic Front in Sudan that emphasized penetrating existing political institutions to achieve its Islamist aims. AI AI then re-emerged within the capital Mogadishu as an "Islamic Court" enforcing Islamic law with its own paramilitary force and continues to seek influence in other areas of the country, including the self-administered territory of Puntland . Elements of AI AI-dominated Islamic Courts merged into the judicial, security and administrative apparatus of the Transitional National Government currently in place in Mogadishu .
AI AI remains a threat to regional stability. In the past, it has cooperated with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in undertaking operations in East Africa . AI AI has itself engaged in terrorist action inside Ethiopia ; it appears to be actively creating a base of support within the Somali communities of Kenya 's North Eastern Province ; its fighters are responsible for the unprovoked murder of a U.S. aid worker; and some of its fighters have engaged in maritime piracy. Since 9/11, AI AI and much of its leadership have reduced their visibility, but there is no reason to believe that they have ended their association with international terrorism. AI AI likely continues its relationship with Al Qaeda, as Al Qaeda continues to use Mogadishu as a base for operations in East Africa . Although not as potent a military force as it once was, due in large measure to decisive military and political interventions by Ethiopia , AI AI's espousal of the formation of a pan-Somali state means that it maintains intentions on territory inside Kenya , Ethiopia and Djibouti . Ascension by the organization and its members to power in Somalia holds the promise of aggressive actions against neighboring states. Factions within Somalia are on the cusp of achieving a plan for national political reconciliation and the establishment of a clan-based government of national unity. It is yet to be seen how the militant Islamists fare in their ongoing bid to achieve state power in this new context.
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| 06-17-2005, 09:36 PM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Emergence of Al Ittihad Al Islamiya
Somalia has a well-known history of an Islamic resistance to western occupation and influences: In 1899 Muhammed Abdilla Hassan (also know as the "Mad Mullah") raised an army of "dervishes" that sought to consolidate an Islamic state among Somalis and rid northern Somalia of British occupation. The resistance of his movement lasted until his death in 1921. His movement sought to organize Somalis across clan divisions and sought to impose a rigid Islam on a population practicing a generally moderate Sufi tradition of that faith. The combination of moral rectitude and aggressive tactics that characterized this earlier movement can be seen in the AI AI movement that emerged in Somalia in the 1980's.
The immediate ideological roots of AI AI may be found, however, in Islamic resistance to the socialist and secular government of General Mohamed Siad Barre. Post-independence Islamic militant groups first emerged in Somalia in the 1960's, and were inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the first modern Islamist organization that challenged secular rule in Egypt through Islamic revolutionary tactics. The Somali Islamist groups were brutally suppressed by former Somali strongman, Siad Barre, who came to power in a 1967 military coup. Siad Barre first allied himself with the Soviet Union , but then became a U.S. ally when the Soviet Union gained influence in Ethiopia . The anti-Siad Barre Islamic groups attempted to garner popular support for their opposition to the Barre regime through an appeal to Islamic identity and values - a faith-based political strategy which contrasted sharply with movements vying for political support on the basis of a secular Somali nationalism or clan identity and loyalty.
Later, in the early 1980's Islamic religious study groups consisting of young, professional men, many of whom had experience studying or worked abroad, merged to form AI AI. The two groups that merged to form AI AI were Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Association), which was based in the South and was led by Sheikh Mohamed Eissa, and Wahdat Al-Shabab Al-Islam (Unity of Islamic Youth) based in the North and led by Sheikh Ali-Warsame. The corruption and repression of the Siad Barre regime had motivated these groups to look for political alternatives to the status quo. Somali Wahabists who had fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as mujahadin in the 1980s helped shape AI AI's political, military and religious strategies. The ranks of AI AI's top leadership reportedly graduated from Islamic universities in Pakistan , Saudi Arabia and Kuwait .
The Afghanistan mujahadin connection appears to explain the genesis of AI AI's early association with Al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups. East Africa reportedly was the scene of a major recruitment drive for anti-Soviet fighters in Afghanistan . There is evidence indicating that that several hundred recruits from central Somalia were airlifted in the 1980's to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union as mujahidin. This trafficking in Somali "mercenaries" reportedly proved to be a lucrative trade, from which government ministers profited. According to Kenyan security sources, in the 1980s over 2,000 recruits for the mujahdin fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan came from the Mombasa area alone. They were recruited from the ranks of unemployed youth and in later years, demobilized former Somali government soldiers.
