مشار و بنت سوداء يتبحثا زيارة البشير الى جوبا و انتو لسه فى اليرموك!!!

Quote: مشار و بنت سوداء

كل سنة وأنت طيب ياخ

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Quote: الكيزان لا أخلاق لهم أبدا ومستعدين أن يبعيون حتى أبنائهم من أجل البقاء في السلطة.

Quote: مصادرى تقول ان الكيزان إتحيروا من الضغوط الغربية لحكومة الجنوب و التى وصلت الى حد التهديد المباشر لحكومة الجنوب إذا لم تقدم تنازلات التى فاقت توقعات الكيزان, بل الضغوط طالت تنازلات لحكومة الجنوب فى مسائل اتفقت عليها فى نيباشا اصلا. و يعتقد مصدر صديق كان شاهدا للمفاوضات بان الولايات المتحدة و بريطانيا و النرويج و من الخارج المصريون و القطريون و السعوديون "كانوا حائمين فى الدهاليز" باغت الوفد الجنوبى بالضغط عليه علنا فى وجود الوفد السودانى و هذا ما ادى الى إنسحاب الوفد الجنوبى لاكثر من مرة و العودة الى جوبا مرات عديدة لتشاور. الجنوب ارغم على قسمة كل شئ مع الشمال تقريبا, الى جانب اعادة انتشار قواته عشرة اميال من جنوب نهر كيير بعدما كانت 34 ميل شماله و هذا ما لم يحلم به الكيزان. و لكن فى المقابل, سيقوم النظام فى الخرطوم بطلآء مناخيره باللون الزهرى و يبتعد من مثلث الشيعى "نجاد, نصرالله, سوريا" و حماس و يتعاون مع الغرب و سيعفى الديون تدريجيا, اى بالبونس حسب السلوك للنظام. كذلك سيقوم النظام بتطهير اركانه من ما يسمى بالمتشددين سوا داخل الجيش او من خارجه و سيشهد الايام القادمة تطورات خطيرة. ضرب المصنع موجهه لإيران و للفلسطينين و لحزب الله و النظام كان ملم بالحكاية و لذا فرغوا المصنع من كل شئ تقريبا و علشان كدا الاعلام العربى شمى شئ فضرب النوم. الغرب وراء مصالحه و الكيزان يرون مصالحهم مع الغرب و عبر الجنوب. اعتقد ان هناك طبخة لإخراج البشير من الجناية الدولية.

(عدل بواسطة Mohamed Suleiman on 10-27-2012, 09:27 AM)

Quote: By Magdi El Gizouli October 30, 2012 — Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation (MIC), established according to its website in 1993, has as its motto the phrase ‘for peace we gather all our effort’. The phrase mocks the fact that the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) which grew out of the Egyptian-clad and British-disciplined Sudan Defence Force (SDF) has been consumed throughout its history in battling insurgencies within the country’s territories. Ghazi Suleiman, once a regime-critical human rights lawyer and today a loud enthusiast for President Bashir, did not mince words in spelling out the esprit de corps of the SAF officer class with reference to the envies and passions of his own social milieu, the educated effendis of the professions. An innocent-looking TV presenter asked Ghazi over Eid whether there was anything he regretted during his rather dramatic life of political zigzags. Ghazi, priding in his frankness, said he regretted the decision to enter the law faculty of Khartoum University instead of joining the army. Had I been an officer, he said, I would have surely managed to pull off a coup and realise my dream of becoming the country’s president, the uncontested Bringi (number one). Ghazi’s fantasy is shared by many an effendi, officers and civilians alike. In an address to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on 5 September this year Mubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi effectively invited his interlocutors to back a coup plot against President Bashir, justified as is the habit with the necessity to facilitate the leap to democracy. “The army could be the conduit for transition, as happened previously in Sudan, and recently in Egypt and Tunisia”, said Mubarak, another president hopeful whose political ambitions are perennially thwarted by the superior clout of his cousin and chairman of the National Umma Party Sadiq al-Mahdi. The perpetuation of Sudan’s civil wars stems in part from this investment in the power of guns to short-circuit political struggle. Combine Ghazi’s officers and Mubarak’s marketing strategy and you arrive at the elemental features of effendi political projects, shared by the rulers and their contenders: self-referential with little regard to the people to be ‘saved’, ‘liberated’, ‘delivered’…etcetera, and extraverted, whereby external anchor is sought to compensate for the deficiency in domestic legitimacy. With that in mind it might have been cheaper for Israel to solicit the cooperation of the security-military establishment in Khartoum rather than bomb the Yarmouk complex, in particular that a history of joint ventures is not lacking. Jaafar Nimayri, Sudan’s president between 1969 and 1985 and President Bashir’s role model, partnered with Israel without as much as a whimper in Operation Moses which involved the air-lift of Ethiopian Jews or Falashas to Israel via Sudan in 1984. In recent years Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) evolved into a trusted subcontractor of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the ‘war on terror’, delivering “important, functional and correct” information in the words of a State Department official in 2005. President Bashir’s government, handed over Carlos the Jackal to the French with a price-tag attached, offered to ship off Osama bin Laden to the Saudis and then to the Americans, and transferred al-Qaeda suspects to the mercy of the CIA with little discretion. Israel was apparently compelled by domestic political concerns and wider geo-political constraints of its anti-Iranian zeal to strike at Khartoum rather than bargain. In that sense, Israel and Iran were text-messaging in missiles over Sudan’s territories, and Khartoum but a screen. President Bashir, the proverbial naked king, picked up the Palestinian wrap to cover up his exposed ‘defences’ in a televised meeting of the Council of Ministers the day after. Israel, he said, targeted Sudan because of its position against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Nafie Ali Nafie, ran off with mantra. Sudan will not be deterred by Israel’s aggression from supporting the Palestinian cause, he told a function of the ruling National Congress Party. The claim is to say the least hypocritical. The commitment of the ruling elite in Sudan to the Palestinian liberation struggle is as sincere as Ghazi Suleiman’s human rights antics, convertible if priced. Short of allies to support its counter-insurgency campaigns President Bashir’s government picked up weapons wherever it could find them, Iran being one provider. The bill, it seems, included space for Teheran’s military to operate in, much like the readiness of the government to rent off thousands of acres of agricultural land in the country to any foreign investor able to flash some cash. Ali Mazrui developed the concept of ’multiple-marginality’ to define Sudan’s predicament, a notion that could well be employed to grasp its multiple-dependencies, and consequentially the promiscuous foreign policy of its effendi rulers. The author is a fellow of the Rift Valley Institute. He publishes regular opinion articles and analyses at his blog Still Sudan. He can be reached at [email protected]

Quote: Yarmouk, some 14 kilometres from central Khartoum, is in El Shejera (‘tree’, originally Gordon’s Tree) and a series of strategic installations is scattered across the area from the White Nile to the Blue Nile, mixed in with mainly down-market housing. The National Security and Intelligence Service (NISS) quickly cordoned off the area, refusing access even to police, who alone have the laboratory and other facilities needed to investigate the damage. NISS officials locally blamed the attack on the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, which only served to enhance the image of regime disarray, since the SPLA (North or South) has no airpower. Khartoum State Governor Abdel Rahman el Khidr then explained that the fire had spread because of ‘dry grass’, after which the Sudan Armed Forces Spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Sawarmi Khalid Saad, blamed a welder. The NCP Spokesman, Professor Badr el Din Ahmed Ibrahim, offered yet another version and it was hours before Culture and Information Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman blamed Israel. The NCP was probably awaiting confirmation of Israel’s role from ‘other security forces in the neighbourhood,’ an oppositionist said.