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| 06-17-2005, 09:39 PM |
Ibrahim Adlan
Ibrahim Adlan
Registered: 08-22-2004
Total Posts: 1200
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Re: HIGHLIGHTS OF NIF ROLE IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA (Re: Ibrahim Adlan)
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The Sudanese, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Connections
The U.S.-led United Nations operation in Somalia , which in 1992 first sought to provide humanitarian relief for millions of Somalis threatened by starvation and which later engaged in a nation-building exercise, coincided with the relocation from Afghanistan to Sudan of Osama Bin Laden and his burgeoning terrorist network. Both the radical NIF government in Khartoum and Bin Laden regarded the U.S. presence in Somalia as an attempt to dominate a Muslim state and a threat to their Islamic hegemonic ambitions in the region. Al Qaeda opposed the involvement of the United States armed forces in the Gulf War in 1991 and in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 and 1993, which were viewed by Al Qaeda as the beginning of preparations for an American occupation of Islamic countries. During the same period, Bin Laden and his strategists reportedly wanted to establish an Islamic state in Eritrea as a staging ground for carrying their Islamic revolution to Yemen and Ethiopia . Somalia likely constituted a southern beach head in this regional strategy. Both the Sudanese government and Bin Laden became allies in an effort to make the region a radical Islamic state and to oppose U.S. actions in the region. AI AI leaders reportedly met in 1992 with bin Laden in Khartoum where the two organizations consolidated their alliance. The next year, 1993, proved to be a key year in the efforts of both of them to oppose the U.S. presence in Somalia .
The authors of this study have found mounting evidence suggesting that significant numbers of mujahidin veterans of the Afghanistan war were actively supporting AI AI in its operations in the 1990's. These veterans, whether Somalis or so-called "Afghan Arabs," provided critical training to AI AI militia and fought alongside AI AI militiamen. Their involvement with AI AI may help explain the Taliban-like military tactics employed by AI AI. The National Islamic Front-type tactics previously described may be explained by the significant support provided by Sudan .
According to U.S. officials, bin Laden spent $3 million to recruit and airlift elite veterans of the Afghan jihad to Somalia via third countries, such as Yemen and Ethiopia . Al Qaeda also used its East Africa cell, based in Kenya and Tanzania , as a gateway to Somalia . Al Qaeda operatives in Kenya shuttled between Mogadishu and Khartoum using Nairobi as a hub of operation. In addition, two Al Qaeda front organizations based in Nairobi , the Islamic charities-Help Africa People and Mercy International-- provided support for AI AI humanitarian activities after 1994.
Al Qaeda's first strike against the U.S. military presence in Somalia is believed to have been the organization's first ever terrorist bombing. In 1992 Al Qaeda exploded a bomb at a hotel in Yemen used by American military personnel en route to humanitarian operations in Somalia . American military personnel were not in the hotel at the time, but a number of civilians were killed in the blast.
Al Qaeda planned additional actions against U.S forces, and a number of Al Qaeda operators were dispatched to Somalia to train AI AI and other forces in their battle against the U.S.-led force. Mohammed Saddiqi Odeh, a Palestinian born in Jordan , was among those dispatched to Somalia , and an Afghanistan-trained member of the team which would later bomb the US embassy in Tanzania , Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, traveled by fishing boat from Kenya to Somalia to give military training to AI AI. According to British government information, Mohamed Atef, the now-deceased Al-Qaeda operator who had been in charge of its training and organizing of military and terrorist operations, was also dispatched to Somalia in 1992 and 1993 to instigate actions against American and UN forces. The British account claims that Atef trained Somalis to fight UN forces and that Al Qaeda operatives participated in the October 1993 attack against U.S. helicopters that resulted in the ultimate departure of U.S. forces. Another Al Qaeda leader who trained Somali militia members was Abdullah Ahmed Abdulla. He was among 480 Arab combatants who joined bin Laden when he moved to Sudan in 1991. From Sudan , he moved to Somalia , and in 1998 he moved to Kenya , where he arranged and paid for the travel of the Al Qaeda operatives who planned the August 7, 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania .
In a 1997 interview with CNN, Bin Laden gloated that Al-Qaeda had trained and organized the Somali fighters who did the actual fighting against the U.S. forces.. Al-Qaeda members are suspected of teaching General Aidid's militia how to shoot down U.S. helicopters by altering the fuses of rocket-propelled grenades so that they exploded in mid-air. This tactic, developed by the Afghan mujahidin in their war against the Soviet Union , was the same one Al Qaeda forces used to bring down two U.S. helicopters near Gardez , Afghanistan , during Operation Anaconda in early March 2002.
AI AI's anti-American stance appears to have been planned in Khartoum . In February 1993 four Somali Islamist organizations, including AI AI, met there to discuss strategy for expanding fundamentalism in Somalia . This may explain the decision to move AI AI forces into Mogadishu at this time. A month later, a U.S. military spokesman in Mogadishu announced that U.S. troops had found a cache of arms at a compound belonging to AI AI, and about mid-year, AI AI launched an anti-Western and anti-U.S. propaganda effort, calling for Jihad against the United States .
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